ANNIVERSARY ISSUE

FREE WORLD

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MESSAGES

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OCTOBER, 1942
40c PER ISSUE

FREE WORLD *reports to its* CHARTER SUBSCRIBERS

On September 24, 1941, the first issue of FREE WORLD appeared on the newsstands and was sent to a few hundred subscribers. On September 15 of this year, the subscribers numbered 9,352 and the newsstand sales averaged more than 4,500. This remarkable increase, which represents a record in the growth of a quality magazine, was achieved by our readers and contributors; it was not the result of advertising or canvassing or promotional pressure.

What FREE WORLD *has done in one year is only the beginning—the beginning of a historic effort to build all over the world large groups of readers who will never again submit to shortsighted policies of appeasement; the beginning of enlightenment concerning the fundamental principles of constructive democracy which will secure not only peace but freedom, economic well-being, and justice to all the peoples on earth.*

Every problem of the United Nations, every underground movement, every economic and political development, every military and propaganda effort of the enemy, every significant plan for the future—all have been or will be discussed in these pages.

That is why today the leaders of the fighting nations from the four corners of the earth have paid such high tribute to FREE WORLD. *That is why we have been able to establish our Spanish edition,* Munde Libre, *for Latin America and our Chinese edition,* Tzu Yu Shih Chieh, *for the Far East. That is why* FREE WORLD *is one of the most quoted magazines in existence—discussed by radio commentators, newspaper columnists, editorial writers, teachers, and clergymen, wherever men are able to express their opinions freely.*

In the months to come, FREE WORLD will add new and original features to the striking character of its pages which will deal with the vital problems of the present and the future.

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FREE WORLD

A Monthly Magazine

devoted to

Democracy and World Affairs

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ARCHIPELAGO

Today we think of islands. . . .

"Yellow sand-spots," the artist said.
"Sea that unbelievable parrot green . . .
and the goonies, the goody-birds, with their deafening
clack-gaggle clattering racket wide-wing-planing
always aloft or braking for a landing!"

Specks the islands in the enormous flow
and welter of the lavish elements. . . .

It's where the world ends
the place for jumping off
the Alexander Selkirk solitude . . .
wings of a dove . . . the sea-fowl in her nest . . .
Robinson Crusoe with his nanny-goat. . . .

And then the first apparent enemy hulls
rising beyond the sea line the vibration
loudening fading of planes . . . the far sea-battling
over the horizon by remote control. . . .

Crash of anti-aircraft whine of torpedo-planes
assault like Midway with their carriers swinging
to dodge the babies from our bomb-bay doors
Waterspouts like whales blowing shot-silk
of sky and sea ripped by the flash and crash
and sound and flame . . .

Aloof the islands lie . . .
Wake that the indomitable four hundred
leathernecks held and held for fourteen days. . . .
Midway the Marshalls spawn-swarm of Micronesia . . .
the Marianas that Magellan found . . .
Our Mindanao Davao musical names . . .
Luzon that held Bataan Corregidor
names more than musketry and cannonade . . .
the spread of equatorial Melanesia
down to Australia and the Coral Sea. . . .

God made big islands too He made Australia . . .

and the Carolines in never-ending June. . . .

But now it is beach-heads held or beach-heads taken.
Fleets now of monster birds with metal wings
and doom-filled bellies and all that endless ocean
studded with island ambush. . . .
Over the surf
of the coral reef the goonies bank and veer
and crawk and cry or shake their mating dance
awkwardly silhouetted against a sun
that rose in red once and that sets in blood
slowly slowly under the long sea line. . . .

Today
far islands that are very near.

WILLIAM ROSE BENÉT

EDITORIAL

ON the first anniversary of our publication, we bow our heads before the victims of fascism of all countries, of all races, and of all creeds. We respectfully salute the memory of the soldiers of the United Nations who have given their lives for the defense and the consecration of the ideals of freedom and justice. We recall particularly the heroic soldiers of China, who through the long years of their unaided struggle against Japan stood firmly at the crumbling walls of their cities. We think of the millions of tenacious Russians defending every inch of soil against the powerful nazi machine. We honor the free fighters—Czechs, Frenchmen, Greeks, Norwegians, Poles, Yugoslavs, and others—who fled from their enslaved countries to take up arms against the ruthless enemy that is terrorizing their loved ones at home. We hail the aviators, soldiers, and sailors of Great Britain and the United States, who are carrying on relentless battle in all parts of the globe.

And we bow reverently before the men and women undergoing the nazi campaign of terror in the occupied regions, the daring forces of the underground which have overcome despair and now fight on with a courage unsurpassed in all history. In this one year, the European continent has been the scene of sacrifices more terrible, more heroic, and more noble than those made in all previous centuries. Innumerable Jews and Czechs and Serbs and Greeks and Frenchmen and Spaniards have been forced into slavery—yet their souls remain free.

To these fighters and these victims we have a solemn obligation. To them we owe an effective unity among the nations fighting for freedom. To them we owe the reconsideration of all previous values, the rejection of nationalistic egoism, and the resumption of our march on the road to a free world. We owe them the fullest immediate mobilization of our forces, the daily launching of new efforts, the constant opening of new fronts on every field. Only thus can we redeem their sacrifices and fulfill our duty to them, to the men and women who have been spared the horrors of fascism, and to generations yet unborn.

One year ago, we said that this magazine would be more than an editorial event, that its appearance would be a political act. It has proved to be even more than that. It is an act of war against the enemies of humanity, an act of war against the prejudices which had led to this World War; an act of war against the national egoism which has destroyed international security. We have fought this battle without interruption. Through the

magazine, as well as by radio and every other means possible, the Free World Association has spread the ideas of a free world to enemy and occupied countries. In Latin America, our magazine and our movement have aided all the friends of democracy who with indomitable courage labored to bring about the collaboration of their countries with the United Nations in the great common struggle against tyranny. In the Far East, the words "free world" have become the slogan of tens of thousands of men and women.

One year ago, we said that we would speak the truth, neither suppressing facts nor yielding to pressure—and we have spoken the truth. Whenever the United States or Great Britain or Russia was unjustly attacked, we wrote the truth in their defense; whenever one of the Allied countries or governments erred in respect to the aims and intentions of the United Nations, in respect to the ideals of world freedom and democracy, we did not hesitate to point out the errors and to enter the lists against them.

As FREE WORLD begins the second year of its existence, the Editors can restate their position simply and clearly. The vow we made last year to dedicate our energies and efforts in the interests of a free, democratic, and peaceful world still holds—and it will hold forever. Most of us made this vow long ago, long before this war came. We had begun the fight against fascism when it first appeared on the world horizon. We recognized that the political war of nazi-fascism was declared long before September, 1939, and we realize that it will continue long after the defeat of the Axis. We are convinced that we have to crush and destroy not only the power and evil of Hitler's German armies, but those fascist concepts which have been propagated during the last twenty years under different slogans—once against the yellow race, later against Russia, then against the Jews, and now against the Anglo-Americans. We have to eliminate the causes of fascism—the concentration of political power and uncontrolled concentration of world resources in a few hands. We have to replace nationalism—a great constructive factor during the nineteenth century, but now virulent in its twentieth-century form—with a new kind of nationalism expressed in cultural autonomy, in peaceful and fraternal competition between nations, in arts, in science, in literature, a nationalism which will be integrated in a larger internationalism, which will establish a democratic economy, which will accept the rule of international law against every opportunistic government that may seek to foment new wars by inculcating hatred and stimulating the spirit of aggression.

Democratic peoples hate war and the misery and suffering which are its accompaniment. We do not want war. If we fight this war with all our strength and with the firmest determination to win it completely, whatever the cost, it is because the war was forced upon us, because life itself is worthless and forfeit in the case of an Axis victory. But we are equally determined to avoid war and tyranny in the future. We want to prepare for the generations to come a new world, a world which will secure economic justice and decent standards of living, a world from which prejudices will have disappeared, a world in which mankind will be happy to live.

We founded this magazine and the Free World Association with no other guarantee of success than our profound belief in the masses of humanity in all countries. Thousands of men and women in the United States and all over the world have helped us in performing our task during this first year. They will help us in the years to come. When FREE WORLD reached some of the occupied countries of Europe, men, who jeopardized their lives by doing so, wrote us their heartiest approval, thanked us for the hope we were giving them, and urged us to carry on. In Latin America, our fellow workers have followed our lead in establishing a splendid Spanish edition. In Hong Kong, our Chinese collaborators had begun to print an edition a few weeks before the Japanese captured the city. The occupation of Hong Kong could not destroy this version of FREE WORLD. Our Chinese magazine is carrying on; our ideas are reaching the fighting armies, the workers in the factories, the peasants in the villages, even the guerrilla warriors of China. Within the last few weeks, some of our friends in Canada have taken the preliminary steps to publish a French edition there, where prejudice is still strong, where the foe is still spreading his poison through secret channels.

Our ambition is to create a score or more editions of FREE WORLD, to prepare for the time when the way will be opened by victory for every country to receive the message which FREE WORLD has to deliver to people of good will. For we must carry into the last little village, and repeat day after day, the gospel of freedom and of universal brotherhood; we must continue the fight against the lies with which fascist propaganda has filled the minds of the masses of men, lies about the Chinese or the Anglo-Saxons or the Russians. Wherever and whenever the fomenters of nationalistic hatred or advocates of reactionary policies undertake to destroy that dearly-won freedom, the partisans of FREE WORLD will take up arms against them. We shall preach our message until every free citizen has become a soldier, a servant, and a teacher of the democratic way of life, for then no fascist tyranny, no militaristic or reactionary forces will threaten the peaceful development of mankind. We shall encounter many obstacles; sometimes they will seem to be insurmountable. But we shall never forget our vow to freedom.

We shall carry on.

MESSAGES→

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 27, 1942.

Dear Mr. Dolivet:

All good wishes to you on the first anniversary of the publication of your magazine.

Very sincerely yours,

Franklin D. Roosevelt

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

Washington

ON the occasion of the first anniversary of the FREE WORLD, I wish to express to you my appreciation of the splendid work which you have done for democratic victory and world organization. The phrase, "free world," is making the hearts of increasing thousands of people beat faster. You are helping in your way to give a spiritual meaning to the war, without which the Free Nations cannot win.

Henry A. Wallace

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
CHUNGKING

Promote justice.
CHIANG KAI-SHEK



THE BRITISH EMBASSY, WASHINGTON

I SEND YOU MY CORDIAL GOOD WISHES ON THE OCCASION OF THE PUBLICATION OF THE ANNIVERSARY ISSUE OF *FREE WORLD.*

HALIFAX

PRESIDENTIAL PALACE, MONTEVIDEO, URUGUAY

FREE WORLD IS SOMETHING MORE THAN THE FELICITOUS TITLE OF AN EXCELLENT MAGAZINE. IT IS THE SLOGAN OF ALL THAT AMERICA WANTS, EXPECTS, AND IS READY TO OBTAIN AT ANY COST, SAVING ITS DESTINY AND THE FUTURE OF MANY GENERATIONS OF MEN FROM THE DARK AND ENGULFING WHIRLPOOL OF THE IDEOLOGICAL AND PHYSICAL SLAVERY OF TOTALITARIANISM. NOTHING EXCEPT SUCH NOBLE AIMS AND CAUSES HAS BEEN ABLE TO MOBILIZE SIMULTANEOUSLY THE IMMENSE MORAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC RESOURCES OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE. IN THE FACE OF THE PARTICULAR RISK AND DANGER WHICH THREATEN OUR CIVILIZATION AND THE NATIONS THAT HAVE CREATED IT, AMERICA HAS SUDDENLY FOUND ITSELF, HAS RECOGNIZED ITS HISTORICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL UNITY, BUT HAS ALSO REALIZED ITS MISSION AND ITS STRUGGLE. IN THE MARCH OF TIME, EACH SECTION OF HUMANITY, EACH PEOPLE, RACE, AND CONTINENT, HAS ITS HOUR, AND THIS IS THE MOMENT OF AMERICA, AS WE ALL BEGIN TO SEE CLEARLY NOW.

"A FREE AMERICA IN AN EQUALLY FREE WORLD." HERE IS A SPLENDID REWARD THAT WE MAY GAIN BY THE SACRIFICE THAT CONSTITUTES OUR PRIVILEGE, WHILE WE ARE FULFILLING THE MOST ELEMENTAL, THE GREATEST, AND THE MOST BEAUTIFUL OF ALL THE DUTIES OF MANKIND: THE PRESERVATION OF OUR LIFE AND OF THE DIGNITY OF EXISTENCE.

ALFREDO BALDOMIR

COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM
NEW YORK

MAY I extend my congratulations on the first anniversary of FREE WORLD magazine. I wish you during the second year even more success than you had in the last twelve months.

FREE WORLD magazine, it seems to me, has surpassed even the fondest hopes of those who wished it well a year ago. It is not only one of the most important periodicals to be had in this country but is probably the only magazine in the world which through its Spanish and Chinese editions has achieved a world-wide reputation.

My birthday wish for you is that you will continue your excellent work against fascism and your vital activities toward laying the foundation of a new free world after the Axis is liquidated.

WILLIAM L. SHIRER

OFFICE OF THE LORD PRIVY SEAL
LONDON

GREETINGS TO THE *FREE WORLD.* CONGRATULATIONS ON THE PUBLICATION OF YOUR ANNIVERSARY NUMBER, AND GOOD WISHES FOR THE CONTINUED SUCCESS OF YOUR EFFORTS TO CREATE A VIVID SENSE OF THE NEED FOR A NEW WORLD OUTLOOK.

WE ARE NOW APPROACHING THE MOST CRITICAL PHASE OF THE WAR. DURING THE NEXT FEW MONTHS, THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS WILL DECIDE THE DESTINY OF THE WORLD. WHETHER WE ARE TO BE A FREE WORLD OR A SLAVE WORLD DEPENDS ON THE SUCCESS WITH WHICH WE WORK AND FIGHT, NOT AS FORTUITOUSLY ASSOCIATED NATIONS WITH SEPARATE ENDS IN VIEW, BUT AS A CLOSELY KNIT GROUP OF PEOPLES WITH A WELL-UNDERSTOOD COMMON PURPOSE.

THE IMMEDIATE TASK IS TO FREE THE OCCUPIED LANDS OF EUROPE AND ASIA FROM THE GRIP OF THE RUTHLESS INVADER. THE SECOND TASK IS TO ROOT OUT THE MALIGNANT SOURCES OF MILITARISM AND CRUELTY AND DESTROY THEM FOREVER. THE THIRD, AND PERHAPS THE MOST DIFFICULT TASK, IS TO REPAIR THE RAVAGES OF WAR AND CREATE A NEW WORLD ORDER ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTIONS WHICH PRACTICAL NECESSITY IS NOW CALLING INTO BEING.

THE NEW WORLD ORDER, IF IT IS TO ENDURE, MUST BE PROOF AGAINST CYNICISM. IT MUST BE BUILT BY MEN OF IMAGINATION WHO ARE NOT LACKING IN COMMON SENSE.

THE GOAL IS CLEAR. WE WORK FOR A WORLD IN WHICH ALL MEN OF ALL PEOPLES—WHATEVER THEIR RACE OR COLOR—SHALL HAVE AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY OF REALIZING THE BEST IN THEMSELVES. TO THE MAKING OF THAT WORLD MUST BE DEVOTED ALL THE PATIENT SKILL AND CRAFTSMANSHIP, ALL THE INVENTIVENESS AND MOTHER WIT, AS WELL AS ALL THE IMAGINATIVE PLANNING, OF WHICH THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS ARE CAPABLE.

STAFFORD CRIPPS

PACIFIC PALISADES
CALIFORNIA

ON the first of October the FREE WORLD magazine will celebrate its first anniversary. That is a welcome opportunity for us readers to express our congratulations and our gratitude to its creators and editors.

Allow me to tell you that no issue of your magazine has appeared which I have not read with greatest attention, greatest pleasure, and greatest benefit. Thousands of readers of the English edition, and also of the Spanish and Chinese editions will also have found stimulation, encouragement, and spiritual pleasure in the pages of FREE WORLD. I hear with gratification that a French edition will soon be printed in Canada.

May FREE WORLD live long, and last far into the free world for which we all hope and which your paper, as hardly any other, helps to bring about.

THOMAS MANN

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, BOGOTA, COLOMBIA

PRESSING OCCUPATIONS HAVE PREVENTED ME WRITING YOU. SEND YOU CORDIAL SINCERE CONGRATULATIONS. MAGNIFCENT WORK ACCOMPLISHED IN YEAR OF FRUITFUL LABOR IN DEFENSE OF PRINCIPLES OF LIBERTY, HUMANITY, AND DEMOCRACY. HEARTIEST SALUTATIONS.

GERMAN ARCINIEGAS

NEW YORK

THE great force of FREE WORLD is the sincerity of its work for the cause so well expressed in its own name. FREE WORLD is not a magazine devoted exclusively to the cause of freedom in one country, but in all countries. FREE WORLD is a magazine which values the people more than the governments. It is indeed a voice for actual freedom on earth. It is indeed a flag. I am extremely glad to salute it on this day.

OCTAVIO MANGABEIRA
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil

EMBASSY OF THE U.S.S.R., WASHINGTON

THE ATTACK ON THE VARIOUS COUNTRIES MARKED BY HITLER AND HIS ACCOMPLICES AS VICTIMS OF THEIR FUTURE AGGRESSION BEGAN FROM WITHIN THESE COUNTRIES LONG BEFORE THEIR MILITARY ASSAULT FROM WITHOUT. WE KNOW NOW TO WHAT EXTENT THE MINDS OF MANY PEOPLE IN THOSE COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN SOILED AND POLLUTED BY NAZI-FASCIST PROPAGANDA AND THROUGH WHAT MULTIFARIOUS AGENCIES AND AGENTS. THERE IS NO MORE HONORABLE AND IMPERATIVE JOURNALISTIC TASK THAN TO COMBAT AND DESTROY THE EFFECTS OF THIS POISONOUS PROPAGANDA AND TO PREPARE THE MINDS OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR SUCH A SOLUTION OF THE MANY POST-WAR PROBLEMS THAT WILL MAKE FOR THE CREATION OF A SOLID FUNDAMENT OF UNIVERSAL PEACE AND OF A REALLY FREE WORLD. I KNOW OF NO OTHER PUBLICATION MAKING SUCH VIGOROUS AND SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS IN THAT DIRECTION AS YOUR *FREE WORLD*. I HEARTILY CONGRATULATE YOU, THEREFORE, ON YOUR ANNIVERSARY AND SEND YOU MY BEST WISHES FOR THE CONTINUATION OF YOUR USEFUL WORK.

MAXIM LITVINOV

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

MAY I send you my best wishes for this first anniversary of the publication of the FREE WORLD magazine.

SUMNER WELLES

DELEGATION OF FIGHTING FRANCE
TO THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON

ON the occasion of the first anniversary of your remarkable magazine, FREE WORLD, I wish to address to you my warm congratulations.

Fighting France struggles not only for the independence of France, but for a free world which will know neither aggression nor tyranny. The fundamental principles of the United Nations which you have discussed so brilliantly in your magazine correspond to the great common ideal of the free peoples.

Bon courage!

ADRIEN PIERRE TIXIER
Chief of the Delegation

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER
CANADA

THE foremost need of the world today is the mobilization, against the forces of tyranny, of the arms, the minds, and the hearts of all free men and nations, and of all men and nations who hope to be free. FREE WORLD is greatly aiding in this mighty task. This new exponent of man's courage, intelligence, and faith is making clear to the peoples of the strong and powerful democratic states that enduring freedom is something which is one and indivisible.

I am pleased to avail myself of this anniversary to extend to FREE WORLD, and to the Free World Association very hearty congratulations on their achievements of the past year, and my best of wishes for the future.

W. L. MACKENZIE KING

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

THIS is the first anniversary of the FREE WORLD magazine.

Ideas carry farther than bullets, travel faster than airplanes. The free nations are so constituted that they can draw on ideas from all sources. As a forum in which some of these ideas have been and will continue to be expressed, FREE WORLD renders a service to the United Nations in the maintenance of their war against Axis tyranny, and in their plans to build a world free from all tyranny.

ADOLF A. BERLE, JR.
Assistant Secretary

SCRIPPS-HOWARD NEWSPAPER ALLIANCE
WASHINGTON

CONGRATULATIONS upon your first year of constructive work. The need for what the FREE WORLD magazine is doing has just begun. Its constructive voice will be needed more and more as the war continues. And as time goes on, I hope your voice will continue to grow in strength and volume because it is only through such leadership as you are giving that we will be able to garner the true fruits of victory. With best wishes.

RAYMOND CLAPPER

CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC
CHANCELLERY OF THE PRESIDENT
LONDON

WE MUST AND DO SINCERELY WELCOME ALL CONCERTED AND CONSTANT JOURNALISTIC EFFORTS TODAY SEEKING TO UNCOVER THE ROOTS OF THE GREATEST REVOLUTION OF ALL TIMES, WHICH IS THE PRESENT WAR, TO STUDY ITS CAUSES, TO KEEP THE PUBLIC WELL INFORMED ON ALL PHASES OF THE GIGANTIC STRUGGLE, TO CLEAR UP THE PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH PREPARATIONS FOR THE FUTURE WORLD AND FOR PEACE. THE MANNER IN WHICH *FREE WORLD* IN ITS FIRST YEAR TACKLED THIS DIFFICULT AND IMPORTANT TASK DESERVES THE RESPECT OF ALL WHO ARE WORKING IN THE SAME FIELD, I.E., FOR THE DEFEAT OF THE DARKEST BARBARISM AND MOST BRUTAL TYRANNY THAT EVER EXISTED. THE FACT THAT THE *FREE WORLD* MAGAZINE IS BEING PUBLISHED ALSO IN THE SPANISH AND CHINESE LANGUAGES IN ITSELF CONTRIBUTES TO ITS ACCOMPLISHMENTS. I, THEREFORE, SINCERELY CONGRATULATE *FREE WORLD* ON ITS WONDERFUL WORK.

THE FUTURE TASKS OF YOUR MAGAZINE ARE NEITHER SMALL NOR EASY. PUBLIC OPINION IN THE WHOLE WORLD CONSTANTLY NEEDS, AND WILL NEED EVEN MORE WITH THE PROGRESS OF THIS WAR TO FINAL VICTORY, RELIABLE INFORMATION AND POLITICAL ADVICE. IF *FREE WORLD* WILL BE ABLE TO CONTINUE WITH THE SAME SKILL AND DETERMINATION ON THE JOURNEY IT HAS SUCCESSFULLY BEGUN, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT IT WILL CONTRIBUTE SUBSTANTIALLY TO THE MORAL AND POLITICAL ENDEAVORS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND TO THE FULFILLMENT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK MOTTO, WITH WHICH WE BEGAN OUR STRUGGLE IN 1939: *SVOBODNA CESKOSLOVENSKO VE SVOBODNE EVROPE AV SVOBODNEM SVETE* (A FREE CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN A FREE EUROPE AND A FREE WORLD).

EDUARD BENES

LONDON

WARMEST CONGRATULATIONS ON FIRST ANNIVERSARY.
NOTHING IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR WORLD PEACE THAN CONTINUED UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN AMERICA AND BRITAIN TO WHICH *FREE WORLD* HAS SO EXCELLENTLY CONTRIBUTED.
ALL GOOD WISHES.

CECIL

HOTEL AMBASSADOR
NEW YORK

ON the occasion of the first anniversary of FREE WORLD, I wish to congratulate you on the assiduous effort of the workers and collaborators who have achieved singular success in such a brief period of time.

Now that freedom is the goal of the United Nations, it is an indisputable fact that only complete faith in this principle and its full application will create the necessary strength with which to win a quick victory and a lasting peace. FREE WORLD has made its valuable contribution in bringing about the recognition of that fact by all the peace-loving peoples and nations alike.

I am convinced that as days go by, its effort will be crowned with even greater success, which is the success of all of us.

WEI TAO-MING
Ambassador of China

EMBAJADA DEL ECUADOR
WASHINGTON

IT is with gratification that I have learned of the approaching first anniversary of FREE WORLD magazine. I have followed with much interest the publication of this enlightening magazine and I have been able to appreciate its invaluable cultural and ideological contribution toward the great task of consolidating the democratic doctrines in the collective feeling of America.

It gives me great pleasure to extend my heartiest congratulations to the promoters of so intelligent and timely an undertaking, expressing at the same time my sincere hope that the reading public will continue to benefit for long years to come from FREE WORLD.

C. E. ALFARO
Ambassador of Ecuador

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
NEW YORK

FREE WORLD has been an act of faith, and its success is not only a justification of the cause for which it stands, but of the courage and foresight of its supporters.

JAMES T. SHOTWELL
Director

CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, WASHINGTON

GREETINGS TO THE READERS OF *FREE WORLD* MAGAZINE ON THE OCCASION OF YOUR FIRST ANNIVERSARY. LABOR FEELS THAT IT HAS MOST AT STAKE IN THIS WAR OF THE FREEDOM-LOVING PEOPLES AGAINST THE DARK FORCES OF ENSLAVEMENT REPRESENTED BY THE HITLER AXIS. WE WELCOME ALL EFFORTS TO BRING TO THE PEOPLES ENGAGED IN THIS GREAT STRUGGLE A CLEAR REALIZATION OF THE VITAL ISSUES WHICH ARE AT STAKE FOR OUR WORLD CIVILIZATION.

PHILIP MURRAY, President

UNIVERSITY OF CAUCA
COLOMBIA

I GREET with sincere admiration and pleasure FREE WORLD magazine on the first anniversary of its establishment, and I congratulate the founders of such a distinguished and civilizing enterprise for the work that it has already accomplished during the first cycle of its existence. FREE WORLD represents today in America the greatest and best directed effort of enlightenment in attaining the union of the people of the Continent to counteract the destructive tendencies of men and ideas opposed to the civilization which these nations received from Europe and which they have maintained, modifying it in the sense of granting more liberty within the boundaries of law.

B. SANIN CANO
Rector

PITTSBURGH, PA.

YOUR magazine has undertaken the important job not only of proclaiming the principles of freedom, but also of studying seriously the different aspects of a truly democratic national and international organization of humanity.

In striving for a free world where the rights of all men will be properly recognized, we must constantly keep in mind that liberty cannot be allowed to mean license and that any actions of an individual which adversely affect the welfare of society must be controlled to preserve essential freedoms for all mankind.

FREDERICK C. McKEE
Chairman, Citizens for Victory

NEW YORK

IRRESOLUTE and dispersed before an enemy that prepared to fight with an inflexible determination and an absolute unity of purpose, the democratic forces of the world came at last to unite as the war spread to all continents. Now it is their duty to strengthen this union to meet the task of reconstruction after victory. The FREE WORLD magazine has been an efficient factor of democratic solidarity, and devotes itself from now on to the great cause of the future—the cause of freedom for every people in the world. Its anniversary, therefore, must be heartily greeted by all democrats in every country.

ARMANDO DE SALLES OLIVEIRA
Former Governor of the State of S. Paulo, Brazil.

POLISH INFORMATION CENTER, NEW YORK

ON THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF PUBLICATION OF THE *FREE WORLD* MAGAZINE I CONGRATULATE YOU WITH HEARTFELT CORDIALITY UPON YOUR OUTSTANDING ACHIEVEMENTS IN INTERPRETING TO THE DEMOCRACIES OF THE WORLD A UNITED IDEALISM OF BOTH THE FREE AND THE OPPRESSED NATIONS STRUGGLING TOWARD A UNIVERSAL SOLIDARITY IN SUFFERING AND IN THE REAPING OF PEACE.

YOUR MAGAZINE SPEAKS THE MIND OF THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THUS IT IS FREE TO PROBE COMPLEX ISSUES—DISCUSS OPENLY HEDGED SITUATIONS—BARE PRESSURES DISTORTING TRUE FACTS. IF IT CONTINUES SO TO ACT, IT WILL REPRESENT A POTENT INFLUENCE WHEN, MIDST THE ASHES AND SKELETONS OF OUR HOMES, YOUNG LIFE WILL SURGE ANEW.

STEPHEN DE ROPP, Director

EASTON, PA.

MY heartiest congratulations on your first year! Not alone has FREE WORLD been a distinguished editorial achievement—in its searching, clear-cut, exclusive reporting of events; in its thoughtful and forthright interpretation; and in the quantity as well as the quality of outstanding material you have presented. As notable as the excellence of FREE WORLD itself is the acclaim and enthusiasm which you have won in so short a time.

HUGH MOORE
President, Dixie-Vortex Company

THE CORK HAS POPPED

by

Walter Millis

ONE year ago, when FREE WORLD first took up its high and formidable task, the United States had reached a peculiar and painful stage in the development of its policy toward the great crisis of our age. Looking back at it now, the scene recalls a remark of Sir Cecil Spring Rice, the nervous and sensitive British Ambassador in Washington at the time of the American entry into the first World War. "The situation," as he jotted hurriedly into one of his letters in late February, 1917, is "much that of a soda-water bottle with the wires cut but the cork unexploded." On a much broader scale, so matters stood in September, 1941. The wires had been cut. All the important decisions had been taken; the basic elements of American policy had been established, it seemed clear, beyond the possibility of reversal. Even among the isolationists few questioned that the United States had a vital interest in the defeat of the Axis Powers. Neutrality had been abandoned, save as the thinnest of legal fictions. We had declared economic war on Germany with the enactment of lend-lease in March, and on Japan with the "freezing" order, amounting to a total embargo, in July. There were the beginnings of military war in the North Atlantic; while in August, with the Atlantic Charter, the President had not only formally signalized what amounted to an alliance with Great Britain for the waging of the conflict, but had asserted a belligerent's right to influence the peace and had even laid the foundations of an American peace program.

The wires had been cut, but the cork was unexploded. The debate was over; but the talk went on. It seemed obvious that the United States could never go back; but neither, amid the vociferous obstructions of the isolationists, the defeatists, the appeasers, and the pro-Hitlerites, did we seem capable of going forward. By the late summer of 1941, the only remaining issue seemed to be whether the United States would find the realism, the energy, and the determination to act, before it should be too late, upon the course to which it was already irrevocably committed. Yet there appeared to be no way of bringing the issue to a focus.

The situation raised, in particular, two great and anxious questions—military and political. We had staked our national future on the defeat of the Axis; but the Axis was winning the war, and it seemed doubtful whether the American people would awake in time to the enormity of the military problem—no longer capable of solution by the anaesthetic formulas of "hemispheric defense," "aid short of war," and so on—or make the grim sacrifices of life, wealth, and comfortable habit which would be necessary if our potential strength was to be brought to bear on it. And even if we did make good the military victory, it seemed doubtful whether we were in any way equipped to deal with the inordinately difficult problems it would bring. Passing, as we were, through one of the great revolutionary epochs of world history, had we really either understood or accepted its implications? Would a new peace be wrecked, like the previous one, on an inability to face the immense social, economic, and political readjustments which it would necessitate, if that tolerable world for which the peoples were fighting was ever to be realized?

In September of 1941, these were the only questions which really mattered any longer; and they were also the questions which nearly everyone was evading. The wires were cut, but the cork remained in the bottle, stoppering the national energies and only generating an

unhappy sense of frustration, anxiety, and growing domestic irritation. In a time of more acute national peril than we had known for generations, the House of Representatives had come within one vote of discharging our new draft army. The U.S.S. "Kearney" was nearly blown in two; in October the U.S.S. "Reuben James" was torpedoed and sunk. Nothing happened. Already straining our economy to produce lend-lease supplies, we continued to consign them to "the bottom of the Atlantic"; admitting that our national existence was at stake, we continued to defend it with the proviso that the Russians and British should do all the fighting. Only in retrospect does one realize just how anomalous, and dangerous, a situation it was. But then, in December, General Tojo and his militarists intervened. The bombs on Pearl Harbor not only drew the cork; they shattered it into a myriad fragments, and in those first, startled moments it seemed that both questions had found their irrefutable answer.

Within a space of hours, Japan, Germany, and Italy had declared war upon the United States. That in itself was a shockingly novel experience; in all our previous wars it had been the United States which had taken the initiative, and we had been arguing so long over whether we should go into the war that some even now cannot quite grasp the fact that this time it was war which had come to us. But it had. In an instant we had been involved to the hilt in a struggle for which either world power or downfall was the only possible outcome. Every resource of the American people was pledged to its prosecution; and it was a total struggle in which there could be no further question of "limited liability" warfare. What had been merely obstruction before had become treason overnight. The normal recalcitrances of peacetime life, the little defenses of narrow privileges and prerogatives, had lost their meaning and must certainly be swept away by the imperatives of the conflict.

In a military sense we were now fully committed. Nor was it difficult to foresee, in view of the enormity of the task which the "two-front" war with both Germany and Japan imposed upon us, that to achieve a victory we would be compelled to far-reaching revisions of our social, economic, and political ideas. We had seen the process at work in Britain; we certainly would not escape it here. We would be forced to face many of those latent problems of national and international organization which, left unanswered, had been at the bottom of the failure of 1918. The winning of the war would go far toward preparing us to deal with the peace, while an intelligent and dynamic concept of the peace for which we are fighting would become a more and more necessary weapon for the winning of the war. Mingled with the shock of the Pearl Harbor defeat, there was a genuine exhilaration. Our energies were at last released; our immense potential power would be fully mobilized and applied to some purpose in this world; the two great questions of the fall had been answered and anything seemed possible.

II

SO it seemed. Today, one is not so sure. The history of the past nine months can be regarded as primarily a history of the way in which these two questions have in fact been addressed. And it must be admitted that they are questions still. Whether the United States has risen to a full grasp of its military problem, whether it has laid sure foundations for the political and economic solutions which both war and reconstruction will inevitably demand, are at least matters for doubt. Certainly, to go back is even more totally impossible now than it was last fall. But are we going forward fast enough?

In the military field, the past nine months have been months of immense effort, but of many disillusions as well. Pearl Harbor turned out to be not only a defeat but a paralyzing military disaster, flowing from an unexpected inertia and incompetence in the command. Something, at least, of the same sort appeared in the Philippines. In spite of the danger, reinforcements had only belatedly been rushed to the scene; the air power which got there found no preparations made to protect it against modern war and most of it was destroyed in the first hour. Perhaps it would have been impossible in any event to have prevented the Japanese from overrunning the southwest Pacific; but it has become painfully evident that lack of plan, lack of forethought, lack of intelligent prior co-operation between the ABCD Powers, and a fair amount of plain military stupidity contributed greatly to the speed of an advance which will now cost us an immense toll in life and effort to undo.

Since May, 1940, the country had been ap-

propriating billions for armaments; but when the crisis came it was to find us less prepared, materially and psychologically, than most had assumed. The navy was almost completely unready for the submarine attack along the Atlantic coast, and there ensued a disastrous slaughter of shipping which is only now being brought under control. Some of the most important of the airplane types which we were putting into mass production were of seriously antiquated design. There were grave defects in our industrial mobilization and weaknesses, only slowly eliminated, in the staff organization set up to direct it. The proper balancing of orders and production, the allocation and conservation of raw materials, the utilization of small industry, the public salvage programs were dealt with only tardily, if at all, and as a result our material contribution to the war has been somewhat disappointing. The two imperative military problems of man-power utilization and inflation control have been tangled in petty politics, with a frivolous disregard of the terrible urgency of the times.

There have also been magnificent achievements, while many of these practical difficulties and failures were no doubt more or less inevitable. What is disturbing is not so much the failures that have been revealed, but the tendency to gloss them over with emotion, dramatics, and patriotic pride, rather than to admit them and root them out with all the sternness which a total war demands. The truth is that American prestige has not been increased by the contribution we have so far made to the common war. There is no doubt that the contribution will grow and can ultimately be made overwhelming; but in the meanwhile, the failure of the public, and even more, of the responsible authorities to recognize the realities argues that even now there is a dangerous inability to understand the deadly size and seriousness of the task on which we are embarked. There is a question as to whether the national intelligence and realism are yet adequate for the winning of this desperate struggle.

III

ONE must still ask a similar question in regard to what has here been called (for want of a more inclusive word) the "political" field. The past year has witnessed some very great advances in this respect. The Atlantic Charter has proved a far more fruitful beginning than many supposed it would be at the time of its announcement. It led directly to the United Nations—still a very nebulous organism, but one which has in its turn provided a first practical foundation for post-war international reconstruction, and has even begun to sprout a few of the rudimentary organs of international joint action which the post-war world must develop. In 1917 and 1918, the League of Nations could be discussed only as a theoretical future instrument; the advantages of having an actual institution, however vague, around which thinking and planning can crystallize in advance are very great. Out of the Charter and the existence of the United Nations, responsible statesmen and publicists of the various fighting peoples have already developed a rather surprisingly detailed program for reconstruction; and the American contribution, as voiced particularly by Vice-President Wallace, Mr. Cordell Hull, and Mr. Sumner Welles, has been an important one.

This program envisages a peace which will be made only gradually, and can, therefore, in large measure grow naturally out of the actualities of the time rather than be imposed, as in 1918, by a single act of "settlement" which is unlikely to settle. The prerequisite is total victory for the United Nations, though it is at least quite possible that victory may come and reconstruction be started in one theater before the war has ended in others. The first step must be the complete and unilateral disarmament of the aggressor powers. The United Nations must then be maintained as the center of power which will police the ensuing reconstruction period and serve, no doubt, as the nucleus around which some final form of international organization will be developed. But the program, while asserting the necessity for such an organization, insists that it should come at the end and not at the beginning of the process. The immediate task must be economic reconstruction, connecting the raw materials and the industrial capacity of the victors with the desperate need of the ravaged victims, eliminating trade barriers, restrictions, and particularisms so as to establish a going world economy that will actually produce a maximum of welfare for all. On the foundations supplied by a genuine economic reconstruction, working political settlements can ultimately be erected.

This program is not actually so general as it may seem. It offers specific answers for a number of questions—such as the bases of disarmament, or whether to make peace first or reconstruct first—which caused much of the trouble in 1919. It eliminates "reparations." It supplies a rational combination of sanctions with the positive economic benefits necessary to make them acceptable. It amounts to much more than mere pious platitude. Yet it has received a surprisingly large measure of assent among the spokesmen of all the United Nations; and, as expounded by Mr. Welles and the others, it has awakened very little objection in the United States. There is no doubt that the impact of war has brought the American people to accept, as almost axiomatic, many propositions—such as a close association with Soviet Russia, an international world organization, international monetary and commercial systems—from which they would have recoiled in horror a few years ago.

This marks a real and important advance. But the question is as to how deeply it may go. The general program appears to have been accepted; but there seems to be very little positive popular enthusiasm behind it, while few have stopped to examine its very far-reaching implications, much less to endorse them. There is a great deal in the American scene today to perpetuate the doubt as to whether we are in any way prepared to deal with victory, assuming that we finally help to achieve it. When Mr. Welles advanced the idea of a gradual settlement by speaking of a "cooling off" period, he was assailed on the ground that this was suggesting a weak leniency toward Germany. It seemed to indicate an abysmal misunderstanding of the whole problem. So does the frequent cry that this is no time to talk about the peace; we must win the war first. It is, of course, imperative that talking peace should not become a substitute for waging the war; but until there is a wider realization that the war and the peace are inextricably interrelated—that they are in fact only two aspects of the same continuing problem—the United States will scarcely be capable of doing its part toward winning either the war or the peace. Here again, as in the purely military field, there seems to be a disturbing want of seriousness, an inability to measure the true proportions of the immense crisis of the times in which we are involved.

These comments may be unduly pessimistic. Perhaps they recall too much of the unrealities of the opening days of our precipitation into the war, and allow insufficiently for the American people's capacity to learn. We are learning fast; for we are in a hard school, and we shall probably learn faster still as time goes on. But though one may be hopeful of the answer, it must be admitted that after nine months of war the question: can we move swiftly enough, on both the military and the broader plane, remains a question.

Vincente Lombardo Toledano

WE are particularly glad to welcome as member of the International Honorary Board Señor Lombardo Toledano, President of the Latin American Confederation of Workers, an organization of over three million members including all the labor groups of Latin America.

Señor Toledano's significant contribution to the work of the International Labor Office in Geneva, where his strong stand in favor of collective security marked the active participation of the workers in international affairs, encouraged the European labor movement and strengthened its ties with labor in the Western Hemisphere.

We are confident that the acceptance of our principles by the President of the Latin American Confederation of Workers and his full collaboration with our movement will be of great value to the war effort of the United Nations. Señor Toledano is now touring Latin America for this purpose and we shall publish an account of his mission.

THE PENDULUM SWINGS

By
NORMAN ANGELL

THERE is a strange, and at first sight extremely puzzling contrast between the war situation in Europe of a year ago when FREE WORLD issued its first number, and the situation of today. America at that time, though not neutral (so little neutral and so near the line of belligerency that President Roosevelt had just given orders to the navy to sink German U-boats found in Atlantic waters) had not yet entered the war. Britain and Russia, and the conquered nations of Europe were praying—out loud, for the world to hear—that the United States might as quickly as possible take her place formally and fully beside the other nations fighting the Axis Powers. On December 7 this prayer was answered—at Pearl Harbor. There followed formal declaration of war by Germany and Italy upon this country.

And then came this paradox: Things took a turn which made the prospect on the whole look blacker to Europeans than it had looked before.

Just about a year ago, it was my good fortune to encounter quite a number of fugitives from the conquered nations—French, Norwegian, Dutch, Belgian, Greek. And they all, in varying degrees, but all in some measure, testified somewhat to this effect:

> What above all sustains us in our struggle still at the end of 1941 is a double fact. First, the spectacle of Britain and what seems to us her almost miraculous indestructibility. Here is a country which by all the military rules should have been beaten in the summer of 1940. France at that time believed Britain was done for; Germany believed it; most of Europe believed it. But now, a year later, in this fall of 1941, not only is she not beaten, but despite reverses is in a stronger position than she was a year ago. After more than two years of war not one acre of her territory or her empire, save only small islands off the coast of France, is in enemy hands; she has defeated great Italian armies in North Africa, torn the Italian Empire to shreds, is in a position to restore Abyssinia to its Emperor; she has rejected all offers of peace, turned down the proposal of Hitler (made through Hess) that Britain keep her fleet and empire intact in return for giving him a free hand against Russia; she has entered into firm co-operation with Russia; and she has greatly accelerated her war production. Britain, a nation apparently beaten, is not merely surviving, but seems to be winning. That is one great part of our hope. The other part of our hope lies in the role of the United States, obviously destined to become belligerent. When she does, and her vast, incalculable, latent power is added to that of Russia and of Britain, we shall have complete and certain assurance that our liberation will be achieved.

Then, when the prayers were answered and America became fully belligerent, throwing all that she has and is into the struggle, this strange thing happened. The British Empire, which had stood up for over two years almost alone against all the might of nazidom and its satellite, Italy, began to crumble under the assaults of Japan, whose feet (we had been told by some in a position to know) were of clay; the Japan of poverty, of limited resources, who, in the view of many, would prove a "push-over." As Malaya and the Dutch Empire followed the fate of the Philippines, and Burma followed these, and Japan swept forward over sea and jungle to the very gates of Australia and India, the mood in Europe—as in America—began to change.

There is no means, of course, of measuring even approximately the extent of this change in the subjugated territories of Europe, but we may be sure that the news of the reverses suffered this last six months have not been softened in the nazi telling; and we know in some measure what the effect of the reverses has been upon feeling in Britain and in this country. Just recently a poll was taken of the answers to the request: "Name the Allies in the order of the importance of their contribution to the war effort." The great majority put Britain at the bottom of the list. Think what the answer would have been a year ago.

In Britain itself the change of mood is evident enough. Criticism of the conduct of the war has taken on a sharpness and bitterness which it did not have when the outlook was much more hopeless than in fact it now is. Opposition which began as military discussion is in some cases becoming entangled with, and developing into political and party opposition. The demand for a second front particularly has taken on this aspect of a party quarrel, the implication of so much of the criticism (though this is certainly not a majority view) being that the hesitation in opening the second front is due to the Conservative suspicion of Russia on grounds of class and economic interest. The accusation is made (though again mainly by a vocal minority) that military policy is determined by consideration for certain vested interests, that military incompetence is due to nepotism and favoritism in high places, the implication being that the road to improvement is a great social and political upheaval of some kind or other (though precisely what kind is seldom indicated).

Even if we assume some element of truth in these accusations,—this writer has never been able to get much tangible evidence of their truth—the effect, if not the intention, of the criticism is to create a mood, not perhaps widespread, but at times vocal, of distrust in present leadership, a mood of misgiving, if not of hopelessness, and bewilderment as to the future.

II

THIS raises, of course, the extremely difficult problem of how to reconcile criticism, which is the very lifeblood of democracy, even in wartime in some measure, with the maintenance of national unity and the maintenance of confidence. After all, it was by virtue of very free parliamentary criticism, by insisting upon a change of government in the very midst of war and disaster, that Britain found her leadership in Churchill, of whom a French observer in Britain, Marcel Hoden, has written this:

> Between him and the people there grew up a mysterious link, a deep and constant communion, such as history shows only on very rare occasions, between a great warrior and his army, or a statesman and the nation whose destiny is in his care. In the hour of extreme danger, the people knew he was there, keeping watch, day and night; they knew his only thought was for resistance, his only care the survival of England, the destruction of the enemy. They watched for the almost legendary figure of the thick-set fighter. They waited upon his words of praise or blame or of comfort. He shared the joys and the sufferings of all and he knew how to express them in a magnificent English prose which made hearts beat faster. He was the embodiment of the fight to the finish, of confidence, of hope, of the will to live and to conquer. He was the very soul of the nation.

I have quoted that passage because it reminds us of a mood which is momentarily in abeyance in some degree: the mood of a whole people which had found the right leadership, without which its greatest efforts could not have been put forth, efforts which alone enabled it to survive and so help others to survive. It owes that leadership to democratic institutions, to free parliamentary criticism which would not have been possible if Neville Chamberlain had possessed the power and the will to silence criticism, or to paralyze parliamentary action. If, therefore, the fact that there has grown up a type of criticism which indubitably has had some effect of undermining confidence is recalled, it is not from any conviction that criticism, even in war time is in itself inadmissable, but as a reminder of the circumstances in which criticism became fruitful.

What were those circumstances? The most relevant fact was this: To the government then under criticism an alternative was at hand; the effect of the criticism was not merely to create distrust in one government but to create hope and confidence in another

immediately available. The alternative government spelled more national unity, not less, than the one condemned.

The matter concerns us because on confidence in the future, and on the possibility of united action by the enemies of Hitler depends the future of Europe.

Consider for a moment the situation which will confront us when the cease fire sounds. Some dozen or more nations will have lived for years under the Hitler tyranny, separated from their governments-in-exile. During the years of underground struggle local leaders will have been thrown up by the circumstances of the struggle. Obviously those leaders will not always see eye to eye with governments that have been absent for years from the national soil, especially as during those years all the devices of nazi propaganda will have been directed to sowing distrust in those governments. That problem of itself will demand an effort of adjustment and conciliation of no mean order. But there will confront us also the even more difficult task of the co-operation of these subjugated nations with each other, a co-operation which will be an indispensable condition of any future peace. If all the old nationalist jealousies are to spring to life so that it will be possible, as of old, to play off one against another, we shall face the beginning of a new set of intrigues for the splitting up of Europe for the benefit of some new set of gangsters.

III

WE are in the habit of proclaiming this a revolutionary war, and are anxious to assure the peoples of the world that they are not fighting to preserve the *status quo*. But what is the relationship of revolutionary feeling and impulse to this major problem of the future?

Now in the social field, alike in this country, in Britain, and in France, there was certainly before the war no very frozen *status quo*. This country was getting into the stride of the New Deal; in Britain the people had asserted themselves sufficiently for the Trade Unions twice within a little more than a decade to have taken over, through their political instrument, the Labor party, the government of the country. Working-class enterprises like the consumers co-operatives had become among the biggest big businesses in the country. There had been built up the greatest system of social security in the world and by its means, and the work of the Trade Unions themselves, and by means of the stiffest income tax and death duties in the world, there was taking place a more equitable distribution of the national income. The pace was too slow, of course, but the progress was steady. The point, however, to keep in mind is that this was reckless revolution itself, both as to tempo and extent, compared with any fundamental or organic change in the field of international politics; in the modification of national sovereignty, in the upbuilding of a federative international society, in the creation of any system of collective security, and the abolition of the international anarchy. There was, on the contrary, in this field of international politics an ironclad, stonewall, conservatism, a Bourbon Toryism. The tiniest move toward reform, however cautious, like that of Wilson's League, or this country's entrance into membership of the World Court, met fierce resistance, a resistance derived not merely nor mainly from vested financial or other interests, but also from popular sentiment. And even in Europe the popular feelings and passions which gather about nationalism made effective combination of the European states against aggression impossible—which is why those states are now under the heel of Hitler and such social progress as they had made is swept away and replaced by the Hitlerite slavery.

Here, surely, in this international area is where revolution is needed most. Without it, the social revolution is of no avail, simply because it would all be undone by Hitlerite victory. Make sure of the defeat of Hitler, and even though on the social side we do return to what we call the economic and social *status quo,* that *status quo* can once more be made a fluid one, the transformation of which can be resumed at an accelerated pace. But fail in the political revolution, the revolution in international relations, and all fails.

We shall be most likely to secure real revolution if we face the strength of the obstacles which stand in its way. Those obstacles include the immense emotional forces which gather about nationalism and isolationism—forces of political conservatism which are, paradoxically enough, usually encouraged by those sometimes most vocal in demanding a revolutionary attitude.

This paradox is too often ignored by re-

formers and revolutionaries. When some national group—whether forming part of a Russia, or an Austria, or a Poland, or a Czechoslovakia, or a Britain—demands "complete freedom and independence," it can usually count upon the strong support of many sections on the left. It seems to be assumed as a matter of course that the right alternative to imperialism is isolationism, for each national group to have complete independence; and that to insist upon the recognition of reciprocal or mutual obligation is somehow to have some part and lot in the sin of imperialism. It is this strange fallacy which has delivered the continent of Europe over to Hitler and which, if persisted in, will make impossible the achievement of social revolution. For if each nation is, in the future, to be completely free and independent, the last word will always be with the Hitlers.

When the Austrian Empire was broken up, the impulse which guided the various nations that came out of it was toward complete independence. But that impulse never stops where those who most readily invoke it seem to suppose it will. If Czechs invoke it for a Czechoslovak state, Slovaks can invoke it for a Slovak one; and we had at one stage the mournful spectacle of Poles taking advantage of the tragedy of a Czechoslovakia ravaged by Hitler to put forward nationalist claims and willing to take part in the picking of the Czechoslovak body.

Happily, a better sentiment and a better policy prevails today; and we have now the more inspiring spectacle of Polish and Czechoslovak governments preparing the ground for a workable federation, not only of these two countries, but of others with them. We have other encouraging signs. We have been witnessing not merely a decisive rapprochement between Britain and Russia, but a long-term treaty designed to ensure political and economic cooperation during many years. The fact that a Churchill and a Stalin can thus get together is a really hopeful portent. It does not mean that Stalin has become a Tory Capitalist, nor Churchill a Communist; nor that either has sacrificed his convictions on those points to the other. It does mean that both have recognized that above their differences exists a great basic common interest—the common interest in the defeat, in the international field, of the satanic violence and aggression which Hitler embodies.

From the underground movement all over Europe comes assurance—and evidence—that resistance to Hitler is not merely maintained but grows in intensity, in discipline. If the Russian-British co-operativeness is taken as an example of what may be accomplished in the way of combining widely divergent ideologies to a common purpose, we need not fear as to the future outcome.

It is well that those of us who are still out of the reach of the Gestapo should constantly ask ourselves, "What must those who live within its shadow most desire of the future? What is their greatest interest?" The answer is not difficult. They assuredly put first one supreme aim, namely, that the future shall be free of such a horror; that there shall be no possibility of its casting its blight upon their children. To give those who now suffer the torments of Hitler's rule the sure confidence that such torments will be forever banished from human life, we must make real this aim of a world so organized internationally that it will be able to act as a unit against such an evil. All other aims rest upon that faith.

SANTIAGO DE CHILE

I BELIEVE that Latin America, by reason of its riches, its geographical position, and its social possibilities, plays in this war a role of ever-increasing importance. As Indo-Americans, we cannot forget that FREE WORLD has been the first magazine of world politics to esteem our continent at its true value. Also, we have the highest regard for it as it holds and defends for the future of mankind a social promise that coincides with that which animates our struggle. I express, therefore, my best wishes for FREE WORLD.

MANUEL SEOANE

LATIN AMERICA *AND* THE WAR

by
Américo Ghioldi

I AM writing this article today, August 24, only a few hours after an event of great importance in democracy's struggle for survival. I refer to Brazil's recognition of a state of war, brought about by German and Italian acts of aggression against her. In order better to define the atmosphere which surrounds me at the moment of writing, I shall say that apart from our anxiety caused by the situation at Stalingrad, three significant events have recently taken place in Ibero-America: the announcement of the Chilean President's forthcoming visit to the United States, the entrance of Brazil into the war, and the meeting at Montevideo of the Free Italians of the continent.

A few hours ago, a peaceful country, whose population constitutes half of the total population of South America, was obliged to take up arms after the outrageous sinking of eighteen of its ships totaling sixty thousand tons, and the assassination of over six hundred men engaged in peaceful pursuits within the coastal zone of their own country. This cruel and savage submarine warfare has come to the southern Atlantic in violation of the law of humanity and of the fundamental principles of what was known yesterday by the name of international law. As a consequence of this barbarous nazi attack, Brazil has aligned herself on the side of the Democracies, and her people and her resources are being integrated into the armies and the arsenal of liberty. Brazil, the first South American nation to intervene actively and directly in the war, is of incalculable economic and strategic importance; first, because of the variety and quantity of its raw materials and its magnificently fertile soil; secondly, because of the enormous extension of its Atlantic coast, a safe refuge for ships; and, thirdly, because of the Natal salient, which brings the American and African continents to within sixteen hundred miles of each other.

The projected visit of President Rios to the United States, announced after the significant speed which he made scarcely three weeks ago in Valparaíso, must be interpreted as the announcement of a coming change in the international policy of Chile. So that within less than a year the whole American Continent has aligned itself clearly in the active defense of democracy: the United States was thrust suddenly into the war by the treacherous Japanese attack; and after that great Republic, the other countries of the continent, carrying out their pledged word and sincerely following their destiny, either broke relations with the Axis or entered the war forthwith, before or immediately after the conference at Rio. Mexico and Brazil, are now at war because of Germany's criminal conduct. Chile, too, will express in an unequivocal manner her adherence to that American solidarity which was proclaimed at the conference. The Argentine Government will remain alone in its intransigent and impenitent neutrality. "Some country must prepare itself to be a mediator," said a diplomat friend with the kindly purpose of explaining the obstinate official position of the southernmost country of South America.

The third event to which I referred is the meeting of the Italians who are following Count Sforza in his magnificent Free Italy movement. The Congress is an event significant not only for the Latin roots of America, which are strengthened by the contribution

of the Italian spirit, but for all free people, for whom this first meeting of fascism's exiles will not pass unnoticed. The Congress (which met in Montevideo because it could not have convened in Buenos Aires without violating Argentina's chaste official neutrality) had a deep and human meaning in Latin America, for as its eminent leader has truly stated, it performed a real diplomatic, psychological, and political service for all the republics of the American continent.

In view of the present developments in military as well as diplomatic and political events, it is difficult to explain the lack of understanding in certain sections of America, particularly in Argentina, regarding the danger of nazi-fascism. Such lack of understanding could not be based on ignorance of Pan-Germanic plans for universal domination, for they were published over fifty years ago, with maps and descriptive graphs of the zones of exploitation which Germany proposed to conquer for economic, political, and military reasons. Ignorance of the purposes of Hitlerism must be calculated and intentional after the abundant proof accumulated in recent times, and the important books published about nazi aspirations in America, among which those of H. Fernández Artucio deserve mention. Nor is it possible to plead ignorance of nazi strategy, employed first to disorganize peoples spiritually, then to paralyze them by defeatism, to frighten them by terrorism, and finally to incapacitate them through the pernicious action of the Fifth Column. Thus, incredulous of their danger, trusting in their divine neutrality, the unprepared countries fall easy victims to the mechanized might which brings complete military domination and which destroys their independence, their institutions, and their liberty.

We all have sufficient intelligence to understand what a reign of slavery and of exploitation would await America in a world in which Europe was dominated by the Nazis and Asia was ruled by Japan. Slavery would return to the American continent in its worst forms, those of pseudo-scientific organization and diabolical philosophic justification. The immense civilizing work of this continent which began in Argentine in 1813, when it proclaimed the freedom of procreation; in the United States in '63; and Brazil in '86 would be destroyed by nazi barbarism. After enslaving Europe, it would put its mark on this continent which was conceived as the seat of liberty.

There are, nevertheless, sections of America which prefer not to understand the menacing reality—to such a degree that Count Sforza was not able to hide his surprise that the danger of an eventual nazi hegemony should not be realized by all Latin America as clearly as it as been understood in North America for many months. "Didn't I find, when I was a young diplomat, in the salons of Prince von Bülow in Rome, and later in Berlin and Madrid, German experts who spoke with characteristic arrogance about future plans of German influence in Brazil and Argentina, as if you were the center of Africa?" The venerable statesman recalled in Montevideo that he once sent to his friend Marcelo T. de Alvear, ex-Ambassador of Argentina in Paris, a confidential memorandum which he had received from Berlin explaining that one of the secret bases of the new geo-political science which had just been invented in Germany consisted in regaining spheres of influence in South America in order to convert them into actual colonial possessions. Of course, it is clear, Count Sforza will add, that the archives of certain ministries are graveyards of serious ideas and nurseries of useless phraseology.

In order to meet the nazi danger, each country of America must understand and aid continental defense. One arrives inevitably at this conclusion merely by a realistic consideration of the present facts and of historical continental solidarity. It is not inappropriate in forming our judgment of situations and conduct, to give place to what we might call wholesome regional selfishness, intelligently interpreted. Thus, for example, the position of the United States is at the same time selfish and idealistic when it conceives continental co-operation as its own best defense. Based on nazi strategy, the radius of action of the present destructive technique, and the geographic structure of America, the United States has been obliged to modify and broaden its conception of strategic defense because the inadequacy of military power sufficient to defend itself merely as far, let us say, as fifteen degrees below the equator, was soon apparent. Nor would it suffice for the purposes of its own safety to limit the defense of the hemisphere to a point forty degrees south.

Thus, just as it would be childish to make fun of the generosity and benevolence of the United States in the application of the lend-lease law which is, in the last analysis, the

highest expression of enlightened self-interest, so it would be absurd to believe that the solidarity of American countries in the face of the nazi attack against Brazil or the Japanese attack against the United States is an attitude of infantile altruism. Nothing of the sort. Active solidarity in the face of extra-continental aggression is the wisest defense of one's own national patrimony, the only form of effective struggle for sovereignty on the part of each country, and the most reasonable practice of co-operation in the face of the only common enemy of the independence of peoples and the freedom of Americans.

The central argument of the Fifth Column in Argentina and in Chile has been, of course, that national sovereignty is compromised by agreements for continental solidarity. The fallacy of this argument—but is this the moment for contentious debates and quarrels provoked by specious poisoners of the public conscience?—is clear to countries like Argentina which are members of the League of Nations, whose Covenant and statutes require member nations to adopt sanctions which are not subject to the free and absolute determination of each sovereignty.

II

AMERICA then, is practically united in a vast effort of struggle for existence, since this is war for the survival of free humanity. Except for Argentina and—for a little while—Chile, all the nations are part of a great democratic front. America has (with the exceptions noted) banished the master minds of nazi espionage in each republic, has co-ordinated its economic, military, and political action to the purposes of defense, has pledged its resources in strategic raw materials and metals to the cause of the United Nations, has deployed its armies in continental defense, has co-operated in guarding part of the Atlantic coast. This is a contribution of great importance in the vast contest, and doubtless necessary for victory. One needs only to think of those metals of prime strategic importance which exist in Latin America—antimony, bauxite, aluminum, chromite, copper, manganese, mercury, tin tungsten, vanadium and zinc—and which the United Nations require for their gigantic military effort. Thus we realize that the totalitarians have brought together against themselves the most stupendous array of material and spiritual forces to arrest them and conquer them. It is all of civilization battling for its own preservation!

No one can fail to understand that the present war is a revolutionary one. The forces of reaction and obscurantism have declared war on the great people's revolution which for a century and a half has been creating democracy and liberty and an increasing degree of social justice. It is a universal war ideologically as well as physically. Neutrality is impossible, and in the long run can redound only to the benefit of the aggressor.

For my part, as I have said in Parliament, in the press, and on the public platform (when it was still possible before the state of siege existed), I believe that a clean-cut modification of our international policy is urgently necessary. Argentina wants to be neutral toward an enemy who deprives her of the freedom of the seas and sinks her ships (by mistake); who establishes a blockade zone to suit his own convenience; who prevents her from taking her ships to the Atlantic ports of the United States; and who, tomorrow, as a result of the Brazilian attitude, will establish a new blockade zone including the ports of her sister republic. Try as I will, I cannot imagine an Argentina isolated from the world and from the Continent. America is giving a magnificent example. She has understood in time what Europe refused to accept; that appeasement and isolation were merely incitements to the malignant promoters of the "new order."

Above and beyond the more or less established divisions—Latin, Hispanic, Indo-America, Anglo-Saxon America—unity has been found again in the defense of freedom. The American wants to believe in the freedom of man. In this year which began in November of 1941, America has made up her mind in favor of the historic system of life which rests upon the declaration of the rights of man. The spirit of America, that continental melting pot of races living together in the practice of liberty and tolerance, has wrought the miracle of co-operative unity in the decisive hour of trial.

May the virtues provoked by this dramatic war for life be virtues to purify the peace of the American tomorrow, free from cruel dictatorships, from extortionate monopolies, from enslaving imperialism, from insecurity of life, and from obscurantist reaction.

—Translated by Richard Holder

War for a Continent

BY
WOUSAOFONG

IN all the recorded history of the Far East, there is no year so revolutionary in its events, so critical in its immediate prospects, and so meaningful for the future as the one just past. In the space of a few brief months, the whole character of a political system which has existed for several centuries has been altered beyond recognition. The colonial empires of the Western Powers have been virtually destroyed, not only by the conquests with which Japan has swept or threatens to sweep their armies from their possessions in the Pacific, but also by the inevitable political and psychological repercussions which have followed Japanese victories.

At this moment, the military situation is confused and unbalanced. Japan holds all the outlying territories of the Southern Pacific except Australia and New Zealand and the reconquered Solomons. On the Asiatic continent, it is in possession of Burma, Thailand, and Indo-China; it is knocking at the gateway of the vast Indian Empire and menacing Siberia; it is still in control of many of the strategic cities of China. But the initiative and the power of an offensive is fast passing from Japanese hands. Everywhere in the Far East, except perhaps India, the United Nations are displaying a new-found material strength and moral vigor which presage a turn in the tide of battle.

Nevertheless, the defeat of the Western empires and of the United States, however temporary, has had a tremendous influence on the minds of the Asiatic people, an effect which the occidental world has not yet fully realized. The West has lost "face" in the eyes of the peoples of Asia. It did so, not merely because of successive defeats suffered at the hands of a surprisingly powerful and able Asiatic Power, but also because of the character of these defeats. The successive surrenders of vast forces in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Java shocked the people of Asia. Even so devoted a partisan of the cause of the United Nations as Madame Chiang Kai-shek declared:

> During the last three months our Chinese people have watched with incredulous amazement the spectacle of Western armies surrendering because, it was explained, of Japan's superior might. This explanation is to us in China incomprehensible. It is also incomprehensible to us why the West for so long swallowed insults, indignities, and face-slapping with a mien meek and mild on the plea that it was unprepared for war.
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> Neither can we understand why the West, with its vaunted prescience, could not see that each passing hour gave Japan added opportunity to prepare to strike more deadly blows while the Powers contented themselves with fortifying their positions with paper bullets. When the Japanese started their aggression against China we were unprepared. In fact, no nation could have been less prepared than we, for China had still not recovered from the wounds of decades of civil strife. But we took up the gauntlet.
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> During the past five years there has been no instance of Chinese troops surrendering to the enemy. On the other hand, there have been numerous cases of officers and men fighting to the last though there was no hope of reinforcement or escape—except by surrender. They disdained to embrace such an alternative. . . . To them death was preferable to dishonor.

In view of the centuries-long assumption of white superiority which irked the Asiatics even more than political oppression and economic exploitation, it is understandable that this loss of "face" gave them a certain amount of satisfaction and that the Japanese who effected it received a corresponding amount of admiration and sympathy. By reversing nazi racial doc-

trine and imitating nazi methods of propaganda, Japan has exploited this sympathy to the utmost and has won the temporary support of many natives.

The most obvious result of this loss of "face" has been the uncompromising demand for independence on the part of the All-India Congress; less publicized but equally strong has been the realization of all the other native peoples in the Far East that the time of their independence is near. This view has been encouraged by Japanese propaganda as a means of establishing Fifth Columns in the colonial possessions of the Western Powers. Now that it has served its purpose, the Japanese will, of course, seek to suppress it. But they will find that they have created the Frankenstein for their own undoing and that the native peoples of Asia will not easily exchange one foreign rule for another.

The most striking feature of the developments during the past year in the Far East; therefore, is not the amazingly rapid conquest of territory by Japan, but the growing consciousness in Asia, no less than in Europe, that this is a war of liberation. The most dangerous element in these developments lies in the possible confusion on the part of the native peoples as to what action will win for them the freedom they desire, and against whom the first steps toward independence must be taken. In resolving this danger, in clarifying the issues at stake, and in showing the peoples of the Far East who are their enemies and who their friends, the role of China is undoubtedly of greater importance than that of any of the United Nations. As the battlefield in which Japan has yet to win a decisive victory, China has been constantly gaining prestige in the Far East: as a nation which, during five years of one-sided warfare, has been able to develop its military and economic resources and to strengthen and popularize its Government, the Chinese people and their leaders have acquired a position of moral and political leadership; and most important, as the first victim of Japanese aggression, China presents positive proof of the cruelty and exploitation that go hand in hand with Japanese conquest.

Were it not for the Allied errors in military strategy which characterized the early stages of the war, China might today have been in a stronger position to influence the Asiatic people in adopting the cause of the United Nations.

When British commanders refused the Chinese offer of military co-operation in the defense of Hong Kong, Malaya, and Burma, they not only deprived themselves of the trained forces which might have kept one or all of these strategic territories from the hands of the invader, but they lost the vitally necessary opportunity of presenting to the native population concrete proof of the falseness of Japan's claim that it came to liberate the Asiatic people from white domination. Every Chinese soldier in the ranks of these defensive forces would have been tangible evidence that the hope for freedom of the yellow and brown races did not lie in Japanese victory. Similarly, the withdrawal of the British Army from Burma into India was a costly mistake of political warfare as well as of military tactics. This army, combined with the ever more powerful Chinese forces, might have turned the recent successes in the Kiangsi and Chekiang provinces into a Japanese rout that may well have affected the entire military situation in the Far East.

II

IN spite of these mistakes, the present situation in China is distinctly favorable to the Allied cause, a circumstance all the more remarkable in view of the desperate condition that prevailed only two short months ago. American help in matériel and American military collaboration have been utilized to the utmost with striking results. The Chinese armies are not only driving the invaders from cities and provinces, but by the capture of strategic air bases, are establishing the means whereby Japan itself may be attacked and the industrial and nerve centers of its vast military effort may be destroyed.

After five years of fighting, Chinese military strength is reaching its peak, both in size and power. Since the beginning of the war, the Chinese Army has increased from 200 poorly-equipped divisions to well over 300 divisions that are constantly benefiting by lend-lease aid and by the growing domestic output of armaments. There are now 5,000,000 men in the field and 15,000,000 more in reserve units and in training camps. More than 600,000 regular troops, aided by 800,000 guerrillas, are operating behind the Japanese lines, harassing Japanese garrisons and communication systems. In addition, there are 50,000,000 able-bodied men of military age available for service against the Japanese reservoir of 10,000,000 men,

which include Koreans, Formosans, and other subject peoples.

More encouraging even than the military situation has been the economic progress of China in the past year. To be sure, inflation, due principally to the issuance of paper money as a means of financing the war, threatens a serious financial crisis. At the outbreak of the war in July, 1937, the total amount of currency in circulation was 1,407,000,000 Chinese dollars; today, the figure has reached somewhere between sixteen and eighteen billions. This has brought the inevitable suffering to the salaried and middle classes. On the contrary, the farmers are enjoying relative prosperity and their purchasing power has increased. In fact, the economic situation is, on the whole, encouraging. The efforts of the Government to increase farm production by issuing agricultural loans amounting to 500,000,000 Chinese dollars and by organizing rural co-operatives have borne fruit. Food production has increased 9,867,000,000 pounds in 1941. And the 317 co-operative banks, with a total capital of $59,000,000, which have recently received a loan of $157,324,000 from the government banks, assure the Chinese people of further increases in agricultural production.

Even more remarkable, when one considers that they have been made in a country which is the theater of a devastating war, are the recent industrial gains. Not counting the arsenals, 108 industrial units have been built by the National Resources Commission. At present, there are several thousand factories in the interior, a great many of which have been moved from the maritime provinces. They include 1,629 coal mines, 380 chemical plants, 376 machine works, 273 textile factories, 122 iron mines, 87 metallurgical factories, 44 electrical plants, 42 oil refineries, 17 paper mills.

III

SECOND in importance only to China as a factor in the Far East is India. Although the situation there is at present far worse than at any time since the beginning of the second World War, there are mitigating circumstances which permit hope that this vast and powerful country may yet be enlisted as a loyal participant in the Allied cause. Among the most potent influences in that direction are the efforts of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to convince the leaders of the All-India Congress that their soundest policy, both as regards India and the future welfare of the world as a whole, is one of complete collaboration with the United Nations. General Chiang Kai-shek's personal influence with Nehru, the sympathy with which the Chinese people have regarded Indian efforts toward independence, and the many cultural and national ties which bind the two countries offer some reason to believe that the Indian leaders may be prevailed upon to subordinate the immediate interests of their country to the general cause of freedom and democracy. On the other hand, it is to be hoped that Great Britain will seriously consider General Chiang Kai-shek's suggestion that "the Indian people must be given real political power in order that they may be in a position to develop further their spiritual and material strength. The Indian people would then realize that their participation in the war will not merely aid the democratic nations to secure victory but it will be the turning point in the struggle for their own freedom."

The alternative is not pleasant to contemplate. The Japanese have the means and will certainly make an effort to establish a "Free India" government. Operating from Singapore with the exiled Indian extremists as a puppet administration, the Japanese may enlist the fifty thousand Indian war prisoners in an allied force. Should these fifty thousand soldiers under the command of the Japanese march across the borders of India "to free Gandhi," it is doubtful whether the Indian troops under Allied command would resist them. In addition to this critical military situation, equally serious results may follow the spread of the present disaffection of the civil population. Though still chiefly agricultural, India in the last few years has made great strides in industrial development. Her production of coal, steel, manganese, and cotton are of great importance in furnishing the materials for the war effort in the Far East and her agricultural products are necessary to provision the United Nations' forces. Even temporary internal disturbances will inevitably affect this production. Practical considerations, therefore, no less than the well recognized rights of the Indian people demand immediate resolution of the impasse which exists today.

No consideration of the situation in the Far East can neglect the revival of the Korean fight for national freedom and independence. Under the leadership of Kim Koo a Provisional

Government now functions in Chungking and many thousands of Korean troops are fighting the Japanese alongside the United Nations. Recognition of the Provisional Government-in-exile by the Allies awaits the settlement of an inner struggle between liberal and communist elements. Here, too, lesser interests must be subordinated to the cause of freedom and a compromise solution evolved which will enable the Korean patriots to make their fullest contribution to the struggle against Japan. As pointed out in the April Round Table on the Far East, the chief service of the Koreans will be rendered in guerrilla warfare and sabotage which will harass and disrupt the Japanese military and industrial machinery. Similarly the patriotic and loyal elements in Burma, Malaya, and the Netherlands Indies as well as the unconquerable people of the Philippines are now disturbing the Japanese program of conquest and occupation by underground activities which force Japan to enlarge the garrisons in the occupied countries of the Far East. An offensive by the United Nations' armies will be a signal for native revolt.

Nowhere is this awaited more eagerly than in Indo-China, betrayed into the hands of the Japanese by the Vichy Government at the behest of Berlin. Had Indo-China been controlled by fighting France, the native people no less than the French would have resisted Japanese invasion. More than local politics determined its status. The Governor-General of Indo-China offered to take his stand on the side of Free France if he received a guarantee of military support from the United States in the event of a Japanese attack. Unfortunately at that time, the United States Government could not commit itself in violation of its position as a neutral.

IV

ONE thing this past year has been proved more conclusively than anything else, and that is that everyone has seriously underestimated the strength of Japan. The Western Powers especially were under the impression that, in so far as they were concerned, Japan was merely bluffing, that it was seeking to take advantage of a favorable situation to gain as many concessions as possible, but that it would not carry out its bluff of challenging the might of Great Britain, Holland, and the United States in the Pacific. This attitude was responsible for the most optimistic reports about Japan's military and economic resources. A typical example is seen in the study, made in 1941 by the Trans-Pacific News Service, of the effects on Japan of the economic blockade instituted by the United States and Great Britain. This survey offered the following conclusions: (1) Based on the current rate of consumption Japan will have exhausted her reserves of oil and gasoline by the end of March of next year; and her stocks of imported iron and steel scrap before the end of December this year. (2) The most important industries in Japanese economy and foreign trade will be drastically affected; the silk industry will be two-thirds ruined, and the cotton industry operating at 25 per cent of normal capacity by next spring. If the blockade continues, the survey believes Japan will be forced at the end of six months "to plead for an economic truce with America and Britain and sue for a military armistice with China."

We know now that this was wishful thinking. What is more important, we must recognize that today Japan is in control of all the potential resources of rubber, oil, iron, tin, quinine, *etc.*, in the South Pacific. In so far as these commodities are concerned, the roles of blockading and blockaded country have been reversed and now the United Nations are deprived of these vital materials while Japan adds them to the vast stock to which the United Nations so thoughtlessly contributed. Fortunately, in these last few months, Japan has suffered tremendous losses in planes and ships which it will not easily replace. The American fliers, who in one day shot down ninety-six Japanese fighting and bomber planes, materially affected its aggressive power, and the successive American naval victories in the South Seas are making Japan's far-flung outposts of invasion progressively more vulnerable to attack and annihilation. Similarly, the failure of the Japanese "lock out China" campaign, due to the offensive ordered by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and brilliantly carried out by the Chinese armies with American support, have crippled Japan's striking power and have thereby reduced somewhat the danger to India and to Siberia.

But it would be negligent to assume that the powerful Japanese Army is beaten. It is undoubtedly gathering its forces for one more blow. Yet the fact remains that the crucial year is over and that the United Nations in the Far East have successfully weathered the crisis.

LABOR AND VICTORY

By
J. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO

SINCE its first number FREE WORLD has consistently stressed the importance of winning labor's full participation in the direction of the war and the organization of the peace. Recently the Free World Association has concentrated its efforts on creating within the framework of the United Nations an International Labor Committee for anti-Axis propaganda. We know how difficult the task will be, but it is well worth attempting, again and again if necessary. If democratic institutions are to survive, labor must play a conscious and decisive part in the battles now in progress and in those which will follow the end of military hostilities. But to be effective, labor must close its ranks not only within the borders of each country but in the international field.

The record of the past throws a sharp light on the necessities of the present:

Without wasting time on criticism or a recapitulation of old mistakes, it is beyond doubt that Hitler and Mussolini and the entire fascist Axis came to power only because the divisions and other weaknesses in labor prevented the organization of a world-wide movement of opposition to aggression. A chief purpose of fascist propaganda today is to maintain and intensify these divisions in the ranks of labor.

The fascist Powers know that the policy of appeasement would have been impossible had it not been for labor's lack of unity and of militancy. If labor had not been divided, there would have been no Ethiopia, no Austria, no Spain; there would have been no Munich. Munich was the measure of the impotence of the international labor movement.

Without a consolidation of the labor movement, it will hardly be possible to generate the energy that is required by the present desperate military situation. Labor is needed for the creation of a successful second front. It is needed to help organize resistance in the occupied countries of Western Europe. Only a united labor movement can speak with authority to the masses in Europe who form the vanguard of the forces of revolt.

An enlightened and determined labor movement is necessary to thwart and avert any maneuver aimed at a negotiated peace. Without a strong labor movement the Democracies risk the danger of political collapse and demoralization in case of major military setbacks. Only such a movement can inspire the peoples of the world with confidence that labor will be on hand in the hour of peace to prevent another monstrous Munich through which the reactionary forces will snatch from the people the final fruits of their struggle.

Labor propaganda is needed in Latin America. If today the workers of the southern Continent were closely allied with American labor, we should have all the American republics really—not only formally—committed to the war.

It is only a united, militant labor movement —not parties, not private organizations alone —which, on an international basis, can achieve these aims and prevent the dangers which threaten the democratic conduct of the war and the preparation of a people's peace.

Planning of the Future—
A Weapon for the Present

By LOUIS DOLIVET

Preamble About Utopians

A DAMOCLEAN sword is hanging over everyone who thinks about the future. The Sword of Damocles is the label, "Utopia." A liberal makes a speech. He notes the mistakes of the past and suggests a world organization for the future which will avoid similar mistakes, and he is immediately called a Utopian.

The world is filled with people labeled Utopians. There are so many of them that a classification seems indispensable. The simplest way to handle them is to divide them into categories. The first category comprises a great number of men and women—practically the majority of mankind—who have decided to establish after this war a world order which will guarantee freedom, peace, and prosperity to every nation and to every human being. The bulk of this category is made up of the common people who are simply tired of war and tyranny. They are so stubborn that they are ready to give, and are already giving, their lives to the attainment of that goal. It is nothing new to them—their fathers and forefathers, too, gave their lives to the same cause. The only new thing about it is that this time they mean business; they want more than wartime promises. They go even so far as to ask that the foundations of such a world order be laid immediately, that plans for the great transformation be started now.

And as usual in such circumstances, a great number of intellectuals, known as liberals, have made these demands their own, and imagine they are even working out—O! how Utopian! —principles and schemes for a world order. The liberal who does not want all the Fascists and semi-Fascists to return to power in Eastern or Central Europe, who does not want the resources of humanity wasted through outmoded tariff barriers, who wants reactionary

IV
THE BASIC PRINCIPLES*

principles excluded from an international organization forms the second category of Utopians.

A third category, known as the underground movement, is composed of millions of men and women in the occupied countries who, while fighting to free their countries from the Axis yoke, are also discussing the foundations of a new world order. This last category is fortunately spared the defaming name of Utopian. Nobody knows how long this respect will last —it will probably end once the occupied countries are free again.

The writer of this series of articles belongs to at least one of the above-mentioned categories. He will therefore respectfully introduce a fourth category which he will call the Realist-Utopians. They call themselves realists and will probably not welcome at all this addition to their name. They are sincerely in favor of a better human order, but they sternly disapprove of "unhistoric dreams." They are in favor of a world which resembles strangely the

**This is the last in a series of four articles on the Planning of the Future. In the May issue Mr. Dolivet discussed the potential forces in Europe; in July, the potential forces in Asia; in August, the potential forces of the Americas.*

one which we have known before; despite their desire to avoid the mistakes of the past, they ignore the law of cause and effect and forget that if they re-establish the old order mistakes similar to those committed before this war will be unavoidable. They are opposed to aggression, but they refuse to transform the social and political system which was responsible for it. They dislike fascism, but they refuse to take measures which will make it impossible. They are in favor of some kind of world organization and world court, but they refuse to limit national sovereignty and forget that without limitations upon sovereignty the whole system will sooner or later break down, as the League of Nations broke down. The curious thing is that they are learned men. They know history, and still they stick to the old formulas which have been the basis of so much misery. And yet their realism is correct in one respect: in spite of the deep desire of a great mass of people, humanity does not seem completely ready for a democratic world order. The desire is there but the knowledge and the will to fight for it seem to be lacking. The common man complains about the periodic return of war and suffering, but he goes no further than lamentation in his search for sound solutions. Therefore the Utopians in the first three categories have the great task before them of educating as many human beings as possible in the basic principles of democratic world organization, and in the art of fighting for it. When 10 per cent of the world's population, that is 200,000,000 human beings, shall have become conscious of that fight and shall know the fundamental problems of international organization, then the dream of a world order will cease to be Utopia. The Realist-Utopians, on the other hand, have the task of abandoning solutions consisting of half measures. They have to realize that if their analysis of the more probable prospect of a peace in the old pattern is relatively less Utopian, in the end it will be as Utopian as the Versailles Treaty turned out to be.

Revolution à la Mode

MANY years from now, students reading the history of our times will smile at the word "revolution." For decades revolution was the specter haunting the dreams of brave citizens. Followers of revolutionary doctrines, or even people who dared pronounce that word, were considered enemies of society. Mussolini, Hitler, Beck, Carol, Franco, Stoyadinovitch, and many others won respectability for a certain time as defenders of the world against revolution. But when their "counter-revolution" threatened the very existence of our civilization and independence, we rediscovered the meaning of Magna Charta and of the French and American revolutions, and the unspeakable word became respectable again.

Today revolution is on all lips. But if the word is on all lips, its real meaning is far from being in all minds and hearts. To many people it is merely a slogan of war, revolution *à la mode*. It expresses in their opinion the violent changes which the war has brought with it. The disappearance of borders, countries, and whole continents under the wheels of the advancing nazi tanks, or the occupation of century-old colonies and fortresses is revolution to them. It is revolution to them in the same sense as nazism and fascism were socialism in their opinion.

No, the violent changes, the advancing Axis Powers, the new technique of war are not revolution. They are the counter-revolution. The real revolution is in the underground forces of Europe, fighting with an unparalleled heroism against their oppressors. The revolution is in the fighting and in the immense sacrifices of the peoples of China and Russia. The revolution is in the hearts of the men of the air forces and navies of the United States and of Great Britain, who fight with the consciousness that everything they value is at stake. It is in the civilians, ready to work and to die for the defense of a freedom which they achieved through past revolutions. It is in the awakening of the great masses of people, who see this war as the continuation of man's long struggle for freedom.

But above all, it is in the hopes, dreams, and aspirations for the future free world order to come. The horrors of this war would be insupportable without the hope of a better world. This hope is the antidote against suicide and despair in the occupied countries, the force behind the will to fight. When British people greet American soldiers, when Russians greet British and American fliers, when Chinese resist Japanese offers and shake brotherly hands with their white allies—it is this one great hope for the future that unites them. The memories of past injustices, ancient suspicions are overcome by this great hope in the common future.

Therefore, the future is a part of the present revolution. The more we think about it, the more we plan a world inspired by the same generosity, by the same internationalism which binds the United Nations, the more we give humanity a reason to fight, the more we shorten the war.

Four Principles of a Free World

BEFORE undertaking an examination of international institutions, it is necessary to reach an agreement and to educate public opinion concerning the basic principles of world order. As a matter of fact, a blueprint for institutions is much more liable to modification by changing circumstances than is a summary of fundamental principles. That is the reason why the founders of the Free World movement have concentrated their attention on principles.

The first principle adopted is *International Democracy*. Experience has conclusively proved that the most perfectly conceived national and international institutions cannot come into being without the establishment of international democracy. This means, in the first place, equality of all races and peoples. Of course, this principle does not exclude different functions of the various peoples within the framework of the United Nations. But these different functions will have to be fixed, not on the basis of racial or other discriminations, but according to the specific situations of the people involved. The specific functions fulfilled by each nation are equally important to humanity as a whole. Therefore, there must be no discrimination either economically or politically against any people, as for example in the distribution of raw materials or the admittance to political leadership of the world. International democracy means the end of colonial exploitation. Backward areas and people yet incapable of democratic self-government will benefit by an international administration which will be guided by the interests of those peoples and by the interests of humanity as a whole. The democratic elements in the different existing colonial administrations, in so far as they exist, will of course be able to continue; but the old type of colonial administration for the purpose of exploitation by one country will definitely have to be abandoned if we do not want to see the return of colonial wars. Permanent peace is impossible without the abolition of colonies. The whole of humanity will benefit immensely by the opening of vast new resources through the new conditions created in backward areas. The democratic transformation of the colonial system will have two important consequences: (1) new rich areas will be opened to humanity and will increase its general welfare; (2) colonial administration, until now one of the most reactionary factors in international affairs, will disappear.

International democracy means further collective security—that is, an organized system making aggression impossible through the permanent pooling of the resources and power of all peoples against the aggressor. Collective security will bring an end to the system of military alliances which sooner or later lead to war. Collective security will guarantee the application of the rule of law in international relations.

The numerous military alliances of France after the last war did not prevent the temporary triumph of the aggressor. Only collective security will make disarmament possible—naturally, after a long period of re-education of the Axis nations and their satellites. The adoption of these principles will have as a logical consequence the end of the regime of absolute national sovereignty. Limitations will be required only in the field of military expansion and violation of international law. Civilized peoples will voluntarily renounce, as the individual citizen already has renounced, the rights to make war and commit crimes. Each nation will actually be more sovereign in the flowering of its national genius and culture, in the development of its particular way of life, and in the enjoyment of an economic prosperity corresponding to the achievements of modern science. The individual citizen will be called upon to bear fewer sacrifices and burdens for war effort.

International democracy will also constitute a first concrete step toward internationalism. Internationalism in our conception means not the negation of national units as cultural entities but the end of that aggressive nationalism which has made international co-operation impossible in the past and will stand in its way in the future. As far back as 1922, a peace congress met in the Hague under the auspices of the International Federation of Trade Unions and suggested educational measures against the "glorification of conquerors and conquests." The international labor movement and all the progressive forces were conscious

of the fact that economic and military nationalism constitutes the greatest danger to peace. No future peace settlement can be successful without the elimination of aggressive nationalism. Democracy itself is impossible in a nationalistic society.

The second principle is *Political Democracy*. This means that only governments which are a true expression of the will of the people can represent the people in the world organization. It means, further, that the participating countries will have to assure to the individual his essential rights without distinction of race and creed.

There is considerable opposition to this provision of democracy. Part of the opposition comes from people who cannot see how the international organization can intervene in internal affairs. The answer to this objection is that there is no case in recent history where free people have voted of their own free will in favor of a dictator. Therefore, international society will have only to intervene in rare cases in order to re-establish the right of the people to express their free will. Who will determine when the will of the people is violated? The World Court, through its special section on constitutionality. Furthermore, the experience of the last twenty years has proved that militaristic and fascist dictatorships inevitably lead to war.

The other part of the opposition comes from people who are troubled about Soviet Russia. But it is quite clear that Soviet Russia, despite its being a political dictatorship, cannot be compared in any way to the totalitarian regimes in the Axis countries. First of all, the Soviet Russian doctrine considers aggression or domination of other peoples as counter-revolutionary, that is to say, as being opposed to the most vital interests of Soviet Russia herself. Secondly, Soviet Russia has realized one aspect of democracy, which is economic democracy. Every page in current Russian doctrine indicates the necessity of passing from a temporary period of dictatorship to democratic socialism and communism. Even though its practical application may be delayed, the Soviet constitution represents a very clear step forward toward this goal. Furthermore, no people other than the Fascists, could neglect the vital contribution of Soviet Russia to winning this war. Finally, Soviet Russia has proved in the past to be extremely co-operative in international affairs, and during her stay as a member of the League of Nations, her attitude was absolutely correct, apart from the war against Finland, which has to be considered in relation to the military and strategic advance of nazi Germany. Therefore, Soviet Russia can be and must be an important member of the international order to come.

The members of the international order will have to agree on a method of international democratic control which will necessitate a minimum of interference, but which will constitute a maximum guarantee for the free development of humanity.

The third principle is *Economic Democracy*. Economic democracy implies the production and distribution of goods in the interest of the whole of humanity. It implies a certain regulation in the same way as political democracy regulates the relations between citizens. Changes in the distribution of wealth will follow necessarily in order to realize one of the four freedoms—freedom from want. Food, clothing, shelter, and medical care are essential to the existence of every individual, essential to every civilized society. In the international field this implies, apart from access to raw materials, regulation of immigration according to international necessity and according to absorption possibilities of various countries.

Economic democracy is the indispensable complement to political democracy. Without economic democracy, sooner or later the citizen loses his power to exercise his rights. Through monopolistic control of national life, peace is endangered because of the inevitable conflict of special interest groups.

The fourth principle is an *Association of Nations*. A full guarantee of peace and justice naturally requires the creation of a real association of nations. Such an association might include within its framework different continental or regional federations, but only as auxiliaries of the world machinery. The Association of Nations will guarantee collective security and have the necessary political, military, and economic powers to make good this guarantee. But in order to use repression as little as possible, the Association of Nations will need broad educational powers in order to spread the idea of world citizenship which will be the ultimate and supreme guarantee of peace. Past experience has proved also that in addition to government delegates, popular representatives should be elected in order to maintain a constant contact between the aspirations and needs of the people and the institution

which will safeguard the rights of mankind.

Today, no one can predict whether the principles of a democratic world order will be adopted. Historic necessity points very clearly to the adoption of such an order. But frequently mankind is backward in the acceptance of historic necessities. War and misery are the result of such delay. Reactionary and counter-revolutionary forces are far from accepting disarmament. Even after the Axis defeat, we shall find them fighting against the new order under a variety of covers and pretexts. The initial advantage is with them, because international order is a new experience to humanity and because by virtue of the law of inertia automatically the old order attracts greater attention. Lack of education and ignorance of international affairs on the part of the immense majority of mankind is another great obstacle to progressive solutions. When we consider also the force of nationalism and the economic power of the reactionary interests, we realize how difficult the battle will be.

Existing conditions on various continents are different. We saw in previous articles that the maximum changes will probably come on the European continent and in Asia, and the minimum in the Americas. The important objective is to release the immense forces in Europe and in Asia, and to encourage their development toward democracy in accordance with their traditions. This will involve the education of great masses of people on a scale of which we are not dreaming today. The spreading of knowledge to peoples which do not even know how to read is a primary condition for the establishment of a democratic world order. The organization of popular forces and unity within the democratic movement is a second vital and indispensable condition. When these conditions are fulfilled we shall be able to look ahead more confidently to the future of humanity.

MORALE *in* AMERICA

By ARTHUR UPHAM POPE

THE American public was quick to recognize at the very outset of this war that morale would play a decisive role, a conviction that has now been deepened and universalized, and though one almost wearies of the word, it still retains its savor. Simultaneous reports from six areas of the war effort recently stressed morale as a central factor. Morale is not a new discovery. It has always been a major element in every war, and the greatest generals of history have known how to enhance and exploit it in masterly fashions; but with the growing intelligence and the wider dissemination of knowledge, ideas are now more potent than ever, and the possession of the mind and the destruction of the enemy's will to resist are primary military and political objectives.

How has it fared with American morale this last year? On the whole, despite deficiencies, we have reason to be encouraged. A year ago the morale of the country was definitely at a low ebb. While cordially detesting Hitler, the nation was far from any common conviction as to what we could or ought to do about it. The inherent conflicts and normal rivalries between economic, social, racial, and religious groups were in full swing. The public lack of self-confidence was reflected in the confused and divided counsels of Congress; apathy and inertia prevented prompt or whole-hearted action even in the most urgent matters demanded by the public safety. The poison of frustrated idealism from the first World War made a mock of great causes which were already in mortal jeopardy; a morbid propaganda phobia denied validity to every reasoned argument, obscured thinking, and deprived us of precious information. The deterioration of religious and ethical sanctions, widespread anxiety and insecurity, a deep-seated emotional dread of war which counselled a demoralizing evasion of the realities—all these left the country on the whole perplexed and vulnerable. Despite the President's almost clairvoyant understanding of the real issues and the menace that faced the country, despite his unexceptionable statements to the nation, and despite the burning appeals from the anguished victims of German brutality, our people remained apathetic and

distraught. A sundry assortment of marplots —Lindbergh, Senators Wheeler, Nye, and Taft, Father Coughlin, Mrs. Dilling, Colonel McCormick, and the egregious Hamilton Fish —stirred up a huge clamor, loudly proclaiming that there was no danger, that it was all a plot of Roosevelt's—a campaign which added to the general confusion and heartened and delighted our enemies.

Pearl Harbor was the thunder clap that cleared this murky atmosphere and shocked the American public into the realization that we were in danger, that the aggressors meant bloody business and would not hesitate to fight a dirty war against us anywhere at any time. In how far was this new attitude only emotional, temporary, superficial?

The shock fused and vitalized many loose and inert elements. The services, particularly the navy, were fighting mad; and they will stay so until accounts are squared. The general public on the whole realized the folly of isolationism, realized that we were in for a tough business, and began to make ready for the strains and sacrifices; but there were and are important exceptions that are busily sabotaging the national morale, and events and mistakes of governments both at home and abroad have conspired to aid them. The leading isolationists are temporarily hushed, but many of them are more bitter than ever and on December 17, only ten days after Pearl Harbor, Lindbergh advised a group of America Firsters to bide their time; "Wait until the heavy casualty lists begin to come in—then will be our opportunity," he declared.

Some powerful business interests continued to put profits as usual before victory and are still shrewdly maneuvering for post-war economic advantage at the cost of present military necessities. Attempts which disregarded the realities were made to stir up an artificial hate against labor. The loss due to strikes was unscrupulously magnified. Translated into man-hours the figures were impressive, although at the top of the recent campaign of labor villification less than one-twelfth of one per cent of the labor engaged in war production was on strike. The horrifying losses due to preventable industrial accidents have until recently been ignored. Measles and the common cold have cost more in actual production than strikes. Rebates, concealed profits, shocking commissions, cartel agreements, the withholding of valuable knowledge have impeded our capacity. No wonder Leon Henderson said: "This country has not yet made up its mind whether it prefers victory or personal profits." A sorry proportion of men in public life have still been busy with politics as usual. The scurrilous Dies Committee was continued by a Congress that had the "backbone of a chocolate éclair."

The spirit of the general public also still leaves much to be desired. There has been too much "chiseling" on the gas ration, too little bond buying. Political indecencies have been tolerated by the voters, and many whose past performances should have spelled political extinction have been renominated triumphantly at the primaries. Their records were clear; either they could not read the plain signs of the times, or from improper motives they were willing to take a chance on the country's safety. They showed themselves unqualified for their responsibilities, yet the electorate in many sections did not care enough to act. Complacency, ignorance, party politics, irresponsibility have played their part and will result in the return to power of some unfit to govern, whose presence in Congress will embarrass the war program and multiply the difficulties of the peace and reconstruction.

II

OUR morale has also suffered from the ambiguity of fundamental notions. Basic to our whole undertaking are certain ideas and principles which are cluttered with conventional verbiage and sterile emotions, and inherently weakened by implicit contradictions. Sovereignty and nationalism each imply, in Hegelian phrase, a plurality of absolutes—a fatal contradiction. A freedom which opens the door to the forces aiming at the destruction of freedom is not only logical nonsense, but, as the Weimar Republic proved, can spell disaster; and a democracy that confers democratic rights on those who would mock at and ruin democracy is equally fallacious. There has fortunately been some hard thinking about democracy, but not enough. Democracy is a program and a process, not a fact—a challenge and a hope, not a gift.

Once all these notions are clarified, their potency will vivify and sustain every effort. Here the philosophers and writers have an opportunity for genuine service to morale, for all these basic notions have to be washed clean

of their irrelevant and self-frustrating accretions before they can render their maximum service to morale. National unity, for example, that essential ingredient of victory, is still only imperfectly understood. Unity in the sense of uniformity, a general diffused consent, is neither necessary nor efficacious. Quality of conviction counts more than numbers. It is psychic intensity that releases the miracle-performing energy.

To be afraid of criticism or honest dissent, to insist that we cannot go forward until all chant the same phrases and display the same emotions, is to confess our national unity fragile and impotent. Honest criticism is necessary and a sound morale is invigorated by it. A dishonest opposition that is cynical and self-seeking, cannot be won over by sweet reasonableness, nor need it deter us. If, like the McCormick-Patterson Axis, such critics work mischief, sow dissension, and flirt with treason, then both public opinion and the law ought to be sufficiently confident and virile to dispose of them without being intimidated by raucous self-justification, insincerely seeking protection in the very ideals which they so constantly outrage. We cannot wait for the slow-grinding mills of the gods to pulverize their hard hearts, nor for time to bring them round to a thoroughly genuine spirit of service in the national interest. It not infrequently happens that great journalistic power is wielded by those with a definite neurotic taint, with aggressive and distorted impulses that have no part in reason and yield only, if at all, to the skill of the psychiatrist, rather than to honorable or straightforward debate. There is no excuse for our being squeamish with this type of disruptive influence.

The Government also must bear its share of blame for present deficiencies in morale. There has been muddle and bungle in many a department. Government pronouncements have often been ambiguous, sometimes inconsistent, and until recently they have been too often manipulated and prettified. The Government was slow to see what Winston Churchill saw in a flash, that the Americans as well as the English can take it, and that our public is made suspicious, not to say infuriated, by rose-tinted "handouts," while bad news promptly issued and frankly admitted, is for the average American a tonic and a challenge. Stark realism is one of the main props of a stout morale; hence the vast relief at Elmer Davis' first statements to the nation where he declared that we were not yet ankle-deep in the war.

This has been one of the principal defects of national leadership. Morale demands clear, firm, and honest decisions. It needs the assurance that the leaders are resolute and adequate. It was not encouraging to have Mr. Nelson say nine months after we got tangled with a world in flames that he was *now* going to get tough.

How much the nation's morale has suffered from the appeasement policies of the State Department is hard to say, but the damage has been considerable and many thousands of honest and patriotic citizens have felt that the Department's policies these last ten years have dishonored and enfeebled the national tradition. The Department's anti-Semitism, its cruel, reactionary policy toward political refugees have been perplexing and depressing. The sight of America intimidated by the braggart Mussolini into conniving at the assassination of Ethiopia and sabotaging the League of Nations' one great attempt to preserve international decencies, was a new and dispiriting spectacle in American history. Our share in the pitiful tragedy of Spain will long be remembered with shame. The sending of hundreds of thousands of tons of scrap to Japan and, what was worse, the assent to the trickery by which far more of it than the President's decree intended or warranted continued to reach Japan; the farce of Saint Pierre et Miquelon, and of Martinique—all these have contravened and tarnished American ideals which are at the roots of any high and sustained national morale.

Other elements in Government also have been deleterious to the national morale. The farm bloc with its stubborn insistence on preference for one economic group at the expense of the whole is a bad sign, but the Government's silver policy, if less important, is equally indefensible. There is a suspicion that many officials are ready to give the "brush-off" to both Kaiser and Higgins—two heartening exponents of the American way of doing the impossible, men whose achievements have contributed to the morale of the whole country.

The policy concerning the second front, which has only in the last few days conceded the rights of public opinion, has been damaging to morale in both this country and England, as well as in Russia and on the continent

of Europe. The professional view was that the public had no business to express an opinion. Yet there was nothing in the record of the High Command of the United Nations that warranted the demand for unquestioning confidence, a confidence that can be accorded only on the basis of realities. The public has not wanted to say when and where a second front should be opened, but it was entitled to say that such a front should be established at the earliest possible moment, even at great risk, and that the perfect operation later might be too late and the imperfect one now, however forlorn, might help spell ultimate victory. Public protests in England and America correctly affirmed the right of the common people to contribute to broad policy in time of crisis. The feeling that those who would bear the loss should be heard is in itself inspiriting to morale, while to be told that such an appeal is improper and untimely is distinctly damaging. For the sense of active participation, the sense of belonging, the feeling of responsibility for the common welfare—these are all indispensable and powerful morale builders.

III

THE morale policies of the Government have been for the most part conventional and obvious, based chiefly on common sense; but in a perilous total war, this is not enough and the mobilization of the spiritual forces of the country, the survey of the morale health of the nation, and the diagnosis of its morale ills, the disclosure and analysis of the many surprising and subtle motives that enter into this organic and multi-angled problem, cannot be left to guesswork, nor are they fully understood by even the most gifted politicians.



The problem of mental and moral health is one for social scientists and educators, for psychologists and psychiatrists, working with colleagues in a dozen other fields. The immense body of knowledge that has been acquired since the last war bearing on these questions has not been properly utilized by our Government. It has consulted Hollywood, Broadway, and the advertisers, but has consistently refused to assemble a group of experienced experts for research and policy planning on this fundamental subject.

The Government program on morale has, as a result, been fragmentary, ambiguous, and often naïve. The President's speeches have indeed been great morale builders; each has enlightened and fortified the will of the nation. Elmer Davis' honest realism and Vice-President Wallace's epoch-making speech on the People's War have helped to solidify and arouse the whole people. But alas, none of this was systematically conveyed to the armed forces, as it would have been in any other country and so far these efforts stand too much alone.

In various military departments certain morale problems have been thoughtfully studied. The value of recreation, for instance, has been recognized and it has been lavishly provided, but apparently without any clear theory of morale priorities or any co-ordinated morale program. The central role of knowledge, particularly the knowledge of our own traditions in morale building, has been neglected, and a painful proportion of our army, at least, is still puzzled as to the reasons for our being in the war, or where they are going, and why. In one infantry company recently tested, eighty per cent could not locate Africa on the globe—unbelievable but true.

Again, the Government has hesitated to announce with convincing thoroughness the broad and concrete war aims for which the enslaved and wretched populations of Europe are listening—in heart-breaking silence. Concrete pledges that envisage security and a decent world, the right to take part in a reorganized and more just society, the certainty that the average common man and his children will actually reap the values which could come from a courageously defined peace—these supreme morale weapons have been used only timidly. They are swords not to be flourished, but with which to smite.

These deficiencies of the Government both

reflect and influence the state of public opinion. The Government has not yet got tough at many critical points. It is still afraid to fire incompetents, is reluctant to give sufficient responsibility to boldly constructive minds, is still encumbered by red tape and routine, which obscure the realities.

IV

THE country as a whole is by no means really angry, but is in large part strangely quiescent in comparison with the forthright violence of feeling of 1917. Earnest patriots then felt that we should all be contaminated by eating sauerkraut, unless it was rendered innocuous by calling it Liberty Cabbage. It was hotly argued that our young people at the most impressionable moment of their lives would be infected with the German virus if they marched to or from the altar to the strains of either Wagner or Mendelssohn. The study of German was to be dropped promptly throughout the country, as an "encouragement to our boys at the front." There were senseless cruelties and brutalities to those whose names or birth suggested even a remote tie with the enemy.

We may be grateful to have been delivered from such vicious nonsense, but the raging fury against German abominations in Belgium, the flaming zeal for a great cause that looked beyond national defense to universal well-being, these are strangely absent now, although the crimes, the provocation, and the danger are immeasurably worse. Belgium in the first war was hardly more than a rehearsal for the massacres, tortures, starvation, the night of terror and horror that Germany and her odious accomplices have let loose on the world. Are our sympathies exhausted? Where is that burning wrath that could consume all the obstacles to the swift victory, obstacles which still impede us? Many seem bored at the thought of other peoples' suffering. Many still doubt if we are or have been in any danger. All is not yet right with our morale.

Yet the morale outlook is by no means as dark as it might appear from a frank review of its problems and deficiencies. The morale potential of America as a nation remains superb. It needs only to be fully evoked to be capable of any sacrifices, almost any accomplishment, and unlimited endurance. The combat morale of the fighting forces has been beyond all praise. Has their gallantry been appreciated by the country? When Winston Churchill, who knows what these things mean, heard of the gallant exploit of our aviators off Midway, from which only one returned alive, he wept. How many Americans shed a tear for this exploit, not surpassed in the annals of heroism of any nation?

Despite the lack of government support, morale research, education, and planning go on. The Committee for National Morale, the most ambitious of the organizations concerned with the question, has already published several books and many studies, has more on the way, is constantly conducting seminars and other discussion groups, and much of this material has been utilized by various Government agencies, though not in accordance with any over-all plan. The Harvard Defense Group under Professor Ralph Barton Perry, and the Harvard Psychological Seminar on Morale under Professors Murray and Allport have carried through some researches of great value. The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues has produced a notable volume edited by Professor Goodwin Watson, on Civilian Morale. The English Government is now supporting morale research and Canada is developing a morale service, while the Government of Australia has established a Commission for National Morale along the lines of the American Committee for National Morale. These and other morale agencies are steadily expanding their work and influence, and in direct ways they are contributing to the morale of the nation.

But the greatest source of morale lies within the nation itself. Morale is the product of tradition, history, character, and none of these can be made in a day; they can only be evoked and directed. The power-generating ideals in the nation's life, which are strong enough to achieve victory and insure a constructive peace, are there, if still dormant. For their maximum effectiveness there is need of strong and confident leadership, at the top and all the way down the line; a need of education, of guidance, of expert protection from the psychological machinations of the enemy, a need of an abundance of straight information, a more complete identification with our own past, more zest for the best possible future, more sense of our oneness with those of many nations who through common faith, aspiration, and necessity are now our next of kin.

"I say, you chaps, we've no more room."

THE SECOND FRONT—

—some day

BY TOM WINTRINGHAM

London, September, 1942.

AFTER the visit of M. Molotov to London and Washington, there was a natural expectation here that action would follow in the shape of a second front on the Continent of Europe. After Mr. Churchill's visit to Moscow this expectation was revived, though the disappointment of the previous month or two still shadowed many minds. This disappointment seemed to parallel much of the history of the previous six years.

In terms of my own experience, typical of the experience of many, these years included a continual repetition of the same unfulfilled promise. During the first six weeks of the war in Spain politicians of the Left told me that the plans for non-intervention, then being discussed by the British and French Governments, must be supported because we were not ready to oppose fascism with armed force. "Next year we shall be ready." Next year the same thing was said again. In 1938, at the time of Munich, we were told that Britain could not fight; London had no anti-aircraft defenses: "Next year our new arms factories will really start production." In 1939, we went to war but did not begin fighting. When I and others asked, during the campaign in Poland, why we did not lift a finger, or drop anything heavier than a leaflet, to help the Poles, I was told that our "shadow factories" were still shadows, but next year they would be realities. In 1940, everyone in Britain realized that after Dunkirk we must stand on the defensive for a period; but we were promised that in 1941 or at the latest in 1942 we should turn to the attack. Three days after the Germans invaded Russia in June, 1941, I published the first article printed in England advocating a second front; the answer I received from supporters of the Government was that we were not strong enough to do it in 1941, but certainly we could do it next year. And for all whose experience is similar to this there is difficulty in believing that we have come to the end of the inexhaustible capacity of the British Government for postponement.

Two main arguments against the second front continue to be canvassed. One is that we are insufficiently prepared with equipment and that some of the troops who might have to take part in the action are insufficiently trained. The other is that there is a better alternative way of winning the war, by concentrating on the bombing of Germany. The first of these arguments is naturally based to a large extent on British defeats in Libya. Lack of gunpower in tanks and lack of a heavy anti-tank gun in sufficient quantities were two of the main excuses made for these defeats. And it is clearly a fact that the British tanks almost all carry a two-pounder gun which cannot match the German armament; the only type of American tank in Libya, the M3, is already obsolescent, and a considerably better type is being manufactured in the U. S. A. It is clearly also a fact that we have no dive bombers in action, and no other planes specifically designed for close support in ground fighting. For these reasons, say some of those who oppose the second front, it is absolutely essential to wait until the equipment has been produced. When asked whether such waiting may not release against us, through the partial crippling of Russia, a much greater weight of good modern equipment in trained German hands than that which we can manufacture and put in the field, these opponents of the second front refuse to answer. They have become so accustomed, during the past twenty years or more of British life, to the proposition, "Nothing ventured, nothing lost," that they cannot grasp the situation in which it is necessary to exert offensive power in order to prevent a tragic worsen-

ing of the whole position of the United Nations.

In this connection it is useful to recall the very different answer given by the British Government and people to a similar dilemma a generation ago. In 1916, German attacks on the French Army were endangering the power of that army to continue the war, and particularly its power to take offensive action in the future. In that immobile form of warfare the Germans, by attacking Verdun, were able to achieve a weakening of the forces opposed to them exactly parallel to the weakening of Soviet armies by far more spectacular battles of movement on the Russian front today. The British Government was faced in the summer of 1916 by the fact that a large-scale offensive was necessary to relieve the pressure on Verdun and to enable the French Army to rest and reform. Such an offensive had been planned as a joint effort of the French and British armies, in which the former would contribute rather more infantry divisions than the latter. Then the French had to confess that they had used up almost all the divisions earmarked for this offensive, and possessed very few fresh enough to attack. The offensive therefore had to be carried out almost entirely by British troops. And the British army was very ill-trained and very ill-equipped. The British official history of that war states that "the tactical methods in which the infantry had been instructed proved faulty and unsuitable and . . . brought about unnecessarily heavy losses." And the same history describes some of the British equipment of the period as follows: "The firing mechanism of the heavy trench mortars went wrong on the first of July after a few rounds. . . . The fuse of the 8-inch howitzer frequently failed. . . . The 60-pounders averaged two prematures per thousand. . . . An officer reported a dud shell every two or three yards over several acres of ground. . . . Spare parts for every kind of weapon, vehicle, and store had been neglected."

In spite of these deficiencies in training and equipment the offensive on the Somme in 1916 was begun exactly on the date agreed upon with the French, and was continued stubbornly until mud and winter ended fighting. Britain had been less than two years at war when this offensive was launched; and no rearmament program had been under way before 1914 similar to that which, according to government promises, was under way here between 1935 and 1939. We have now been at war for nearly three years; we are faced with a need essentially similar to that of the Somme, in a situation certainly graver. To say that we cannot do as well today as we did on the Somme in 1916 seems to me, and to most of my contemporaries who fought in that war, a ridiculous evasion of plain fact. Although I reached France in August, 1916, I did not see anything of the actual Somme fighting. From the accounts of those who did, and from official or semiofficial histories, it was clear that this was a blundering and badly managed battle, with stupidity almost as evident in its direction as courage in its execution. The waste of lives was appalling. But the offensive secured its aim. German attacks at Verdun ceased, and the French Army was able to win back practically all it had lost near that fortress. The German Army as a whole lost the initiative on the Western front, and had to stand on the defensive for more than a year. These results mattered on a world scale; our losses in achieving these results, though deplorable because largely avoidable, mattered far less. However dissatisfied we may be with some aspect of the training and with a great deal of the equipment of the British and American forces available for the offensive in Europe, it is impossible to avoid this comparison with the Somme, and this comparison leads directly to the conclusion that the factors lacking are not training or equipment but the political and military decision and the will to fight.

Wherever the will to fight may be lacking, it is not lacking among the combatant troops, British, Canadian, and American, now available here for the invasion of Europe. The reverse would be true: a bitter sense of frustration is obvious among fighting men, and also in the civilian population, because we are not allowed to take a share in the war comparable to that taken by Russia.

II

IN any military operation three of the first questions to be asked are "when, where, and how." The first of these is answered by the words, "at once," if the above line of reasoning has any validity. The second is not so easily answered. "Where" must to some extent depend on "when." Today the right choice might

fall on one country; tomorrow, because certain German troops have shifted or because there is a change in the political temper of certain European countries, the choice might rightly fall somewhere else. But in any case, there are certain factors governing the choice that can be stated. One is that the invasion of Europe must occur along relatively short lines of communications and the force carrying out this invasion must not be supplied along sea routes round the Cape of Good Hope and through the Suez Canal. Invasion of Italy therefore could only occur if it were possible to open a safe route through the Straits of Gibraltar. The safety of such a route can never be guaranteed when unfriendly territory exists on either side of the Straits. A second principle is that the readiness and ability of the local population to support our invading forces is of more military importance than other factors which are sometimes considered primary. This principle which derives from the whole conception of the nature of the present war, will be dealt with under the question of "how." The third principle of importance in regard to "where," is that hard country makes good fighting. It is a principle known to American military history through the storming of the heights of Abraham, the crossing of the Delaware, and the drive through the Wilderness, as well as by lesser examples. When two great armed forces face each other, the force taking the offensive cannot often usefully move in the directions which are physically easiest for its movement. Along those directions the enemy expects attack; defenses have been prepared; a counter-offensive is already mounted. In the present war the Germans secured advantages by driving through the most difficult country on the Western front, the Ardennes, and through the most difficult country in Yugoslavia and Greece. These considerations all weigh against the simple attempt to return to Dunkirk or Calais. But whether the choice should fall on Norwegian fjords or Dutch islands, the Scheldt or a rocky coast in France, or somewhere else, cannot be usefully determined solely by geographic and physical criteria; the population are more important than, for example, the port facilities.

How should the second front be carried out? On this question there is no unanimity in Britain. Official plans seem to be for one sort of operation; the popular imagination and the thinking and the desires of progressive officers and men in the forces have shaped a completely different conception. Official plans appear to be based on the purely military conception of a landing not essentially different in its aims and methods from the landing of Allied troops near Sebastopol in the Crimean War of 1854-55. After a series of landings on open beaches, our forces advance on a port; they attack this port, meanwhile fending off enemy counterattacks on their flank and rear; they establish a bridgehead which they fence off with trenches and barbed wire, while accumulating in and near the port masses of material for a cautious advance. During these operations the air force would be used primarily as a protective umbrella, not as offensive artillery or as a link with advanced detachments moving forward so rapidly as to be out of touch with their landing points, and also as a link with guerrilla uprisings along the enemy's communications. Progressive opinion here, in the air force as well as in the army, rejects this conception of the operation as costly in lives and shipping, wasteful of strategic opportunity, and unlikely to succeed — though even such an operation might help to relieve Russia.

The other general idea of how the job should be done derives from technical military considerations as much as from the political view that this war is part of a long-drawn-out people's revolution. It has not escaped us here, for example, that German units during the Polish and Russian campaigns were able to cut loose from contact with their base because "their base was in the air"; from this base they could receive at short notice combatant support in the form of dive bombers or a necessary minimum of supplies, gasoline, etc., by means of transport planes. We also know of the disorganization caused behind defensive positions in other campaigns by the use of air-borne troops. And we have seen the conquest of Crete by such troops alone. Therefore, progressive officers who desire to use air power to the limit reject the conception of what might be called a "very regular" landing in Europe and accept the idea of air power linking a regular striking force with guerrillas from the local population.

Other officers with modern views stress that decisive maneuver in modern battle is maneuver by vehicle. At first sight this may seem to provide an argument against the second front, since the landing of wheeled or tracked vehicles is difficult on open beaches and is slow even in

an equipped port. But there remains a great deal of transport in the occupied countries, and every vehicle in those countries that is in civilian hands can be ours if we can make arrangements to secure it. Experience on the Russian fronts has shown that maneuver by vehicles can be seriously slowed down if road blocks are defended in or near each town and village. If we can organize and arm local forces to establish and defend such road blocks at the right points, each of the centers held will act like a non-return valve in a pipe line; it will let through our forces moving in one direction, but check the enemy forces moving the other way. Even if the defensive capacity of the groups holding the road blocks is very low, and because of lack of arms or experience they can be pushed from their positions in an hour or two, such delay will still be sufficient to make maneuver by vehicle far slower for the Germans than for us. Therefore those who believe in maneuver by vehicle as the main key to success in modern battle incline toward the thesis of the people's war, rather than toward a repetition of Gort's expedition to France.

III

HOW would a second front be carried out on lines that combine the ideas of modern tactics and of the people's revolution? I believe the answer I give is not mine alone, but that of officers of all three services, representing the majority opinion of those services—and including some, but not all, of those holding very high positions.

In the first stage of perhaps a fortnight, raids take place at widely separated points; and most of our offensive bomber force is turned from what may be called economic targets in Germany or the occupied countries to strategic targets, such as bridges, airfields, and defense installations. Political warfare—broadcasting and leaflets—would announce that the main invasion was coming soon, and parachutists would land to make contact with those patriots who control the illegal papers and can muster a number of fighters. Toward the end of this fortnight of preparation, a landing in force would occur, which might or might not be in the area chosen for the main effort. And a certain number of weapons would be landed from the air at points indicated by the underground movement in order to arm the fighting squads of that movement.

In a second stage, lasting only a few days, a dozen fields would be seized each night by these armed squads and held by them for a few hours of darkness, during which our transport planes or bombers would land on them to drop arms, ammunition, and perhaps some light vehicles, by means of which the material landed could be dispersed in the early hours of the morning. For such purposes as holding road blocks, carrying out a general guerrilla campaign disrupting communications behind the enemy's lines, blowing up bridges, stores, and power lines, the weapons required are very simple. A number of rifles; a larger number of light automatic arms; some tons of raw explosives with fuses and detonators, which anyone can make into demolition charges and hand grenades—when worked out on this basis, the loads that can be carried in a thousand bombers or transport planes can be estimated as armaments for several hundred thousand men. With every weapon and every parcel of explosive a simple handbook would go, explaining how to use the arms and giving the principles of guerrilla tactics.

The main landing would be made at the weakest point discovered by the raids, and at the moment of estimated maximum diversion caused by the guerrillas. The object of the landing would not be a limited offensive confined to a small territory, or the establishment of a bridgehead with a neat line of trenches keeping the enemy away. It would aim at going across the occupied country, or most of it, like a forest fire. When checked on the ground, it would leap through the air as a big fire does to start new centers of attack. Most of the centers that matter—Oslo, Amsterdam, Brussels, and Paris—are within a hundred miles of the coast. Each of these national centers is also a center of resistance. The aim should be to capture at least one such center, if possible within the first three days, and certainly within the first five, from the main landing.

These large centers of population and of government are also centers of the enemy power. Their capture, or even an attempt to storm them from outside (while they are being seized at the same time by forces in revolt within them) would have almost the same effect on Europe as is seen in dry countries when a forest fire reaches a store of fuel or explosives. And a blast from an explosion is freakish; an explosion as big as that which Paris could provide might shake things down in Rome.

The only real alternatives to this general idea are either to wait until far into next year, when perhaps we shall have much stronger forces for a "regular" landing, or else to give up the idea of landing altogether, relying only on the bombing of Germany. The risk involved in the first of these is that the damage which is likely to occur in Russia, China, India, and the occupied countries may be so great, during the period in which we are waiting, that when we do contemplate a landing it is against much heavier odds than at present. To this risk must be added the risk that our opponents will seize, while we are postponing action, so much of the raw materials of the world that our production of the necessary arms during 1943 is severely hampered. These risks are now so serious that for most people in Britain they seem greatly to outweigh the risk that an invading force would be roughly handled by the German Army and perhaps thrown out of the Continent. And many people see that such a disaster might strain the German armies in Russia to such an extent that the Red Army could carry out a successful counter-offensive.

The remaining alternative is that of bombing. It has been estimated that the heavy German raids on Britain before the Russian campaign began caused a diminution of production, due almost entirely to the physical destruction of productive facilities, amounting at most to less than 15 per cent of the annual national total production of necessary goods. It is also estimated, by those closely concerned with the morale of the people, that this bombing of British cities caused so great an increase in determination to finish the war by winning it, that over the period of a year it has been responsible for about 10 per cent increase of production. The net effect of bombing on Britain, therefore, if it is considered solely as a military-economic operation, could not amount to more than 5 per cent of the national production. Our bombing of Germany may be heavier and German morale more susceptible, but German targets are far more scattered and can only be reached after a much longer flight. German and Italian air forces have for some time past concentrated against Malta an attack far heavier than that concentrated in any previous campaign against an area of several square miles. This attack has not prevented the civilian population of Malta from continuing to exist and do some part of their work; the docks and airfields still function and land is still cultivated. To carry out a bombing attack on Germany, and on German-controlled areas producing war goods throughout Europe, equivalent in concentration to the attack on Malta, would require the employment of a first line force of about two million planes—two thousand times the number at present available as a first line force. From these estimates most people outside the propaganda bureau of the Air Ministry here consider that the hope of destroying Germany as a fighting force mainly by bombing is based on false premises, and has no relation to the real urgency of our position.

Air raids by a thousand bombers at rare intervals, like large scale commando raids lasting a few hours, may impress the British public for a few days; but the British people's admiration for and concern about Russia, and their feeling that they have not yet had a chance to fight, combine to keep the idea of a real second front continually before the public. Both public and services are more than ready for such a front and are prepared to stand the casualties involved. It is doubtful how long they will stand further postponement.

ULTRA
HAVANA, CUBA

I CONGRATULATE you most heartily on the first anniversary of the publication of FREE WORLD magazine, which is, undoubtedly, one of the leading active forces in winning the battle for democracy in our America, which is so much in need of action against internal and external enemies.

FERNANDO ORTIZ

ROUND TABLE

№ 11

ESSENTIAL FINDINGS

I

The United Nations must launch an all-out offensive against the Axis. In this total war, a division of functions among the different nations is imperative. Equally important is the emphasis on the use of air power, including the bombing of German industrial centers, railway communications, and supply bases.

II

The total war imposes in the political field the need for greater unity in the planning and expression of post-war aims.

III

Although some progress has been made in enlightening public opinion in the Democracies concerning present issues and the problems of a future world order, a concerted effort to educate the masses regarding the interdependence of nations and the need for international cooperation is indispensable to the winning of the war and to the establishment of permanent peace.

IV

The creation of the machinery of a world government in which the present United Nations will serve as a nucleus is a necessary task of the present in order to prepare in time the foundations for a future world order.

The subject chosen for this Round Table is particularly appropriate for the anniversary issue of FREE WORLD. *Past numbers have presented exhaustive discussions of the most important aspects of the war and the peace to come. The following list of the titles will indicate that the ten Round Tables have considered all that concerns us most vitally, from the origins of the second World War to its possible outcome: Inside Stories of World War II; What About Germany's Future?; Chances of Victory; The Anti-Axis Revolt in Europe; What is Wrong with American Propaganda?; Asia and The United Nations; The United Nations; Woman's Stake in the War; Changing Cultural Values; The Coming World Order.*

In the same spirit, the Round Tables to come will deal with specific problems of the war effort and of the equally important task of world reconstruction. As a general introduction to these Round Tables, the present theme, Prospects for 1943, was chosen. The participants in the discussion are: Sir Norman Angell, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize; General Julius Deutsch, former Austrian Minister of War and prominent international labor leader; Max Lerner, Professor of Political Science at Williams College and Contributing Editor of the New Republic, *whose most recent books are "The New Federalist" and "Ideas for the Ice Age"; Eugene Lyons, Editor of the* American Mercury *and author of "Assignment in Utopia"; Ernest Minor Patterson, President of the American Academy of Social and Political Science and author of "The Economic Bases of Peace" and "America—World Leader or World Led"; Max Werner, well known military expert and author of "The Great Offensive: the Strategy of Coalition Warfare"; and William Ziff, author of "The Coming Battle of Germany." Louis Dolivet presided.*

Prospects for 1943

LOUIS DOLIVET—Gentlemen: In this difficult moment for the United Nations there is an understandable desire on the part of democratic elements to have a discussion about the prospects for 1943. Of course, we are no prophets; we leave this to Mr. Hitler, who predicted several times the definite doom of Russia and of England. We are going to limit ourselves to an analysis of the military and political situation and to the examination of suggestions for improving the collaboration of the fighting nations. Mr. Ziff, you have advocated a military concept whereby to improve the present precarious situation. Will you start the ball rolling?

WILLIAM ZIFF—Well, it seems to me that the situation is something more than precarious at the moment, but this judgment is based entirely on the relative military situation, one that we can change instantly by leaving all of our old ideas of military defense and attack and embarking on a campaign which will throw us directly at the heart of the enemy, at Germany itself. If we were to do that, and use the only means by which we can get at the German Reich, it would make very little real difference whether Germany held all three continents, as far as our capacity for attack is concerned.

DOLIVET—All of the three continents, you say?

ZIFF—Yes, all of the three continents. The big danger is that we might allow the Germans a period of time in which they could consolidate their gains so that they could actually outbuild us and attack us in our own way, in which case the military situation would favor them because they could not only outbuild us, but actually encircle us.

DOLIVET—Do I understand correctly that you would like to have the attack concentrated on the Germans themselves, Mr. Ziff?

ZIFF—You cannot win a war unless you attack the principal party involved. The war was not lost by the Allies when the English were thrown out of Norway, and it will not be won by the Allies if the English and Americans are able to take Norway. That would simply be a step, but not a decisive step in the war.

DOLIVET—Would you consider, in that case, that Japan is a secondary front?

ZIFF—Japan is a secondary front for the very best of all reasons. First, you can't get at Japan except over a tremendous water gap, which increases all your difficulties of attack. Number Two: if you knock out Japan, the Germans are very much in the war. If you knock out the Germans, Japan merely holds a little fringe on the Asiatic continent. You can come on her from all the land approaches of Europe and Asia.

DOLIVET—Would you agree with this opinion, Mr. Werner?

MAX WERNER—Yes, on this point I agree. I am totally convinced that Germany represents at least 80 per cent of the military strength of the Axis. There were three factors that favored Japan. First, the weakness and unpreparedness of the Allies. Second, a very well-calculated and improved strategy of fighting forces, a combination of land force, aviation, and naval forces in an oceanic *Blitzkrieg*. Third, the continental power of Germany.

Of course, the decisive problem for the Allies is to overcome the concentrated war economy and powerful military machine of Germany. I think that three elements, three factors, are now in our favor. I think that this wave of pessimism—

DOLIVET—May I ask, before you go on, that we discuss for a moment this point which Mr. Ziff has made? What would you say, General Deutsch, about this conception?

JULIUS DEUTSCH—I agree with Mr. Werner, that Germany is the principal power of the Axis. There is no doubt about it, but I think that the man power of Germany is now weaker than it was a year ago. In the fight against Russia the flower of German forces is being destroyed. The losses in the Caucasus are very, very great.

DOLIVET—Do you think that the Germans have lost really considerably in man power? I have had the impression, judging from the rapidity of their advance, that there can be no comparison between the intensity of the fighting last year and the fighting this year. I think

that this year the Russians are using the tactics of retreat and avoiding the battle, which, of course, reduces the number of victims on the German side.

DEUTSCH—This is true, but the Germans themselves say that losses are very, very big. It may not be as great this year, but combined with the previous year's losses, the total must be tremendous. It may not be as great as the newspapers state, not in the millions, but if we take a count of man power in Germany, we must conclude that the army has five or six millions in the field—no more. If, from this number the Germans lose one million this year —and they actually have lost many more than that—you must see that this means an enormous reduction in nazi power.

DOLIVET—Mr. Lyons has had a conversation with someone who just came back from Germany. Would you like to tell us something about the situation there, especially regarding the morale of the people?

EUGENE LYONS—Well, I can only tell you what he said. I just spent an hour talking to an American of German extraction who lived there for a number of years. He remained in Germany until the middle of this June in order to get his wife, who was a Jewess, out of a concentration camp. This fellow lived among the Germans. He had no contact with Americans, or any foreigners, at all. He is an engineer, not a sociologist; his reactions are purely human rather than a research job; and the picture he gives is one of complete cynicism on the part of the German population.

They are indifferent to victories. They hear the news of another conquest and they believe it, but they say, "So what!" They don't feel it is going to end anything. Living conditions are increasingly worse, and in general—not to take too much of your time—the picture he gives is optimistic, from our standpoint, in so far as everyday conditions are concerned and in so far as the feeling of the average German is concerned.

DOLIVET—Are you under the impression that he thought that this weakening of morale would lead to a breakdown?

LYONS—Well, his wasn't the type of mind that made any sweeping deductions. He was merely the kind of a person who would tell you there wasn't enough to eat and that everybody complains and that just as soon as they feel safe enough, they express discontent with the regime. His feeling is that radio isn't reaching the Germans because people are too scared to listen and that the leaflet method is much more important than the radio in the attack on morale. He found that more people were reached by that sort of thing than ever listened to the radio. His impression was that there was complete pessimism in Germany among the ordinary people, and that the government cannot counteract such pessimism because official propaganda is no longer believed.

II

SIR NORMAN ANGELL—We have not exhausted the first point made as to the main reliance for final victory upon air power. That is your theme, Mr. Ziff, is it not?

ZIFF—That is my theme.

SIR NORMAN—Against it, there seem to be a number of caveats. Although the industrial area in England was concentrated, it was not knocked out—it was so little knocked out that during the year of the bad *Blitz*, Britain was producing much more than she was before the *Blitz*. How, when you have a possibility of German industry distributing itself eastward over vast areas, can you bring about this paralysis of power by destroying industries, industrial plants, and so on, that have undergone this wide distribution.

ZIFF—May I tell you? Your reasoning is completely orthodox, but in view of the conception of air power, it is, unfortunately, incorrect. As a matter of fact, the concentration—

SIR NORMAN—For us, fortunately incorrect, I would say.

ZIFF—Well, fortunately for us and unfortunately for you, as a noted thinker. A concentrated area is by far the easiest to defend against air attack. That is Number One. Number Two, the Germans were quite unprepared for the kind of attack I advocate. They lacked the power in the air comparable to the amount of power they used on the ground in their *Blitz*. Number Three, in regard to Germany itself, they have almost all of Europe—I am looking at the map up there—to defend without knowing exactly where the British and the Americans are going to strike, and hence are forced to immobilize a tremendous amount of power they now must use against Russia to be prepared against this attack.

If you were to knock out, not German industries, which are now disappearing behind

the Sudeten mountains and far to Eastern Silesia, but their whole communications system, in a complex organism such as Germany's—and which has been complex since the days of the elder von Moltke—you make it impossible for raw materials to get to the factories. You make it impossible for anything to be shipped, either to the civil population or to the front, and you completely disrupt every normal factor in German life. You can even take an America which is not at war and completely throw her into chaos if you break her communications system, and Germany is far more complex, far more concentrated than America.

When we talk about an air *Blitz,* we now talk about something which Germany will certainly prepare for, which she was totally unprepared for when she attacked Great Britain. I went to Britain for the Air Ministry last year, and it was even then admitted that if Germany possessed the latent power to continue that *Blitz* for a few more weeks, it was doubtful whether Britain could have withstood it.

A human being is just like a city or a country. He can almost die of hunger, and still survive. If he dies, he is done for. If he hangs on by a very thin thread, he may continue to live. Just one further sentence. If this attack is made like the German attack on Britain, it will fail. If all assets are put into it in the same way that the Germans have thrown all their assets into the attack against the southern sector in Russia, it will succeed.

SIR NORMAN—You say it is easier to defend a concentrated area than a dispersed one, but wouldn't the obvious strategy for Germany be to base her industry upon a dozen concentrated areas and defend those intensively? That is to say, if she has factories of all kinds at various points and at railroad centers and other well defended communication centers, the actual blasting of railroad lines would surely not be very serious from her point of view.

ZIFF—Well, the assumption would be that all of that is possible, and that the blasting of the railroad lines is not serious. Actually, the reverse is the case. If, for example, you were to blast the canal along which iron is carried up from the Balkans, and blast a single railroad—

DOLIVET—Which canal?

ZIFF—There is a canal system connecting the Balkan cities with the Danube. If you were to blast its locks and blast the railroad connections too, Germany would simply have to rely only on the oil that she can extract from lignite.

SIR NORMAN—What about the motor concrete roads?

ZIFF—There is nothing to indicate that a huge war effort can be supported by motor roads alone. You will find that a tremendous portion of our hauling is done in other ways. In fact, even now the German internal system of communication is strained. In fact, if you want to put the lignite extraction of oil out of business, you blast the few power plants around Berlin. There is no effective defense, no matter what you may think, against a first class aerial invasion, if enough power is placed in there and if you are willing to take your losses.

This is a question of losses and a question of power and it gets back to the most ancient system of war. It is not new. It is only new in the sense that you can roll over the enemy's fixed defenses and get at his rear, get at his vulnerable points, and you must be bold enough to take all your resources and place them in this new method of assault. If you don't do that and you can't get at him any way, you may as well forget this business of winning this war. You can't get at him by sea, no sea invasion is possible—

LYONS—Would you say, then, that we ought to stop building up any more armies?

ZIFF—I would say that an army is only useful as an occupational device, both to police a country and to administer it.

LYONS—Here we are, in the United States, with an army of roughly four million men, and gradually increasing it to a point where it may be as high as ten million within the next two years. From the standpoint of aerial *Blitz,* would you say that all that energy and all that man power should be diverted in other directions, that we are making a mistake to build up an army as large as we have already, let alone a bigger one?

ZIFF—I would say that if what we meant was to attack, we are not utilizing the best methods at our disposal. If we mean defense, then we have got to protect ourselves against a possible invasion via Alaska or through the big hump via Brazil.

LYONS—Will we need ten million men for that?

ZIFF—For that you need all the men you can get, plus all the panzers you can get, but if you mean an offensive movement, then you can only utilize what you can find useful. We require no surface forces for invasion except

such an army as is required to land—not from beach heads on the coast, but directly over Germany after we had won—an army of occupation, an army of policemen, of mopping up squadrons or contingents, and of administrators.

SIR NORMAN—Would you take that risk in the case of Britain?

ZIFF—I think that you are taking a much greater risk when you don't do it, because if you look at that map—as Mr. Werner will tell you—you will find that you are immediately outflanked from every possible direction, if those three continents fall.

SIR NORMAN—But the risk I was referring to was the absence of an army. Would you have virtually no army of defense?

ZIFF—Great Britain is in a totally different position. Great Britain can be attacked, her industries destroyed. All the tremendous tactical advantage that she has exists for her only as she becomes a forward base for still another tremendous resource of power, which is the United States.

We cannot be attacked in retaliation. We cannot have our industries broken. We can continue to turn out planes. We can turn out all the paraphernalia of war while, at the same time, destroying everything that is in Germany, and the only thing we risk is our expendable ammunition, which we must consider our planes to be.

LYONS—Well, what I am really driving at—and I agree with Ziff in general—is this: I think that in our own country we will have to make a decision pretty quickly as to whether we are going to be the arsenal of the United Nations in this technological war or whether we are going to divert our man power and materials toward a land army of our own. We can't do both. We can't supply millions of men to all fronts—and the equipment that goes with those millions of men—and, at the same time, help equip the United Nations with the necessary air power and other technological equipment.

I think we are at the point where we have got to make the decision now. We have already drawn heavily on our man power for the army. We have already met many difficulties in materials and labor—because we are trying to do everything at once. The old strategy, the new strategy, the greatest army, the greatest navy, the greatest air power—we have got to decide which comes first and which is going to get priority, not only from our own standpoint but from the standpoint of the United Nations. What we are doing now, really, I think, is giving everybody pretty much what he asks because nobody has the courage to make a decision as to where we are going and how we propose to get there.

DOLIVET—You would favor—?

LYONS — A limited army, and concentration on our chief function, which is the production of the weapons of war.

SIR NORMAN—Weapons of air war mainly?

LYONS — Air war and the others, too.

ZIFF—We ought to produce only what we can immediately throw at the principal enemy and not have them multiply on our own shores to become obsolete, or to become obsolescent as time goes on. We ought not to allow ourselves to deviate for a single second from the principle of the offensive, which means that everything should be examined from that view only.



Max Werner *Ernest M. Patterson* *Sir Norman Angell*

MAX LERNER—May I make an observation here? Mr. Ziff is most persuasive, and—despite my lack of knowledge on this subject—all my instincts are to go along with him. If I would not say that air power alone could win the war against Germany, I should at least say it must be the spearhead—

DOLIVET—What do you mean by spearhead?

LERNER—I mean that the main emphasis and reliance should be placed upon it. I mean that it should be used to destroy the German lines of communication, level the German industrial centers, confuse the civilian morale. There are, however, several things that trouble me. I think Mr. Ziff must decide, for one thing, whether he is advocating air attack as a means of paralysis of the enemy's strength, or whether he is advocating an air-borne invasion of the Continent. If the latter, is it not true that the tactics that succeeded in Crete and Norway would have to be magnified immeasurably to succeed in France; and that, even if you had big enough and many enough transport planes to land a sizable body of men, you would need to get heavy guns to them and keep them supplied; and you would thus, in part, run smack up against the problem of sea-borne invasion? But if the air arm is to be used only to paralyze, you must be prepared to take enormous losses of your "expendable ammunition," as Mr. Ziff puts it—losses so great, perhaps, as to strip your defensive power should the enemy turn and use the same tactics against you (in this case, perhaps, England again).

DEUTSCH—I would like to make a comment, if I may, about aerial attacks. I think you are right, a concentrated area is better to defend than a wider area, of course, and so, if it were easy for the Germans to concentrate industry in many districts then the position of the Germans would be better. However, I think that during the war this concentration is not possible. That is the first point. Secondly, the situation of the German railway system is very, very bad. I think the weakest point in the German defense is the railway system and if the railways would be bombed systematically, then the situation of the Germans would be worse. Thirdly, it is not only the destruction of the matériel which is important, destruction of the morale of the people is important too.

DOLIVET—As former war minister there, would you think that in Austria, bombardments would have a great effect on the disruption of morale in the industrial communities?

Louis Dolivet

DEUTSCH—The Austrian question is a special question. I cannot say whether the bombardment of Austria would be successful. I think that in the case of Austria it would be better to count on the opposition of the Austrian workers to the nazi regime. It is not necessary to bomb the Austrian cities. You have the strong opposition of the workers there. They are doing whatever they can against the Germans.

WERNER—I am convinced that the modern air force is an extremely efficient weapon, a dynamic weapon, and a universal weapon which can be used in every situation and against all objects of the enemy, against its fighting forces, its industrial and shipping centers, but the modern strategy is a strategy of fighting forces that has to count upon and to use all the power of armored forces, to combine them and to let them act in co-ordination and team work. I am against strategic supermodernism.

DOLIVET—What is that?

WERNER—I think strategic supermodernism is very dangerous for us. The controversy about total air power is an intellectual conflict between limited warfare and total warfare. Air warfare, in the sense, in the meaning of so-called bombardment action against transport and economic centers of the enemy, is limited warfare, a limited strategy. What we want first is a total warfare. We must strike the en-

emy with all possible means of modern warfare, by a combination and co-ordination of all our land, naval, and air forces.

DOLIVET—May I ask, at this point, how you would challenge Mr. Ziff's and Mr. Lyons' observations that America, as one of the principal belligerents, cannot do everything at the same time?

WERNER—I will tell you how the problem has to be solved. We are waging a total warfare for the Allies, for the United Nations. In the frame of this total warfare we need a division of function according to strategic positions and resources. We must consider the resources and the military forces of the United Nations as a whole and we must realize a division of military function in the frame of this tremendous total power.

I think that this division of functions for America, especially, will lead us to these conclusions: America has first got to give the Allies matériel in modern, offensive weapons. It can do this. Secondly, America has to give the Allies a total air force, not only bombardment aviation. For the modern air force is a combination of all types of aviation: bombardment aviation, land aviation for the ground forces, and sea aviation. Thirdly, America has to give the United Nations naval superiority for an offensive in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Fourthly, America has to give the United Nations the necessary additional force—limited, but additional force—that has been required for the invasion of Europe.

These are, I think, four tasks America has in this war. About this fourth question, particularly, I agree with Mr. Lyons, that America's total warfare does not imply the creation of an all-out army, but that is a problem of division of function between the Allies. I think that thirty or fifty American divisions as a part of a great mobile force of the Allies for the invasion of Europe will be totally sufficient to give to the Allies the military superiority in western, southern, and northern Europe.

DOLIVET—I know that Mr. Ziff is waiting to get at this conception, but I know Mr. Lyons has a few words first.

LYONS—Well, I think you are quite right, Mr. Werner, that there is this division of function. It is, after all, a great team in which we can't all be halfbacks; we have each got to do the things we are best fitted to do. However, our thinking on war, unfortunately, is not clarified to the point where we understand the primacy of aviation and our obligation to recognize that primacy.

Let me tell you something I ran across recently. I had a writer looking into the matériel situation. We found that the timber industry, the producers of lumber, which is very much needed in connection with cargo planes and other war work, is being held up by lack of labor. Why? Because its men are precisely the type that have gone into the army and have been won away by other war work. Now the industry simply cannot cut its quota of timber. We have got to make a decision as to which comes first, the creation of a soldier or the creation of plywood for aviation. We must recognize at the same time that unless we take command of the air, we shall never be able to transport this vast army; we shall never be able to keep them on the ground, if we do transport them, unless the skies above are in our hands.

ZIFF—It may interest you to know that it requires almost thirteen tons of cargo space a month to keep one man in the field—only one man—but it requires four and one-half tons for the man himself and the rest is required for convoy under the present system.

DOLIVET—However, you will need to bring in oil for your air offensive, too. Will you depend on the convoy system for that or have you another solution?

ZIFF—Certainly. Oil is like any other commodity. You ship it. It is not necessary to ship it by tankers if you can put those tankers on wings. For example, you can put 1,200 gallons of oil in a glider. You can attach three gliders to a tow plane and haul those across the ocean. I saw those gliders only a month ago, and I know what they look like. That is only the beginning. It is not necessary to think in terms of a half-dozen airplanes crossing the ocean. You must think in terms of a supply system equal and adequate to your problem.

If you have a *Blitz* on land which is tied down to panzer divisions, and your supply system is linked to ox-carts, you will certainly lose the war. Your land *Blitz* will be worthless and your panzers will be less than worthless. The same thing is true of an air war. It is not an impossible equation. You can sit down and tie your supply system directly in with the needs if you have an attack force which is capable of meeting and overcoming the obstacles it will face. That has always been true in military history. It is no less true today. It was

true when Hannibal crossed the Alps. He took with him his elephants. He did other things which seemed utterly impossible. And so today there are obstacles which must be met.

SIR NORMAN—I want to clarify that caveat, the clarification not necessarily expressing my view, which I hold in reserve. But my caution is based on the British experience—not of August, 1940—but based on the two years since, that Britain has gone on with her production almost uninterruptedly.

ZIFF—She has had no experience with it, Sir Norman. That is very easy. The Germans are engaged in a tremendous struggle with a powerful adversary. Almost all of their assets have been put into tremendous ground establishments. If we were locked in such a struggle with, let's say, a powerful neighbor to the North or to the South, I should immediately withdraw all my strategic or tactical observations and say we must put our strength into a great land establishment; but since we are free from such attack and from the need for such establishments, then I do not say that.

War tactics are created according to needs. If you survey history, you will find that the Romans had a wonderful land establishment. The Carthaginians won victories because they held the sea. It was only when the Romans decided that they also were going to hold the sea that they beat the Carthaginians back because this was the sphere of action.

There is only one sphere of action today wherever a large body of water separates the two antagonists, and that is the air. There is no other way to get at it. May I point this out to you, that you will never have a greater relative difference in actual—not potential, but actual—military strength than existed between the German *Wehrmacht* and the little British force after Dunkirk? We even had to supply them with old army issue Enfield rifles, and yet the Germans were unable to go through. The important point, might I remind you, sir, is not that the Germans were beaten back over Britain. That is important enough, but that the German *Wehrmacht,* the biggest and most powerful military establishment in all history, was unable to go on and finish its job.

Had they finished their job, they would have come over and taken us with the same ease that Cortez took Mexico; there would have been no trouble.

LERNER—But doesn't Mr. Ziff prove too much by this example of the German air attack upon England? His remark that the real failure was that of the *Wehrmacht* is acute. But why would it not apply to us as well? If the Germans could not use the air arm as their sole reliance, how could we? If they needed someone to finish the job, would we not similarly have the same need? And if the great German *Wehrmacht* could not follow up on the punishing air attack, could the untried Anglo-American Army do it? Again I suggest that Mr. Ziff must distinguish between the use of aviation to complete the whole task of knocking out the enemy (let us call this total aviation warfare), and the use of aviation to paralyze the enemy behind its lines. The latter I should call major reliance upon aviation, but in a strategy of total war. If Mr. Ziff means the latter, I am wholly with him—more so, perhaps, than Mr. Werner seems so far to be, with his admirable analysis of total war and its division of labor, which gives no indication where he would put the decisive emphasis.

DOLIVET—Mr. Patterson, I suspect you are reserving yourself for the political part of this discussion, but would you like to say something now?

ERNEST MINOR PATTERSON—I wish only to make one comment on what Mr. Ziff and Sir Norman said. I am not competent to say whether the experiences in Chungking, Madrid, and Great Britain had any serious effect on morale, but I have supposed that the civilian morale was not broken in any of those cases. That leads me to comment on something Mr. Ziff said about the concentration of production. Such concentration, I suppose, is only relative.

ZIFF—No, it would be a concentration on this one air arm.

PATTERSON—All right, but relative in this other sense that if you do concentrate your manufacture of arms in the Sudeten area, or in some other place behind the mountains—

ZIFF—But I was speaking of America.

PATTERSON—I know, I was simply shifting it to Europe. You still have a task of getting to that area the raw materials—oil, copper, and countless other things—and also have the task of getting your finished product out.

ZIFF—That's right, sir, but that is the German task. I am talking about ours. It doesn't compare to that.

PATTERSON—But this is really in support of what I understood to be your position.

ZIFF—Pardon me, sir.

PATTERSON—Which is that the concentrated

attack on transportation and on manufacturing establishments would seem to me, as a layman in these military matters, to be a very effective thing.

ZIFF—There are no laymen in these military matters any more. The strongest leaders today are actually laymen, when you get down to it.

III

DOLIVET—Gentlemen, I think we have been offered two distinct conceptions of the strategy for 1943. One view, which I shall call the concept of Ziff, urges concentration on air power as the essential means of attack backed, of course, by whatever other forces are necessary. The other, which I shall call the concept of Werner, divides the function of attack among the three military arms.

Now, how would each of you apply your conception to the immediate military situation —first, in regard to Russia; and secondly, in the Near East?

ZIFF—In the first place, we can't help Russia directly. We can only help her by establishing that second front she so urgently desires. It makes no difference with what medium you establish that front. The only difference is in the principle. Wars never change; they merely revert to a complete concentration of power at the weakest point to which you can apply it and, again, to the strongest enemy. If you are able to do that, you are able to establish a tremendous division of the enemy's force. If Germany has to combat a real second front via the air and fight Russia at the same time, we have given Russia the greatest material aid in our power and we have liquidated the impending disaster in the Near and Middle East.

DOLIVET—So you consider, let's say, that the repetition of night attacks by thousands of bombers on German industrial areas and on Germany's communication system is of decisive help to Russia?

ZIFF—It would be decisive help if it were a portion of a campaign of absolutely reducing the Germans—in much the same way as if this artillery barrage, instead of coming from the air, came from the ground, not merely pinpricking, not merely for the purpose of disconcerting the enemy, but actually for the purpose of material conquest.

DOLIVET—This applies to the Near East, too?



William Ziff

ZIFF—The Near East, by practically the same token, because if the Germans cannot supply Rommel, Rommel can, at best, only hold ground.

WERNER—I think that the only important criterion of this coming action of the Allies is the strategic effectiveness of the action, and the only problem is rapid transition to an active war of coalition. You see, independent air actions, that is, big bombardments, have only limited strategic effect. Neither the Russian Army nor the British Army in Egypt was relieved by bombardments of Cologne, Essen, Bremen, and Düsseldorf.

The strategic effectiveness of the air war in the British Isles was limited, not because this air warfare was not yet developed to the highest degree, but because the strategic function of air warfare is limited. The problem is not the relieving of Russia; the problem is the coalition warfare of the Allies, and the relieving of the Red Army is only one element of this active coalition warfare.

The first problem is to organize an efficient Anglo-American attack against Germany, an all-out attack with all available naval, land, and air forces. The second problem is to establish a purposeful, common, offensive strategy of the Allies. It is not the problem of help for Russia. It is the problem of interrelating the

fronts, of interrelations existing between the Western Front and the Eastern Front. We must think of this strategy in terms of the whole picture.

If the Red Army is relieved from the West, it will be able to take an offensive. If it is able to take an offensive, it will relieve the Anglo-American forces on European soil. If the Anglo-American forces on European soil will be relieved, then both of the chief Allied forces in the European theater of war, the Red Army and the Anglo-American Armies, will be able to take co-ordinated offensive action.

That, I think, is the military problem. It is the only military problem. The difference between Mr. Ziff's conception and mine is this: He is for a limited warfare; I am for a total air warfare. When I speak about warfare, I am thinking not only about air bombardment, but I am thinking about the whole combination of air action in total warfare. In short, I am thinking about the air actions against the fighting forces of the enemy on the sea and on the land—and that is the principal difference between us.

DOLIVET—Mr. Ziff, do you want to answer that?

ZIFF—Well, if Mr. Werner really means that one must judge by the yardstick of precedent in considering the effectiveness of air warfare, I think we must all then, gentlemen, be in complete despair for the future of the United Nations in this entire situation because we must apply the same yardstick, then, to the effectiveness of land warfare against the Axis, which has been about nil. I merely point out to Mr. Werner that he is violating one of the principal credos in warfare throughout the ages, which is not to scatter your effectiveness throughout, but to concentrate your force—and not only to concentrate it, but to utilize every possible means at your disposal, whether it is psychological war, whether it is by air, by land, by sea, or any other way, to get at the heart of the enemy, to get through his front, to get to his rear and to smash that rear, or, in short, his vulnerable points.

If you find—as you do find—that there is only one method of getting at that rear, then there is only one method. You have no method of transporting your troops. If you examine a raid like the Commando raid which you just saw, you find that it was protected by two thousand planes and ran into the gravest difficulties despite that. If you had to extend that protection over an entire invading army, you would need more planes than could possibly be at your disposal.

I must go further than that. Just visualize, at any moment, a sea-borne procession attempting to tie up at a German port in an effort to establish a bridgehead for an invasion. I tell you that there would be a massacre. It is an utterly impossible situation. No sane captain would attempt it today. The day when that was possible has already retired from the history of man, because air power at this moment will destroy any sea-borne force which attempts to approach a shore where that air power holds the line, holds the fort. It is not limited in the sense that artillery was limited in the old days. It will attack that invading force as it begins to approach that shore. It will harass it, and the minute it ties into a shore, becoming a stationary target, it will smash it to smithereens.

The British found that out in Norway. I want to point this out to you about Norway, that there never was an invasion so favored—and Sir Norman will confirm this—as the British-Norway invasion. The British held control of the seas. They faced not a hostile, but a favorable population who wished them well and who could be their active allies. There were no tremendously active defenses in Norway, no great fortified places which made landing difficult, and there were no more than a few thousand German troops scattered through that whole area. If ever, according to orthodox terms, a sea-borne invasion could have succeeded it should have succeeded there, and yet Prime Minister Churchill admitted quite openly that with the attacks from the air, even though they were able to establish a bridgehead, they could not land any re-enforcements whatosever.

Then you come down to a prototype of operation which was completed in the case of Crete, where the whole thing was air-borne. It was largely fought on the ground, but it was primarily an air operation. They landed Alpine troops that fought it out in the interior of Crete but it was dominated by the air, and all invasions will be dominated by the air unless you have contiguous land territory. If you have that, you can occupy the opponent's air fields, you can immobilize his own communications and establish a system of things which will equalize the conflict. But in any case, where all power is thrown into one

branch, that branch being the air and that air branch being the only method, the only method of supply or of communication, then no other retaliation is possible.

What retaliation, for example, may I ask you, is possible against the United States of America by the Germans, by the Axis, while we are throwing our weight against the Germans via the air? The conception is impossible. You are now dealing in terms which are so new, and so frightfully new, that all old and orthodox methods of invasion simply pale beside it, and it is difficult to conceive it. It has immobilized them! it has totally knocked them out; they no longer exist.

You cannot bring a sea-borne force up against the German coast. You couldn't ride it up against the Italian coast. If we were to invade Italy, it would end in the slaughter of all the men who came there.

LERNER—Mr. Dolivet, I do not believe we should leave the military phase of our subject without seeing quite explicitly that the military phase cannot be considered alone, as if it were in a vacuum.

DOLIVET—We are going to consider political warfare soon.

LERNER—I do not mean only political warfare. Mr. Werner has said that this must become a coalition war. I agree, and I take it he means the maximum co-ordination with our allies, involving a pooling of problems and resources, a division of labor, a co-ordination of functions. He has also used the term "total war," in what I take to be a military sense —co-ordination not only between allies, but between the various forms of warfare.

But this is also and here I state a truism, total war in another sense—co-ordination between the military and auxiliary phases of warfare. This is not only a matter of supply. It is a matter of precise timing, of resourcefulness in the use of every means, of flexibility in adapting yourself to the changes in a shifting campaign and yet always maintaining complete co-ordination. It is also a matter of complete co-ordination behind the lines. In short, it involves a planned military machine, inside of a planned economic machine, inside of a planned administrative machine. The Germans have shown that they have this; so have the Russians; neither the English nor the Americans have yet shown it.

Now what troubles me is that neither Mr. Ziff's conception of warfare nor Mr. Werner's conception is possible without this absorption of warfare in the machine process. Mr. Ziff admits that the supply problem and other problems will be immense, but he invokes the spirit of Hannibal who solved the problem of the passage of the Alps. The fact is, however, as Mr. Ziff ruefully knows, that our high officials have not yet displayed that spirit. The habits of mind in which they have been bred are habits of a past military era; and men do not easily shake off their habits of mind. Lest I be partial in dealing out my criticisms, I want to apply the same comment to Mr. Werner's analysis. When he speaks of total war, I know that he does it with a full understanding of the enormous problems of co-ordination that it involves. This would require a change of habits of mind, a change even in social institutions (for example, the problem of the staffing of the War Production Board must be pushed back farther to the corporate control of American industry).

DOLIVET—These are far-reaching problems, that we have discussed in earlier Round Tables and that we are also scheduling for later ones.

LERNER—True, but their bearing on our subject for today is an important one. The question here is of the prospects for 1943. I suggest that to face it realistically we must think and talk not in terms of what forms of military strategy would be ideal, but in terms of what changes we are likely to be able to achieve. For politics is still best defined as the art of the possible.

In terms of the possible, I suspect that both Mr. Ziff and Mr. Werner are expecting too much. I am sure that Mr. Ziff knows the difficulties ahead of his conception. There is not only the task of influencing military staff opinion—either directly, or through influencing mass opinion. There is also the task of effecting corresponding changes in the organization of the war economy and the war administrative services. And I am sure that Mr. Werner knows realistically that the co-ordinated warfare of which he speaks is, for the same reasons, some years off.

This is not pessimism. It is a recognition that warfare is fought within the confines of social systems, and that their responsiveness or imperviousness to change is a prime factor in warfare. I have suggested elsewhere that if we win the war, it will be only by dint of our large margin of resources and men — our margin of waste. I think we are proving this,

and I think we are likely to continue to prove it during 1943. I am an optimist in the sense that I believe that men do learn somewhat, although slowly and with difficulty. We are learning, like other mortals, in the school of bitter experience. Mr. Ziff and Mr. Werner are invaluable in underlining our lessons for us; but my prophecy is that there are more lessons to come for them to underline. And we need no less other teachers, who will underline the same lessons in economic, social, and psychological terms.

Just one word more. From this angle, Mr. Ziff's conception has the merit of being dramatic, of having about it a disarming simplicity, of involving a concentration on a single purpose and a single arm of warfare. I hope he will forgive my pointing out that these very qualities, while invaluable in spreading his idea, may prove dangerous when the final test of his conception comes. For I need scarcely point out that intensive aerial warfare of the sort he suggests involves almost as many problems of co-ordination as the warfare Mr. Werner is speaking of. And if we concentrate on the simplicity of the proposal, we will forget the complexity of the execution. It will take not only sophisticated military staff work but also sophisticated and single-minded economic staff work, and that in turn involves a great nation with mature social conceptions. We are very unlikely to get this in 1943. We are more likely to move along slowly in the direction of Mr. Werner's idea of total coalition war—provided Russia has not been knocked out by that time. Only let us make certain that in moving along that way, we pay increasing attention to the use of the air arm as a spearhead of military advance.

DEUTSCH—I want to say only a few words. I want to say that it is not a problem of helping Russia; the problem is to defeat the Nazis. All the other questions are secondary questions. We have first the political aspect and then we have to choose between the tactical questions, and as far as the tactical question is concerned, I am absolutely convinced that a second front in Europe is not to be avoided. If the Allies cannot open a second front this year, then they must do it in the next year. Without a second front in Europe, it is not possible to defeat Germany.

DOLIVET—Now can we go over to the political aspect for 1943?

DEUTSCH—Propaganda is very important in this war—propaganda to those people in the country who can follow instructions and commit sabotage—the workers. Therefore, I think that the best thing to do is to spread anti-Axis propaganda, and the Government alone cannot direct this work. The labor propaganda must be directed by laborers, and so I'll express the slogan: Propaganda must go from labor to labor.

Then, if you will permit me to express it, the second question is the punishment of the Nazis. I saw a black list of the French Fascists, and maybe we can have an international court for all the crimes of the Nazis. Then this international court can pass sentence and perhaps we can broadcast that the international court sentenced Hitler—and Goebbels and Himmler and so on.

WERNER—And then we can sentence them?

DEUTSCH—No, these men know their fate. The important thing is that the sentencing of these men would make an impression on the world.

IV

DOLIVET—I wonder whether Mr. Patterson, who organized and presided over a splendid meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social Science in Philadelphia, would give us his impressions after having heard the representatives from different countries on the aspect of winning the peace as related to the task of winning the war.

PATTERSON—Prior to that meeting, I sought the advice of a large number of persons whom I thought competent to decide the emphasis which should be given, and found that quite a number felt that we should give all of our attention to the ideas involved in winning the war. However, the majority favored discussing the long-run questions because they thought that it was the proper function of the Academy to do so, but we actually stressed both. Probably one of the most astute comments I heard from one who was present was that it was a meeting of personalities, with the emphasis on the personalities and, perhaps, less on ideas. We had Mr. Jan Masaryk and Ambassador Litvinov, and a large number of others. Mr. Dolivet was there.

I think that one of my impressions, Mr. Chairman, is that we in America are apt to swing from one emotional debauch to another, and that the swing now among the groups with

whom I come in contact through the Academy and otherwise, is toward the things for which the Free World Association stands, and similar movements. I fear, however, that that is partly an emotional uplift and that we probably will have some reactions after a time. Certainly we shall, if past experience is any guide, and I am most troubled just at present because there still remain nationalist feelings which keep cropping out as, for example, in some of the criticisms in the United States against the British, and vice versa, and also because of racial feeling as well.

I am particularly interested now in the extent to which there is feeling of the population in the United States toward our own fellow-citizens, the Negroes. One of our greatest difficulties is to reconcile all this talk of democracy with the attitude of superiority that the whites have toward the Negro troops. That is the same problem, I take it, Sir Norman, faced in other parts of the world by various people in their relations with people of other colors, the yellow and the brown races, illustrated currently by the problems in India and the problems of the past in China, Java, and Burma, and in other places.

With this talk of a free world, of a union of all groups for something we call democracy, I am bothered to know how we are going to subordinate, or eliminate, these rather intense feelings which are quite irrational for the most part but which are very deep-seated. We have now reached the stage where we have the most glorious mixture of national antagonisms—some of them left within the United Nations—racial feelings where there are really different racial groups, and then the economic with the conservatives in many countries fearful lest our association with the Russians is going to mean some terrible overturn in our economic institutions and the upset of vested rights. It is a terribly involved situation from the psychological and the political as well as the economic aspect.

DOLIVET—Wouldn't you say, Mr. Patterson, that this complicated situation, with so many different factors, is not a proof of the difficulties which the coming system will face but an expression of the past system?

PATTERSON—I have listened with a good deal of interest to some of our friends discussing military matters. They spoke about certain fundamentals of strategy persisting through the centuries, but at the same time talking about complete change, as though we could forget much of the past in the field of economics and politics.

Psychologically, I think we are going to have a hard time doing what Ramsay McDonald, in an address in the United States, called "Changing our mental furniture." I don't know, Sir Norman, whether you remember his use of the expression, to allow the British time to change their mental furniture, but we have got some mental furniture, too, and mixed together. We have a lot of colonial and other furniture which we cannot get rid of very easily. We can talk about times having changed, but we must not forget that we in the United States have listened to Fourth of July orations, and other expressions of nationalism, including talks about the Hessians back in the Revolutionary days, which stick, and it is a slow job to get rid of all that to the extent that the new conditions call for.

SIR NORMAN—Well, I would like to support most of what Mr. Patterson has just said, particularly as to the ease with which you will get a public—particularly the American public—ready to agree to anything which sounds large-hearted, generous, and the rest of it. You see, some of us who were in this country just after the last war, or during it, cannot forget that there was a tremendous movement in this country in favor of collective security as a means to enforce peace.

DOLIVET—Was it a popular movement?

SIR NORMAN—Very popular! I think it is true that the governor of every state in the union signed a memorial in favor of it. In any case, I heard Taft say, with my own ears: "If ever the Republican party repudiates the League of Nations, I will resign from that party as an ex-President of the United States, giving to my resignation all the scandal and clamor which I can manage."

Everybody was in favor of the League for about a year, and then there came along domestic preoccupations, domestic rivalries, and within a couple of years, all was forgotten and wiped away. The lesson I draw from that is this: We, as educators, have not given an intellectual foundation for popular feeling in favor of peace. The case for international cooperation has not been intellectually vindicated or made plain to the mass of the people. We must interpret the professor to the public, whether it be in economics or anything else.

One proof of how little we have done in the

past for public clarification can be found in the fact that not one businessman in a thousand, in France or Britain, understood why Germany could not pay reparations without exporting goods. Would it be untrue to say pretty much the same of American public opinion? I mean tabloid opinion.

Now, however difficult the task may be, we must get an intellectual discipline of the emotions because it is an intellectual task in the first instance. I don't eschew the emotions. They are as fierce as you like, but we have got to submit to a discipline, which, I believe, we can do, but we have got to start the public, as it were, to see where we failed in the past.

V

DOLIVET—It seems to me that the important thing for us is to consider how the co-operation among the United Nations can be achieved in the political field, in the economic and financial field, and in the different other technical fields. If this co-operation is organized, the United Nations will be able to build up more and more a common outlook for the future.

SIR NORMAN—May I follow that up with a specific suggestion? Here you have, in every one of the United Nations, particularly in the United States and Great Britain, an organized system of public enlightenment—propaganda bureaus, ministries of information, or what you will. Surely, one of the first things to be done by those organizations is to show the defensive interdependence of our peoples.

Professor Patterson, a moment ago, made reference to Anglophobist talk in the Senate. We all know there is Anglophobia in this country. But we are also beginning to understand how much we depend upon each other. Surely, there is an opportunity now, on behalf of war morale, for the various national agencies in their own interests, to bring home to the public how very much we must hang together or be hanged separately.

If there is an obligation, which I believe the British Government is now recognizing, to bring home to the British people how very much we owe to America—I happen to know that the Ministry of Information in Britain is setting out on a regular campaign to explain to the British public how very much Britain owes to America—might not Allied morale gain by definitely organized efforts here to explain the nature of British contribution?

PATTERSON — In agreement, but in slight qualification of some things that have been said, we have talked of psychological influences, and at times the word "intellectual" has come in. I want to suggest that when we leave this building and walk along Forty-second Street, we ask ourselves how long it would take, intellectually to convince the various people we meet along the street, or along Seventh Avenue, or in the subways.

If we are talking about bringing intellectual conviction on these intricate matters to any very large fraction of the population, I think we are mistaken. What, I take it, is being urged is that perhaps we can bring intellectual conviction to a limited few, but that if we are to reach the masses, we are to remember that the day is long past when we think of man as Homo sapiens. We are past the age when we talk in terms of rationalism, and we are going to have to realize that the influence we exercise in this field will be through an appeal to the emotions. A psychological appeal, yes, but not an intellectual appeal.

DOLIVET—Sir Norman, would you say that the idea of interdependence as against nationalism is a decisive idea which we have to teach the people?

SIR NORMAN—Surely, and moreover it will emerge from the strategy of this war. My suggestion was that it could be linked to the whole

General Julius Deutsch

war effort. Yet, perhaps, I differ somewhat from Professor Patterson. There are just a few things which will aid the emotional approach and give the strength and vigorous staying power to the emotional conviction. Take this business of the interdependence of the United Nations. If you had told an Englishman five years ago—as you know, Dolivet, as well as I do—that he was interested in defending China, he would have told you not to talk nonsense.

DOLIVET—As he did; and as everyone did!

SIR NORMAN—Yes, as he did. If you were to start today to explain that to an Englishman, he would say, "Why are you talking all these platitudes? There is not an adult in England who isn't convinced that we have got to defend China as part of our own defense."

Now, if what we believe now we had believed ten years ago, there would have been no war. I do suggest that this belief of today is not something intricate, technical, difficult. It is a thing which has come without teaching at all. We have seen it. The Englishman sees it when he reads the paper and sees that if the Chinese are putting up a good fight and the Japanese are embarrassed and they cannot afford to open a second Russian front, the Russians don't have to keep their forces there, they can therefore go for the Germans; the Germans haven't "luftwaffers" for Coventry and London; and London sleeps more soundly because China is putting up a good fight. Coventry today understands it perfectly, yet would have ridiculed it and laughed at it six or seven years ago.

PATTERSON—Well, I take it that you mean this, that although ten years ago we didn't believe these things, we believe them now. May I ask, do you feel pretty sure we will believe them ten years later?

SIR NORMAN—No, not unless we drive them home in a hundred different ways and not unless we interpret these events in such a way as to make this conviction a definitely acquired part of the commonplaces of our minds, just as we have commonplace beliefs that are usually embodied in proverbs and nobody questions and they remain there.

PATTERSON—So that some other slogan will take the place, say, in the mind of the German of *Deutschland Uber Alles*, and in the French of *La Patrie,* and in the United States, of the Land of the Free and the Home of the Brave?

SIR NORMAN—Well, they may—

PATTERSON—Those are the slogans which stick with us in the various countries.

SIR NORMAN—Yes, they may stick—

PATTERSON—We want to displace them with others, is that it?

SIR NORMAN—Supplement them, rather. The English will sing, "There'll always be an England—provided America will give us the tools,"—the qualification we now add.

DOLIVET—Would you say that for Europe, for England, too, and for Russia, and for the rest of the world, I guess, a declaration of the United States that it will participate in a future world order would be of decisive importance? Many people I meet—I met some friends who just came back from France, two months ago, and who said that there is still no conviction abroad that the Americans will participate in world affairs. It is believed that America will do everything possible to help win the war, but not to participate in world affairs.

Do you think, Professor Patterson, that in view of a favorable orientation of public opinion, it would be possible to get from the representatives of the people a very firm promise of participation in the world order?

PATTERSON—I doubt it very much. Mind you, I favor it. Don't misunderstand me. I am trying to answer your question, though, as I see American public opinion.

In the summer of 1931, I spoke at the Liberal Summer School. It was just after the Hoover moratorium had been announced and the people I met in Great Britain were all enthusiastic over the re-entry of America into the world affairs, and when I ventured to say in an address that summer at the Liberal Summer School, that it was a mistake to conclude that the United States had now re-entered world life and was going to take an intelligent part in it, I had a rather hostile reception from my audience. There was vast disappointment.

DOLIVET—Yes, but the fact is that we are in 1942 now. If you were to speak to the same—

PATTERSON—It would be in the midst of a wave of enthusiasm. Oh, I expect a reaction. I don't believe it would be as great as it was in 1919.

SIR NORMAN—My point is to concentrate upon creating understanding as well as feeling. Your understanding will be advanced by hammering at the factor of interdependence in defense, that we must hang together for

mutual security. We see it now, and the more you can give that a rational basis, the longer will the emotion last.

PATTERSON—I would agree with that.

LYONS—Permit me to add a few words on the general subject under discussion. I find myself, of course, substantially in agreement, at least emotionally, with the fine brave post-war world sketched here. Certainly every man of good will hopes for a more just and better future, a more democratic America, equality for all races including the Negro, a Britain purged of its colonial excesses. He hopes, if it is permissible to be as frank about our allies as we are about ourselves, that even Russia will emerge democratic and purged of some of its specialized excesses. Who among us would object to a pint, or even a quart of milk, for every inhabitant of our globe—provided they like milk?

The question I raise, however, is whether it is fair to expct one war, even a global war, to solve all the accumulated problems and erase all the piled-up evils of millenia of history? Without exception, the United Nations are in the war because they were attacked. They are not in the war to emancipate the sharecroppers or to abolish Russian concentration camps or to free India or to give milk to every Chinese, though all these are desirable and laudable purposes.

You gentlemen think it outrageous, I suppose, for Gandhi and his group to insist on immediate freedom for India. That insistence plays into the hands of the Axis. You recognize that Gandhi is engaged in a species of blackmail, extorting concessions under threat of blasting the war effort. And I agree with you. But when American Negroes choose this moment to insist on certain well-deserved rights, are they not using exactly the same tactics as the India group? Are they not saying in effect, "Give us equality—or else!" In short, are they not using the same sort of blackmail in this hour of world crisis?

Now apply the same logic to all other problems, domestic, colonial, international. Agreed that any by-products of the war in terms of more democracy and greater world-wide good will are desirable. Agreed that certain types of promises for the future are exceedingly worth while now in the psychological warfare, the war of propagandas, that is under way. But let us acknowledge at the same time that the war will not, and cannot be expected to settle all problems and end all evils. If it ends the evil of Hitlerism and stamps out the specific epidemic now sweeping through the world, it will have accomplished a lot.

When your house is burning, the job is to put out the fire. True, the plumbing may be defective and the wallpaper obnoxious and your roomers may have just cause for complaint. But it is the better part of common sense to postpone the renovation and the revision of arrangements with roomers until the conflagration is put out. It seems to me that the man who insists on raising unnecessary issues now—whether Negro quality or socialism or internationalism—to the point of gumming up the war effort is on the highroad to treason. No matter how noble his motives may be. It seems to me that only those problems should be thrashed out and settled now which can't be postponed. That means in the first place strategy—both military and psychological strategy. Obviously if that isn't decided now, we may never have another chance. But let's recognize realistically that the post-war world will be as full of evil, as teeming with unsolved problems, as the world which Hitler attacked.

LERNER—May I say that I agree strongly with Mr. Patterson's emphasis on the temporary character of many of the characteristic ideas of 1942? I do not believe that one can exclude from history or from social life what Nietzsche called "the eternal recurrence." But social progress is nevertheless possible. It consists in having the characteristic tensions and dilemma of each successive epoch take place on a more advanced plane of social, as well as industrial, technology. I do not believe, for example, that we shall do away with nationalist feeling after the war. I should not want to even if we could. But the question is, not what are the residual sentiments among men, but what are the growing-points in their thinking? We must use the opportunity of the war itself (and here I agree with Sir Norman Angell) and of the post-war period, to make the growing-point increasingly that of a system of world sanctions on a military, political, and economic level, and a system of nationalism on a cultural level. Whether we shall make much progress in 1943 I very much doubt, but we must at least know our aims.

May I add a word about Mr. Lyons' last remarks. They imply that the efforts at social

justice and at a fundamental decency of man to man are a sort of luxury, and, therefore, to be denied in war. If that were true, I should follow Mr. Lyons and say, let us apply the scorched earth policy first of all to the New Deal and to the rights of Negroes and Jews and labor—not only the minority groups, but the majority groups as well.

But I do not regard democracy as a peacetime luxury. It is a war necessity for us. Let us recall that one of the really few effective utterances on our side during this war was Mr. Roosevelt's speech about the Four Freedoms. And another was Mr. Wallace's speech about the century of the common man. In thoroughly unsentimental terms these are more valuable than fifty divisions or thousands of airplanes. For, like the bombs aimed at German industry, they aim right at the heart of German morale and the German hold on the conquered peoples of Europe. But these speeches will prove boomerangs unless we apply not only the propaganda of the word, but the propaganda of the deed as well.

May I also say that this is not only an American concern. How we treat our Negroes is just as much a concern of Britain's; what happens in India is just as much a concern of America as of Britain. If my thesis is correct, that these are integral questions in the conduct of the war and that the war is a concern of all the United Nations, then it follows that problems of internal democracy that can be used as propaganda weapons by us or against us are the concern of all the United Nations. That is how I feel about India. I am less interested in arguing the abstract question of whether India should or should not be granted freedom now than I am in asserting that whatever solution is applied must be a solution that comes from and through all the United Nations. I am not interested in arguing abstractly about British imperialism or Gandhi's motives. But I am very interested in our doing what we can to bring a solution where we co-ordinate propaganda warfare as well as military and economic warfare. If the United Nations cannot during the war resolve so important a problem of our propaganda arm—involving as it does difficult questions of minority rights, nationalism, religion—then our chances for tackling the post-war problems, when the agencies will seem much smaller, become rather pitiful.

VI

DOLIVET—May I ask the last question? Do you believe that, in addition to a program of education on the interdependence of the various nations, there must be a similar educational effort on the question of democracy, an effort which, in my opinion, is of the utmost importance? I know the usual objection —Russia. People are skittish regarding the discussion of post-war democracy because they feel that it will exclude the Soviet Union. Nobody wants to exclude Russia at any price because Russia's contributions to the cause of the United Nations are so great. But there is no need for this exclusion, considered even on other grounds. For Russia, although politically a dictatorship, has achieved democracy in the economic field. Also, its international policy is opposed to aggression and is in favor of international co-operation. These are decisive differences between the Soviet Union and the totalitarian nations. Moreover, we must not forget our experiences during the last twenty years. They have shown us that the reactionary forces, which were ultra-nationalist and opposed to collective security, were nonetheless the first to abandon their national interests and to capitulate to the enemy.

SIR NORMAN—Well, I was going to try to answer the point about democracy. It is because I believe that Russia associated with the West will work eventually toward democracy—for the reasons which you have indicated—that I don't want any rigid test of democracy imposed at the beginning which would exclude Russia, or exclude possibly other states.

After all, democracy is a vague word, and to impose upon certain peoples, perhaps the Poles, perhaps the Russians, a constitution which looks democratic to Americans might be the surest way of creating a dictatorship, as it has been in Latin America. Latin America had, during the nineteenth century, beautiful constitutions in theory, but nearly every one of them was a military dictatorship. They would have been less of a dictatorship if they had been less ambitious about the forms of democracy.

DOLIVET—That is a very important point, Sir Norman. We have indicated enough reasons why Russia should not be excluded because of lack of democracy. We consider that

Russia should be in and I am one hundred per cent in favor of this idea, but let's take countries like Yugoslavia, like Poland, Greece, and so on. They were the first allies of fascism. Even before Germany took over, her agents in those countries prepared the ground for the native fascists. I don't see why, when we now see that the peoples of those countries have demonstrated in a very clear way their desire for democracy, we should not support this expression of the public will.

If we could find a single example of a people voting freely for a dictatorship, I should be ready to discuss the problem, but I don't know of any case in modern history where a people really freely voted for a dictatorship. If we permit the existence of dictatorships, we cannot solve the German problem. There can be no democracy in Germany unless the neighbors of Germany are really democratic, because the anti-democratic elements in Germany, the militarist elements, will find constant inspiration in the non-democratic systems of the other countries. Secondly, you cannot have real international co-operation from fascist or other reactionary dictatorships. Poland under Beck never seriously co-operated with the League. Italy never has, and I wonder how you would solve this problem.

SIR NORMAN—There is no complete answer to that problem because immediately you begin to interfere in that way with the external affairs of the country, you begin to create, immediately, resentment against the internal power even among the people. I believe that if we utilize what we actually have, it becomes less difficult to solve. After the war, every state, except America, Australia, New Zealand, and a few more will be in actual need of imported food and materials. The distribution of those things will be in the hands of a council, probably sitting in Washington.

Now, that council, representing a combination of about thirty United Nations, will be able to bring pressure on those countries which show dictatorship tendencies and be able to exact at least rudimentary democratic institutions—and it should use its power in that way, saying, in effect, we want the distribution of this food to be under a democratic administration in order that there shall be no favoritism, and so on. If from your center, from your nucleus, you get that kind of condition in Poland, you will then start a process, a tendency toward a democratic way, toward democratic institutions in those countries where they have heretofore not existed.



Eugene Lyons

DOLIVET—May I ask your opinion on another aspect of this problem? Would it not greatly facilitate America's participation in the world order if, instead of seeing the militaristic and reactionary tendencies coming to the fore in some of the countries during the transition period immediately after the war, the American people would feel that democracy is really going to triumph over these systems?

PATTERSON—I agree with that. But I would like to stress what Sir Norman said about your not getting democracy merely by writing constitutions, as we have done in Latin America. I had a little chance to observe Nicaragua. We supervised elections, as I remember, down there and did some other things, but I would hesitate to say that Nicaragua is democratic, as we here in the States understand the word.

Among the things that impressed me in Germany in the period between the two wars was what seemed to me the difficulty on the part of the German people of getting away from their former dependence on leadership, when they were told what to do or where so

many things were *verboten*. The Germans with whom I talked, even some of the most liberal of the Germans, insisted that the Germans have to have time, slowly to develop the idea of self-government, or of what we think of as democracy as distinct from receiving orders from somebody higher up.—Am I right, Mr. Werner?

WERNER—Of course!

SIR NORMAN—We face two dangers after peace. One is dictatorship in these states that you mentioned, but the other is disorder and chaos which would result from revolutionary efforts coming into conflict; and we have got to have, at the beginning, order, absence of violence, absence of the efforts of local dictators to establish themselves by presenting the commission, or whatever it might be, as they were presented in Paris with the *fait accompli*. Our first task would be to prevent the kind of thing of which Pilsudski gave us an example in Poland.

DOLIVET—Gentlemen, I think that concerning the military prospect for 1943, there is general agreement among us on the importance of waging, on the part of the United Nations, a total war against the Axis. There is agreement on the necessity of making the greatest effort possible immediately in order to relieve Russia and the Near East, and to carry this effort through to next year, until victory is achieved. But there is disagreement concerning the means to be employed. Some of the members of the Round Table are very definitely in favor of making aviation our principal weapon and of limiting every other effort to provide for the needs of that method. Others, on the contrary, believe that while aviation is an extremely important arm, it would not be sufficient to bring victory; that it has to be a part of the whole military force of the United Nations. Of course, there should be a division of functions which would result in specialization by the various countries. The representatives of both conceptions have presented extremely strong arguments in favor of their different conceptions. It is evident that the United Nations general staff has a historic decision to make concerning the best use of the strongest weapon.

Concerning the political aspect, there is general agreement that at this given moment public opinion has made progress in understanding the aims of this war and the vital necessity for every nation to defeat the Axis decisively. But there still remain prejudices and discords of the past which are now used by Axis propagandists or pro-Axis sympathizers in order to drive a wedge between the different fighting nations, or between national groups inside the fighting nations. This is a specific danger, and it is the utmost duty of every thinking man to fight against these divisions. It is recommended that an educational campaign interpreting the various United Nations to each other be instituted so that the unity between the anti-Axis countries would grow constantly and create really United Nations in every field—political, economic, and intellectual.

While public opinion in the United States is at present more in favor of international co-operation than in previous years, there is still the danger that after the war it may change again, as after the last war, and therefore the case for international co-operation has to be made plain to the masses of the American people. The creation and the progressive growth of the machinery of the United Nations on the one hand, and education of public opinion on the other, will prepare the foundations for a future world order.

There was agreement as to the necessity of establishing the rule of international law, but there was disagreement about making democracy the essential condition of membership in the future world order. Some members of the Round Table think that self-government and respect for international law will lead ultimately to the expansion of democracy.

RE LATE MESSAGES

AS we go to press, messages of great significance to our cause which can no longer be included in this number are still arriving from all parts of the world. We shall publish them in the next issue of FREE WORLD.

"Liberté, Liberté chérie..."

BY PIERRE MENDÈS FRANCE

THE thought of escape is the prisoner's obsession. No sooner is a man locked in his cell than he sounds the walls and tests the solidity of the bars and the strength of the locks. Then he studies the guards, their habits, their eccentricities, their diversions. He observes, he scans, he lies in wait. The prisoner watches the guards much more than they watch him.

Only a small proportion of prisoners escape. But all of them, every night of their incarceration, have dreamed of escaping. For some it is a fine plan for a vague and distant future, but they sense beforehand that they will never attempt to realize it. For others it is an undefined possibility, a stroke of luck for which they somewhat timidly and passively wait. Still others have come to a firm decision, have made a rendezvous with fate. They have accepted the risks because of that fascinating and tempting prospect of liberty.

I do not believe in accidental escapes. A prisoner who finds himself oné day in an unforeseen situation which offers the possibility of flight will not take advantage of it, if he has not, once and for all, made up his mind to reconquer his liberty. An escape may sometimes be improvised physically, never psychologically.

My position was somewhat unusual. At Rabat in July and August, 1940, when I was denounced by the official press for an offense I had not committed, I debated whether I should escape or hold out. I finally chose to accept the struggle. For the same reasons, all through the trial, I had decided to await the verdict, whatever it might mean. I did not want to escape beforehand. It would have been a confession of guilt. I should have deprived myself of the opportunity of facing my accusers, and it would have been too easy for them to defame my character. I wanted, on the contrary, to have my day in court, to win the unquestioned proof of my innocence and to expose my judges and the regime they served. I wanted my case to give rise to a scandal; to do this it had to become known. There could be no better way of making it known than to fight my fight before the court and the public.

At Casablanca, one day, I was called before the examining magistrate. The judge, who was busy, had me wait alone in a little room for more than half an hour. I noticed that I was not under surveillance. One of the doors of the room opened on a vague abandoned field, separated from the street by a low railing. Escape would have been easy. This time I did not hesitate; my decision had been made; I remained.

After the verdict, the situation was no longer the same. I had accomplished what I desired: two

or three hundred persons had been present at the trial, and they were acquainted with the facts. I knew they would speak, would tell the story, would become so many unwitting propaganda agents. So in informed circles, and especially at Vichy, everybody knew that I was not guilty and realized that I was the victim of injustice. There could be no misunderstanding of the reasons for my escape. It would be recognized for what it was: a solemn public protest against the condemnation I did not accept.

One day in the course of a conversation with the official in charge of the prison, I made a remark the truth of which I believed with all my heart, and from which I meant to draw all its logical conclusions. I said that the sentence of May 9 had no legal validity in my eyes; it did not bind me; I was not obliged to honor it. Not only did I have a right to my liberty, but I considered it a duty to escape. For in my mind this would be one more way of protesting and making a stand against injustice and abuse of power.

Occasionally I have been congratulated because I had the courage to escape, but it took much more courage to postpone for months an attempt I had already decided to make. A prisoner who discovers a means of flight that he can utilize today, this very night, inevitably asks himself if it will still be available tomorrow or next week. And if not will he be able to work out another?

One day in February or March I notice a piece of a lightning rod on the path in the prison courtyard. It has been torn off by a storm and has fallen to the ground. No one has bothered about it, and it lies along the wall in the mud. It is a rigid little pole more than two yards long with five or six branches of about a foot jutting out perpendicularly. For an ordinary passerby, and even for a guard, it is a worthless bit of old iron. But for me it is something quite different, for all my thoughts are directed to one end—flight. I have previously noticed in a corner of the yard a rabbit hutch standing against the wall. It is about a yard high and very easy to climb over. For weeks I have been thinking of using it, on some far-off evening, as the first step in the scaling of the wall. I am sure that the piece of lightning rod wedged in an angle of the wall can be used as a ladder. The perpendicular branches would constitute the rungs, so to speak. Above the rabbit hutch and the improvised ladder, the rest of the wall would remain to be climbed—about as high as a man with outstretched arms. A chance is offering itself. But I do not take advantage of the opportunity immediately; its time will come. I just hide the providential ladder under a little earth, expecting to pick it up again later. In two days it is gone. A guard—or another prisoner!—must have noticed it. A chance has been allowed to slip away, and there may never be another when my reasons for waiting no longer exist.

One may imagine my state of mind when I see that a possibility of escape on which I was counting has vanished. Every day I carry on an exasperating debate with myself, repeating yesterday's arguments. Isn't it wrong to wait? If tomorrow another solution offers itself, must I disregard it also? Following my program, I waited, and this was the hardest part of all. But I worked while waiting, and I should like to sketch rapidly the precautions and the preparations by which I gradually increased as much as I could my chances of success. . .

. . . . . .

II

AFTER lunch Fonlupt and Rochat visit me; it is a sorely needed relaxation. I am so discouraged that I am on the point of telling them everything. But in the end I say nothing. It would needlessly put them in a very delicate position. For the first time I withhold the complete confidence I have always shown them and which they have so well deserved. While they are there, a clerk of the Military Tribunal arrives to bring me the decision on my appeal. I read as calmly as I can the terribly involved and embarrassed clauses which attempt to sustain the verdict of Clermont-Ferrand. "This decision makes me ashamed for the judges of my country," I say to the clerk who does not relish his function.

The communication which I have just received is the final document in a case which is now closed; it puts the seal on a definitive judgment. Fonlupt and Rochat are depressed by their impotence. I must say, to their credit, that not once did they suggest that I should sign a petition for pardon. They soon leave, saying they will return Monday. Monday—

At bottom I am very much embarrassed that I did not let them know. What are they going to think of me? And what will my friends

think, who have visited me these last weeks and to whom I said nothing. And what of the good chaplain who has become even more affectionate since my conviction, and who, the day before yesterday, brought me books without being asked? Will they not all be offended?

I try to put aside this disagreeable thought: I hope they will understand. Besides I shall send them letters. I prepared a whole series yesterday: for my wife,* for my parents, for for a few friends, for my lawyers. I have also drawn up a letter to Marshal Pétain, which will remain on my bed in the cell. It is a solemn protest against the act of injustice intentionally perpetrated upon me:

> My flight is not the deed of a convicted man who wishes to escape from the punishment he has deserved. It is, after the exhaustion of all legal means, the only remaining way of expressing my refusal to bow before the judicial lie which condemns me. This sentence is no decision of justice; it is not even a legal error; it is an act of political violence. . . . It is not the officer who has been convicted—it is the deputy, the man of the Left, the Jew, the patriot who refuses to accept the defeat of his country. Neither in conscience nor in law am I bound to obedience.

This substantially sums up the message I address to the Chief of State. I hope that it was delivered to him and I paid him the honor of thinking he understood what it meant.

For the last time I put my personal things in order. There is a batch of papers, all the letters I have received from my wife since my arrest. I cannot take them with me. Shall I destroy them? No, for if I am caught I should like to have them back and re-read them from time to time, in a prison which must then be inescapable. And if I am not caught, they doubtless will be filed in some dusty office, and some day I shall be able to claim them.

*I left this letter, stamped and unsealed on my bed. Appealing to the humanity of the authorities, I added a request that it be sent to my wife. It was the last letter from me that she would receive for a long time. The next day it was confiscated by Colonel Lepretre.

Now everything is ready. All of a sudden I am in a state of nervous idleness like that of a traveler who on the eve of a long trip has made all his arrangements, sent off his trunks, and said his good-byes. Douhet, my cell-mate, looks at me. He does not understand my inactivity after seeing me so busily engaged in work whose purpose he did not divine. He has had a bad day. During the visit of his lawyers, he had a nervous attack which was quieted by ether. The nurse who is taking care of him, Mlle. C——, comes to see him. "After an attack of this kind," she tells me, "he often has a quiet night." In the meantime he seems very depressed.

Now it is dinner time. Douhet refuses to eat and offers me his meal. I force myself to eat it. Although I have hardly any appetite, I must lay in a supply of food. I know neither how nor when I shall find my next meal. The dinner also offers me a chance to pick up a knife which I shall take with me. It will be necessary to cut the cords I am using.

Douhet goes to sleep. Time stands still. It is not even seven o'clock.

It would grieve me if Douhet were suspected of complicity in my escape and compromised because of me. I scribble a letter to him, making my excuses in advance. I also ask him to return to the chaplain the books which have been lent me.

I wait and wait. Time drags terribly. At about a quarter to nine Douhet wakes up. We talk a little. He would like the tablets which calm him and put him to sleep, and asks me to dissolve them in a little water. I put four in the glass instead of three. He goes back to sleep. Now my decision is made; I shall leave without telling him anything.



Half past nine. I hear them fastening the shutters of the guardroom which becomes dark. What a relief!

There is still a wait of three-quarters of an hour before I am off on my adventure. I unmake my bed, I tie together a sheet and two covers which I later shall hang from the window. I remake my bed with the second sheet deceptively folded double. If Douhet wakes in the course of the night and notices my absence, he may believe that

I have gone to the toilet. I wrap my shoes in cloths and rags so that when I am outside I can walk noiselessly. Reading detective stories has some use after all! I leave the tips of my shoes uncovered to facilitate my climb along the wall.

Seated on my bed, shaved and dressed for the attempt, I feel my courage ebbing away. Shall I be able to carry through the escape about which I have been dreaming for so long? This evening for which I have waited and prepared with such passion, all at once seems unfriendly, hostile. I have not had the bad luck I had yesterday which made the whole thing physically impossible, but I suddenly discover a thousand unforeseen obstacles.

First of all, the everlasting daylight. I look out of the window. How light it is! The night of June 21 is, alas, the shortest of the year! Furthermore, Paris time, that is to say German time, has recently been extended to the non-occupied zone. At a quarter to eleven it will really be a quarter to ten. It will almost be daylight. And then there is the presence of Douhet. What if he wakes up in the night and gives the alarm. It might after all have been better to take him into my confidence. He is now fast asleep—or is he just pretending? Can I trust him? Wasn't he put there to spy on me? No. Since he did take the tablets.

A clock strikes half past ten. I check the watch on my wrist. According to my calculations, it is exactly ten minutes before the moment when I shall bend down the iron bar and attach the sheets to the window. It will take a quarter of an hour in all to reach the street. I have allowed myself a wait of five minutes—not more—to have the full benefit of the darkness which comes so slowly.

Once more I go to the window. The pathway frightens me. Perhaps I shall immediately be caught by the patrol making the rounds. The deep enveloping silence is strangely impressive. The time passes with desperately aggravating slowness, and yet I would give years of my life to delay, for just a few minutes, the moment which approaches.

It is twenty minutes to eleven. I take myself in hand. It is now or perhaps never. If they are setting a trap for me, the risk will be no smaller tomorrow. And will tomorrow offer the same chances that I seem to have today? A last backward glance at the sleeping Douhet. Everything is ready and within reach; the little valise wrapped in my coat, the knotted sheets, the cords. I seize the iron bar. It is the last moment of hesitation permitted me. Once the bar has been twisted it will be impossible to turn back. I pull it toward me. It resists for a moment then it gives. . . .

III

I SLOWLY let down the valise with a previously prepared and measured cord. The other end of the cord is passed over a bar and tied to my sheets in such a way as to make it possible to get them loose from below. Now I attach the sheets to a bolt on the window sill. I slide through the opening and close the window after me so that the condition of the bars is not too visible from the inside. I cling to the sheets and let myself go; I seem to be descending at dizzying speed; I pass the window of the furnace room beneath my own. I stop. I have miscalculated the height and my feet do not touch the ground. But the distance is not great. I let go of the sheet; I jump and clumsily land on my valise which is lying there. I stumble and fall over, but without hurting myself in the least. But this has made a little noise which may have been heard, since the windows of the large common room are all open. Or if a prisoner is awake, he may have heard a strange falling sound. I press up against the wall for a few seconds, my heart pounding. Nothing moves.

Now I must lower the sheet and the bed covers hanging from the window. My contrivance works very nicely; the sheet and covers fall down right at my feet. I quickly roll them up and hide them under a nearby coal pile on which I have had my eye for a long time. I reach for my valise, and silently go up the iron steps which lead to the footbridge. There is nobody on the path and no noise in the guardroom. All is well.

I leave my bundle on the footbridge. The cord—still the same one—which is tied round my wrist, will allow me to pull it up later. Then I get on the railing and begin my climb. I had previously examined the wall so long and so carefully that I feel as if my movements were mere matters of habit. My hands and my feet touch and grip spots that I "know." I reach the top of the wall, and chin myself up.

The street remains quiet. I crawl toward the place chosen for my jump. Halt, a man is walking by. . . . He passes on. Here comes another. He stops just below me for a cigarette.

Suddenly the flame of his match lights up everything nearby. I am terribly afraid he has seen me. (I forget that a bright light dazzles a man close to it and prevents him from seeing beyond.) He goes on.

I continue to make my way along the wall still dragging my bag behind me. I reach the point where the wall becomes lower and get down. The moment for my leap has arrived.

Just then I hear a sound, a low mysterious murmur. It comes from under a tree next to the sidewalk, two yards away. I stare as hard as I can, and finally I realize there are—two lovers hiding under the tree. They are discussing how to spend the evening. He has a very definite idea. She hesitates and resists. This goes on for a century—I mean ten minutes! These ten minutes may be tragic for me. For at eleven o'clock the audience leaves the motion picture theater, temporarily livening the street. Then, too, if a patrol makes the rounds along the wall, my silhouette at the top will stand out distinctly against the clear sky. There is the same danger if the soldiers suddenly decide to leave the guardroom and enjoy the breeze at the door opening on the footbridge. They did this yesterday.

All I can do is mark time while the debate (the eternal debate) runs its course a few steps away. . . . Suddenly I notice that the rags wrapped around one of my shoes are white and all too visible in the darkness. Unfortunately they are on the left shoe, the one on the outside. I draw my left leg under me; this makes me assume an uncomfortable and precarious position. And I am on a wall, one side of which is over twenty feet high!

The turtle doves are still debating. This fellow lacks authority! Finally she says yes. Dear unknown little sweetheart, you will perhaps some day read this book in which you so unexpectedly play a part. Do not forget the date; it was the evening of June 21, 1941. I must let you know how I cursed your virtue, how I blessed your weakness. The day when we are all called before the Creator to account for our acts, I will, if you wish, assume the responsibility for your lapse from virtue that evening, for I desired it, I swear, even more passionately and impatiently than your young lover.

The two love birds are off to enjoy their happiness. But is the street deserted? Over there I see a motionless shadow. Is it one of the inspectors who is waiting to spring at me? Perhaps. I wait, more long seconds pass. The shadow does not stir. Why delay? Even if they are trapping me, it is too late to turn back.

I jump. I hurt myself a little, but not enough to keep me from walking; I shall limp a bit, that is all! With my faithful cord I draw my valise to me and pick it up. On the other side of the street the mysterious shadow remains motionless. I go right toward it. If they are spying on me, I prefer to end the whole thing immediately. But what I took for a policeman was an innocent bush!

The avenue is really deserted. An automobile passes along a side street. In the distance I see the shaded light of a café and I faintly hear its radio. It is very hot, but a little breeze gently touches my face, a soft little breeze which never blows in prison.

I am free. . . .

—Translated by Albert Lippman

Still Dancing to the Same Tune

THE SPANISH REPUBLIC IN EXILE

By

ANTONIO VELAO

FROM the very beginning, the Spanish Republic-in-exile has felt a strong current of popular sympathy. It was the logical continuation of the support given to the Spanish people by large sectors of international public opinion wherever the feeling of the masses was free to manifest itself. Any kind of Gallup poll taken during the three years of the Spanish War would have shown a strong majority in favor of the loyalist cause. That was true from one end of Europe to the other, with the exception of the two aggressor countries, Germany and Italy.

The feeling was even more evident, if possible, in America, and especially in the countries of Hispanic America.

There ancestral ties and a common tongue afforded a more direct understanding of situations and persons; there it was difficult to persuade people that a representative of Galician capitalistic interests like former Prime Minister Portela Valladares, or a Catholic lawyer like Ossorio y Gallardo had been converted overnight to the doctrines of Stalin. It would have been equally difficult to erase the entire political past of the modest author of this article and represent as a Communist one who has been all his life a member of the Republican Party, and as such, had served in Parliament and in many administrative posts.

The only new note in foreign opinion concerning Spain has been a considerable widening of the circle of people who understand the meaning of our struggle, from the out-

break of the Spanish Generals' Rebellion to the extension of the war to the rest of Europe and the world. The price has been terribly high. A million Spanish dead were not sufficient. The tragedy had to become universal in order that people should understand that the rebellion of the Spanish Generals was nothing more than an incident in the general plan of Hitler and his Axis associates against peoples who should refuse to accept his sovereignty over them. Many of those who denied us their sympathy and considered us merely a disturbing element in Europe while Spain was shedding her blood to prevent a victory by the aggressor nations, now express their conviction that the present war began in Spain; and privately at least, they admit that it was our sacrifices which marked the first act of the tragedy.

It is well that all should know that if the war began in Spain, it is still going on there. A people which has learned to risk everything in its tenacious determination not to allow a regime and an ideology as alien to the Spanish character as nazism to be imposed from without is unlikely to cease its hostility toward men who conspired to that end merely because one phase of the struggle has ended. The great battles have ended, to be sure. But the war against fascism is going on in the mountains of Santander, of Asturias, and of Andalucia, on the one hand, through the courage of the *guerrilleros* (a Spanish word if there ever was one) and on the other hand, through the unswervable opposition of the vast majority of Spaniards to a policy which, in the name of neutrality or non-belligerency, is seeking to place the country at the service of those very nations which invaded it, bombarded it, and sought to destroy it during three long tragic years.

Falangist Spain has no alternative except to work for a victory of the Axis. That fact must be clear to anyone capable of understanding that there is a war today, and that we are not still in the days of October, 1938. With indisputable logic, Serrano Suñer has linked the future of the present regime with the outcome of the war. All his statements and speeches mark the same conviction that a defeat of the Axis Powers would inevitably bring with it the crumbling of the Franco regime. There are those who are still playing with the idea of offering Franco a way out of his desperate situation by taking the Infante Don Juan to Spain and, by restoring the Bourbons to the throne, to bring about a general reconciliation among Spaniards on the one hand, and between Spain and the United Nations on the other. Franco himself has given the answer to these people in his speech of July 18, 1942, on the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the rebellion. He knows that no compromise can save him from the punishment which awaits him, and that no diplomatic skill can help him to survive a defeat of the Axis. That is why he replies to the policy of temporizing with his regime by brave speeches announcing the mobilization of he alone knows how many Spaniards in order to fight against one of the most important members of the United Nations—against Russia—which logically should be the same as fighting against the United States or against Great Britain.

The United Nations have and can have only one ally in Spain, and that is democratic Spain.

In Spain itself, Spanish democracy manifests itself by opposition and by an open struggle against fascism carried on in every way possible, to which three years of savage repression have not been able to put an end. Outside of Spain, Spanish democracy functions through the Spanish Republic-in-exile in various writings of its political emigres, and in the recognition of a government which for us is the Government of Spain.

In order to understand the significance of Spanish Republican Emigration, one must recall that at the end of the Catalonian campaign, every non-fascist Spaniard left the national territory who was able to reach the frontier and who did not still have a mission to fulfill at the risk of his own life, pursuant to the orders of the Republican authorities. In February, 1939, it was not only a Government which might be held responsible for its policy of resistance that left Spain. Nor was it only a few hundred officers who might have done something which, in the eyes of Franco, would have made them subject to a court martial. It was not only political leaders, heads of unions, journalists, or propagandists who had become compromised through a life of struggle for democracy. A part of Spain left. Thousands of men left who had not incurred any risk. Thousands of women, some of whom had fought actively against fascism, and other thousands who had only cursed it from the

depths of their souls. Thousands of children left whom fascism had robbed of childhood's joys. A part of Spain left because it hated this odious regime imposed with the aid of German and Italian airplanes, a regime alien to the national psychology and the national spirit and empty of all noble and generous feeling.

Those half a million Spaniards who burst across the French frontier to get out of the national territory were a type of emigration almost unknown in the history of political struggles. It was entirely different from other migrations, the basis of which is usually a valiant, individual act of escape from the fascist plague so that one can go on living in order to destroy it, and to free humanity from its infectious presence. The Spanish emigration was so eminently political in character that it is no exaggeration to speak of the Spanish Republic-in-exile.

II

IT is on this broad base that the Unión Democrática Española, better known by its initials U.D.E., was formed, not many months ago when the development of the world situation and the very decomposition of the Franco regime made it desirable to have greater unity among the various parties and organizations of the Spanish Republic-in-exile. The different organizations composing the U.D.E. are the Committee of Unity of the Spanish Republicans, which includes the different tendencies existing in the strictly Republican parties; the Spanish Socialist Workers' party; the Communist party of Spain; the General Workers' Union; the Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia; and the Union of Rabassaires (an organization composed mostly of farmers). The announcement of its formation was followed by the setting up of national delegations of the U.D.E. in all the Spanish American Republics containing important groups of Spanish refugees.

It is the firm determination of the U.D.E. to broaden as much as possible this action of unification, but it already includes those most important political and trade union organizations, which enabled anti-fascist Spain to carry on the struggle that astonished the world, a war in which popular enthusiasm and heroism overcame for so long the tremendous inferiority of material means. Its principal aim is clear: to struggle for the re-establishment of the Republic as the legal regime which will assure to Spaniards the possibility of living together normally, on the basis of the Spanish Constitution of December 9, 1931. In the field of international politics the U.D.E. considers as its own the cause for which Great Britain, the United States, Russia, China, and their allies are fighting, and it adheres to the pact signed in Washington by the twenty-six nations, and later signed by Mexico, to the great joy of that people whose generous hospitality we are enjoying.

Having been born of that emigration as a necessary continuance of the policy of understanding among the forces of the Left which proved to be so helpful to the Spanish Republic, it was evident that no political party or organization which had fought in the loyalist ranks during the three years of war could be excluded from this common task. With the same energy with which I, a member of the Republican party, should have opposed the exclusion from the U.D.E. of groups having an anarchist tendency, whose tactics and doctrine are far different from mine, I should have refused to permit the exclusion of the Communists, with whom I also differ on questions of tactics and doctrine, but who fought so heroically, together with other loyal parties and organizations in the defense of the Republic.

It is to be hoped that this new experiment in unity imposed by the reality of the Spanish situation both within Spain itself and outside, will induce all to lay aside the intransigent position of their respective parties, in order to help Spaniards to live in peace with one another. To this end, we must have the courage to revise our own conceptions and admit the extent to which events of recent years have changed things which we had regarded as immutable truths. For us Republicans, without any Marxist backing and inclined to acclaim all liberal principles under all forms, it is necessary to open our eyes to reality and admit that that capitalism *à outrance,* such as we knew before the outbreak of the present war, has lost on the field of battle and in the race with the realities of the new social life which is being born, that resilience which permitted it for so many dozens of years to rule the world. On the other hand, pure Marxism, with its claims of achieving total and absolute justice for the universal proletariat, must

broaden its view so that justice may reach all free men of the earth, without distinction of class.

Just as the world cannot return to the situation existing before 1939, so we cannot approach the problems of reconstruction of Spain, politically or socially, with the uncompromising position of parties which existed in Spain before the war, and still exists. What we have to do in Spain is not difficult because it is much, nor because it goes more or less deeply into the social life of the country. It is difficult because it is new, because it is necessary to solve problems with a procedure entirely different from that which the Republic of 1931 attempted. They must be solved by new standards, with audacious vision, and with a revolutionary spirit. And all Spaniards who feel and think thus, however radical the name they give themselves, will be able to contribute effectively to the reconstruction of Spain and thus play their part in the organization of the free world of tomorrow.

Spain, for example, must solve its agrarian problem. The Republic of 1931 attempted it, showing itself exceptionally generous toward the interests of the large farmers. Today the problem presents itself from an entirely new angle and cannot be dragged into the parliamentary forms of ten years ago. Today we must approach the problem of the land with revolutionary standards, both as regards its social aspect and its technical and economic side, if the great agricultural possibilities of the Spanish people are to be fully developed.

The Spanish Republic must solve the problem of regional autonomy of the Basque country and of Catalonia. The proof that the problem exists lies in the fact that some believe we went too far in that direction, while others are of the opinion that we did not go far enough. Yet until we return to Spain, we cannot allow any irreparable division to occur because of this problem. As long as we are in exile, we have only one people: the Spanish people. We must return to Spain as legally as we left, with the Constitution of 1931, with the statutes of autonomy which the Spanish Parliament voted; and once the Spanish Republic-in-exile has taken its place again in the national territory, the Spanish people will vote on the reform of the Constitution, on the reform of the land laws, on regional problems, on the reorganization of the army, on problems of education. And the will of the majority of the Spanish people, which in any case will be genuinely democratic, will be the one to decide.

It is this criterion of constitutional continuity which makes the U.D.E. recognize as the supreme hierarchy of the Spanish Republic-in-exile the last government of the Republic presided over by Dr. Negrin and the autonomous governments with him. For us the Spanish Republic-in-exile is not a pure sentimental euphemism. It is democratic Spain, organized for the reconquest of Spain and for the incorporation of Spain into the common front of the United Nations.

—Translated by Richard Holder

PLANS FOR THE FUTURE

This is the third of our special sections on the important plans for the future which are being formulated by government agencies and private organizations in the United States and abroad. The proposals of five groups have been published already in the August and September issues of FREE WORLD. *This month, we devote the entire section to a single organization, the Central and Eastern European Planning Board. The deliberations of this group merit special consideration because of the official status of its members, since their programs and ideas will be incorporated in the policies of their governments.*

VI - The Central and Eastern European Planning Board

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Minister of State, Yugoslavia

Deputy Chairmen
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JAN MASARYK
Minister of Foreign Affairs
JAROMIR NECAS
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GREECE
EMMANUEL TSOUDEROS
Prime Minister and Minister of Labor

POLAND
JAN STANCZYK
Minister of Labor and Social Welfare

Secretary General
FELIKS GROSS

AT the International Labor Conference in New York, November, 1941, the delegations of Czechoslovakia, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Poland passed a resolution in which they declared the intention of these states to co-operate closely in the struggle for freedom and in preparing post-war reconstruction. "We hope," the declaration stated, "that the end of this war, which was forced upon us, will save a hundred million inhabitants of Central Europe and of the Balkans from their present state of wretchedness by assuring them the possibility of stable employment, guaranteed by reconstruction and by the development of their industries, agriculture, and merchant marine, and that those peoples will be included within the sphere of international exchanges of goods and services. Special attention goes to the masses of the peasant population and to their social and economic standards, because it is on those elements that peace and security in that region depend."

To further this aim, the Central and Eastern European Planning Board was established by the four delegations on January 7, 1942. "We agree on the essential need of close collaboration among peoples and governments of the small nations of Central and Eastern Europe, while war is still being fought, and later, after peace comes back to the world," stated their joint declaration. "The East European region has its own problems and those must be handled and solved by mutual consent and friendly collaboration of the respective nations. Doing so they believe that the democratic world of today and tomorrow will be enriched by a new sincere effort and by a constructive experiment in the way of the building of a better order. The co-operation of all these nations constitutes a step toward the establishment of a future world order based on mutual friendship."

Much of the work of the Board consists in the collection and analysis of materials dealing with conditions in the nazi-occupied countries represented by its members, in order to keep their recommendations for the future accurately grounded upon knowledge of the present. Four committees are concerned with special fields of investigation: economic (including subcommittees on industry, finance, trade, agriculture, and relief), educational, social, and general, dealing with legal and constitutional questions.

At the inaugurative meeting of the economics committee, Sava Kosanovich, chairman of the Board and Minister of the State of Yugoslavia, stated that the aim of the committee was "to contribute to an honest and objective understanding of the problem of the economics of the region. . . . By its very nature, our Board is a regional and international body. It is a very modest beginning, but it may become the nucleus of something that will grow. Ultimately we would like to see a common European economic, social, and political organization, a World Commonwealth of Peoples eventually. Our Board is working on a minute section of that big dream that is today heartening the masses of fighting peoples on all fronts."

In a report of research presented to the CEEPB by Professor Stephen de Ropp, chairman of the sub-committee on industry, certain problems of post-war economy of the System AB (the region composed of four nations stretching from the Aegean to the Baltic Sea) were outlined and a plan for three stages in post-war development indicated: (1) industrial rehabilitation necessitated by destruction during the war; (2) equalization of wealth and relief of depressed industrial areas; (3) equalization of standards of living within national areas between agricultural and industrial workers, by the building up of new central and provincial urban areas. Finally, two alternatives for ultimate operation were foreseen: socialization of all raw material and mass article production, banking, and transport, with free individual industrial plants of small and medium size, and individual farming; or, on the other hand, a lesser degree of state interference, with private corporate ownership and state control of the distribution of wealth through financial controls.

At a preliminary meeting of the education committee of the Board, held at New York University on July 16, certain plans were adopted for the post-war rehabilitation of universities in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Professor Reinhold Schairer suggested three fields where action should begin: (1) the adoption by educational institutions in this country of the universities destroyed by the Nazis, and their symbolic rebirth in the United States; (2) the preparation of text books and teaching personnel here; (3) the development of concrete schemes of reconstruction of the educational systems of the four countries on the basis of equality for all and a true spirit of peaceful co-operation inside and outside those nations. The immediate task would be "to prepare young American Poles, Czechs, Yugoslavs, and Greeks, or refugees from those countries to be teachers, equipped with more than teaching technique, well equipped with all the skill, and ability, knowledge and patience, and wisdom, which will be needed by everyone who accepts the grave duty to participate in the enormous task of educational reconstruction in those European countries, after Hitler's defeat." Upon the suggestion of Dean E. George Payne of the School of Education of New York University, a resolution was adopted expressing the wish of the meeting to seek the sponsorship, by New York University and by the United States Committee on Educational Reconstruction, of European universities destroyed or closed by enemy armies of occupation, and plans were laid for an institute to be held on the subject at New York University in October.

Plans for Europe

THE CEEPB has made no official proposals for post-war organization, but its attitudes may be inferred from statements made by members of the Board and by individuals representing points of view with which the Board is sympathetic. Among the latter is Dr. Eduard Beneš, whose ideas on the future European settlement are quoted frequently by the Board. The Organization of Post-War Europe, an article by Dr. Beneš, which appeared in *Foreign Affairs* in January, 1942, clarifies objectives which must be accomplished if Central Europe is to be guarded in the future from German attack. The first requisite is a permanent and general European equilibrium: "This equilibrium must be based both politically and economically upon the balance of forces between a number of large political units. The familiar conception of our previous political history, 'the balance of power,' does not, as I understand it, signify the equilibrium of material—or to put it concretely, military—forces, but an intelligent division of Europe into large, individual, and balanced political organisms, each of them sufficiently powerful territorially, politically, and economically. The weakness of small states must not in the future tempt large states to fall upon them. Nor must certain large states countenance this procedure on the part of other large states as a proper price to be paid in order to secure (for a little time) peace for themselves."

With respect to the regions which have in the past been at the center of international strife, Dr. Beneš makes specific proposals:

1. Germany should become a decentralized confederation. A return to the former confederation of the Reich, in a modernized form, is absolutely essential. Prussia's domination over the other elements in the German nation should be broken. Prussia

herself should be divided into three or four separate state units. Further, Germany must return to her pre-1938 frontiers, though possibly with rectifications in favor of her neighbors if such are demanded by considerations of European security.

2. The core of a reorganized Central Europe will be a Czechoslovak-Polish confederation. The creation of this new political unit can already be considered an accomplished fact. It might be joined by Austria and Hungary, and possibly by Rumania, but as to this it is still too early to pass definite judgment; everything will depend upon the internal conditions of these three countries after the war. Hungary cannot be allowed, of course, to keep the territories which Germany gave her as a reward for participating, contrary to her treaties, in this criminal war.

3. The Balkan bloc should consist of a confederation between Yugoslavia, Greece, and Albania, and possibly Rumania. Turkey must decide for herself what she will do. As to Bulgaria, the other states must arrange their mutual disputes with her once and for all. . . . Bulgaria should be compelled to join the future Balkan confederation.

4. In spite of various plans leading in other directions—for instance, the so-called Pan-Europe plan—Soviet Russia must take part in the organization of Europe and in the future co-operation of the new European blocs. . . . The continued disequilibrium caused by the isolation of Soviet Russia was one of the reasons for the second World War. If the error were repeated it would probably lead to a third.

Beginning with the modest nucleus of a confederation between Czechoslovakia and Poland, Dr. Beneš foresees an organic development from the small to the great. A second step might be a bridge between this group and the Balkan group; in time, steps could be taken toward the consolidation of the whole of Central Europe and of Europe in general. "To me it is obvious," he states, "that our final aim must be the confederation of Europe as an element in some sort of world commonwealth; for without the first, the second seems to me really inconceivable. I go further and affirm that without this broad European framework no regional confederation can be envisaged. The security and the peace of Europe are indivisible; that is one of the axioms deriving from the present war." By means of this basic organization of larger federal blocs, Dr. Beneš finds that postwar economic problems will be nearer solution, new and audacious social policies will be facilitated, and human rights will be constitutionally established throughout the world.

Constitutional aspects of the federation of Central Europe were outlined by Anatol Muhlstein, formerly Polish Minister in Paris and now in close touch with the members of the CEEPB, in "The United States of Central Europe." The federation must extend from the Baltic to the Adriatic and must include at least Poland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. The following conclusions are drawn by Mr. Muhlstein:

1. The states situated between Russia and Germany can, in the long run, only preserve their existence and their security by substituting a permanent union in the form of a Federation for temporary alliances.

2. Owing to the diversity of the states which are to form a part of it, and to their historical past, the Federation of Central Europe cannot be completely likened to any of the other great hitherto known federations. Being a new type, it cannot borrow its institutions either from the North American or Swiss Federations. It must adapt them, by an imaginative and creative effort, to its particular composition and to special needs.

3. The Federation of Central Europe must restrict its competence to matters concerning the organization of defense; to the management of foreign affairs, to those economic and social matters which concern all the federated countries and result in a customs and monetary union.

4. In matters of federal competence, the Federation must possess powers of decision and execution independent of the federated states.

5. The Federation must possess legislative, executive, and judiciary organs necessary for the exercise of its functions. The federal authorities must be empowered to exercise direct authority over the individual citizen.

The attitude of the CEEPB toward the question of method in bringing about world organization was expressed by Feliks Gross, Secretary General of the Board, in an article in *New Europe* in January, 1942. He rejects "universalism," which defines the future international order on the basis of the nation and a single world organization, in favor of "regionalism," which "sees the necessity of organizing the many European states into regions composed of neighboring states, bound by common culture and interests, and for economic and political reasons." The second he calls a natural growth; the first would lead to the integration of Germany by its nationalist tendencies and the differentiation and pulverization of East-Central Europe. Restating the ideas of Dr. Beneš, he says: "The

Eastern and Central European region must unite all those states, all those small nations, into one bloc, a bloc that would form a part of a European Union that, in turn, would be a part of a World Association, or a League of Nations."

The democratic basis of peace, particularly as applied to the Central European area, was brought out in June, 1942, by Josef Malik, Director of the National Bank of Czechoslovakia, writing in the English edition of the *West Slavonic Bulletin,* a correspondent of the Central and Eastern Planning Board in New York. Defining democracy in familiar terms as government of the people, by the people, and for the people, he insists on economic and social, as well as political, democracy as the "greatest safeguard of peace between nations." The same idea, with emphasis upon the pre-war bankruptcy of democracy in Central Europe, was developed in the February issue of FREE WORLD by Mr. Muhlstein, a member of the International Editorial Board.

EDITORIAL COMMENT

In the establishment of the Central and Eastern European Planning Board, there is a spark of hope that the new Europe will be organized in a saner manner than the old. A willingness to surrender some features of national sovereignty, to think in terms of collective security, to take heed of the requirements of civil and economic rights for the common man, even a determination to bury past differences—these factors encourage confidence. The efforts of the Board to keep in touch with the buried populations in nazi-dominated countries and to conduct research on the materials which come by way of underground forces are important for our knowledge of actual conditions in those countries where the last two wars have broken out.

Nevertheless, the existence of such a group, however determined the members may be to bring about federation and lasting peace, does not allay doubts based on the painful history of this vital region. The tragic failures of previous treaties and agreements have shown all too clearly that political federation alone, without the essential condition of working internal democracy, will break down under pressure of tyranny. Full participation of the forces of labor (which are undoubtedly represented to some extent in the CEEPB), the raising (not the mere equalization) of standards of living, and enforcement of democratic procedures in each of the nations and in the region as a whole are requirements which must be emphasized even more than regional economic co-operation and security against aggression. The elevation of one dictatorship, however insignificant it may appear, endangers the peace of the world.

In view of modern conditions of transportation and warfare, neighborhood as a basis of security is not so important as the enforcement of international law and total security. Hence the prospects for co-operation are not hopeful unless the regional union has been integrated from the beginning into an international authority. In case of conflict, powers of arbitration and enforcement must lie with a supreme and disinterested body which guards the safety and rights of all members. Many of these ideas have been expressed by individuals connected with the Central and Eastern European group. They must be clarified and understood by all if the high purposes shared by these countries and the United Nations are to be accomplished.

THE UNDERGROUND REPORTER

A Year of Resistance

By G. K.

ALMOST all Europe is now unified under Hitler's yoke. The unification of Europe under Hitler is the unity of oppression, spoliation, and terror, on one side, and of resistance and struggle for liberation, on the other. But the Nazis try to keep their victims separated at any cost. The regimes of the subjugated countries are different, the treatment of the oppressed nations is varied in a skillful manner, and the invader interferes with any attempt to tighten the link between the European countries.

Underground Europe is not a small group of conspirators and plotters; it now comprises all the political and social life of the European population which Hitler might have destroyed but could not suppress. In the meager information we receive from Europe, we see that the underground expresses the stifled reactions of the population as well as the emotional and ideological continuation of pre-war tendencies in European life. Life is not stopped by the brutal oppression, the execution squads, and terror. It goes on in new forms, in the deepest strata of society, invisible from outside. Molecular processes and transformations are at work which will determine the future of Europe after the victory.

Of course the social life in hiding is not the same in all countries concerned. There are countries, like Denmark, whose national life is, for the most part, legal, where, even now, institutions remain almost untouched; there are countries, like Poland, where nothing is left of the independent political structure, where all national life is under the ground. Other countries, like Franco's Spain and Vichy France, are placed between these two poles, retaining more or less legal elements of former national existence.

First Period of Occupation

WHAT were the characteristics of the first chapter of the underground in Europe? What was the state of mind of the population at the moment of German invasion? It was a complete surprise; no one was prepared for absolute collapse. The nations of Europe fell as a prey into the hands of the conqueror. The first moment was one of resignation, lack of faith in the future, complete disorganization of all social and political connections.

But this first reaction, which was especially strong in France, did not continue unchanged. Life had to go on; it was necessary to find some *modus vivendi* with the Nazis. The failure of the German attempt to conquer Britain and the powerful British resistance created some larger prospects. A hope in future victory dawned immediately after the failure of France, and the second period, that of expectation, began.

Europe was not prepared to deal with the fascist rule. Europeans had heard about Nazi atrocities in Germany; they had had the opportunity of meeting some political refugees; but it all seemed to them a purely German or Italian affair. "It cannot happen here" — that was the prevailing thought in every country before it was overrun by the Brown pest. The international, universal character of fascism with its plan of world domination was understood only by a small minority, while the most influential papers, political leaders, radio commentators, and other organs forming public opinion supported and strengthened this popular delusion about the impossibility of introducing fascist rule within their borders. Educated in the legal tradition of the past, considering the German occupation from the point of view of the Hague convention, Europeans hoped to be able to set up some kind of co-operation with the occupying authorities within the framework of established national institutions.

The Germans encouraged this point of view; their plan was also one of co-operation on the basis of elements in the local population sympathetic to their domination. Of course, they would have liked to hand over the government to their own men, to the Quislings and the Lavals, but they sensed the weakness of these groups isolated in the population, discredited, hated by their compatriots. After a short attempt at a government headed by Quisling in Norway, from April 9 to 15, 1940, an experiment with Laval in the first period of Vichy, until December, 1940, and similar attempts in other countries, the Germans proceeded to work with the moderate elements, which were not Nazis but were willing to co-operate with them. One can consider the first year of German occupation in West-

ern Europe as dominated by efforts on both sides to establish some kind of co-operation. A curious evolution took place in Holland where the anti-nazi leaders, willing to collaborate to some extent with the occupying authorities, created an organization called Netherland Union, or De Nederlandsche Unie, whose membership jumped to 800,000 in less than a year.

New Currents

THE fall of 1941 brought the failure of these attempts. The outbreak of the German-Soviet war kindled new hopes in the subjugated nations. The experience of the first year of the German occupation proved beyond doubt the impossibility of a co-operation which would not turn into complete subordination and nazification. Europe learned what real fascism means, fascism which does not permit any manifestation of liberty and independence. The nature of the situation in France described a year ago by Pétain, in his speech of August 12, 1941, could be applied to all Europe at that moment: "For some weeks I have felt the rising of an evil atmosphere in many sections of France. Restlessness pervades your spirit; doubt enters into your minds. . . . In an atmosphere of false rumors and intrigues, the forces of reconstruction are discouraged. Others seek to replace them. . . . A veritable disease has overcome the French people."

This changed attitude expressed itself in the rise of resistance to the occupying forces. A new spirit rose in Europe, and the underground movement of Western Europe joined in the struggle carried on by the older underground in Czechoslovakia and Poland, where the impact of the Soviet-Nazi war was most strongly felt.

The "year of resistance" in Europe begins with the German attempt to curb the new opposition at its source by expanded terrorism, by a policy of provocation, often carried out by the Gestapo, in order to produce acts of violence to be followed by the extermination of hundreds of possible foes and of all possible centers of resistance. In the summer of 1941, the Nazis started to complain loudly of the fact that workers were guilty of sabotage in all occupied countries. The nazi press wrote that "senseless sabotage" in the mines of Serbia was causing an interruption in the local coal supply. Czech, Yugoslav, French, Belgian, and Norwegian miners and transport workers were lined up before firing squads.

The sweep of resistance and of terror mounted simultaneously. They attained a peak in the assassination of Heydrich in Prague and the subsequent holocaust of vengeance in Czechoslovakia and all Europe, symbolized in the destruction of Lidice. This method — the wiping out of entire villages — was inaugurated in Poland in 1939 and applied in the past year on a large scale in Yugoslavia and Greece. But far from destroying the underground movement, nazi terrorism has, for the time being, stimulated greater hatred for nazism and the Germans and contributed to destroy the last delusions about nazism among the conquered peoples.



The above drawing from one of the underground Czech papers represents the spring thaw of the Labe (Elba) River which flows from Czechoslovakia into Germany. The sign in the lower left-hand corner says, "To the Reich." The ice cakes show what remains of the Nazis returning to the Fatherland. The title of the paper is *Fight On,* and the subtitle states, "This paper is issued by the fraternity of the First Column."

Some idea of the increase of the underground activity during this year can be deduced from the statistics on German terror made by the Swedish paper *Geoteborg Handelstidningen* of September 4. The figures are based on German official notices as well as those of nazi-controlled agencies, and cover the period from August 1, 1941, to July 31, 1942. They also include "German-inspired" executions in vassal states, like Italy and Hungary.

In terms of two-month periods the executions have risen from 913 in August and September, 1941, to 2,881 for June and July, 1942. Yugoslavia heads the list with 2,897 victims; Czechoslovakia comes next with 1,391; then comes Poland with 1,091; France, 937; Greece, 405; Netherlands, 132; Belgium, 122; Norway, 92. The total, 7,450, is of course much smaller than the actual

number of deaths, but some indication is given of the relative intensity of the German terror in the various countries — and consequently of the underground activity — while comparison of the number of executions for 1941 and 1942 shows the increase in the movement of resistance.

Popular Resistance

IN speaking about underground activities we must make a clear distinction between the resistance carried on by the large masses of population, very often in a spontaneous manner, without organization or co-operative action, and the activity of small organized groups trying to co-ordinate their efforts and in general connected with their governments-in-exile or their friends abroad. Of course, there is a relation between these two forms of underground activity: the organized groups are trying to influence and direct popular resistance, and their efforts bring results; on the other hand, their activity would be impossible without general sympathy and popular support. The small number of revolutionaries who have been denounced by their countrymen for having perpetrated terrorist acts against the German authorities indicates this most clearly. In this connection, it is necessary to point out that organized resistance has always been only a small part of a people's opposition to tyranny and that often underground groups were isolated from the masses, acting in a sort of vacuum. The history of underground revolutionary movements has many examples of such groups whose activities were spectacular, showing an almost miraculous skill in the diffusion of their leaflets, in posting revolutionary slogans on walls, and so on, without achieving any significant political result. The story of the present underground movement in Europe is entirely different.

VŠEM DOBRÝM ČECHŮM

obývajícím v ulici dům čís.

Je naší povinností upozorniti Vás na to, že Vašem domě bydlí organisovaný ve „Vlajce".

Jistě Vám jest známo, že Vlajka jest hordou zkrachovaných existencí a pochybných individuí zaprodaných Němcům.

Tyto bezcharakterní stvůry schopné každé podlosti jsou placeny německými penězi, aby rozsévaly rozkol v národě.

Nikdo není před jejich udavačstvím Němcům jist a převážná většina členů jest placenými agenty Gestapo.

Každý poctivý Čech a čestný člověk jimi musí opovrhovat.

Pamatujte si je a buďte před nimi opatrní.

TO ALL LOYAL CZECHS

residing in the street of Building No.

It is our duty to call your attention to the fact that a member of the Vlajka lives in your house. You undoubtedly know that Vlajka is an organization of untrustworthy individuals who have sold out to the Germans. These unprincipled monsters are paid by German money to spread hostility within the nation. No one is safe from being reported to the Germans by them. Most of them are the paid agents of the Gestapo. Every true Czech and every honorable man can have no respect for them. Bear this in mind and be on guard.

The most elementary manifestation of opposition is the attitude of the population to the Germans and to their decrees and laws. From all parts of the continent we receive the same report: the Germans are socially ignored and boycotted by the population. In Denmark, where the nazi regime is the mildest, they tried, by every means, to establish social contacts with the Danes, but in vain. According to all available reports, the population behaves as if the occupying forces were non-existent, neither seeing nor hearing them. And the Nazis complain that Denmark is a "land of ice." In tiny Luxemburg the Germans cannot conquer the people either, notwithstanding the affinity of language. They have called the Luxemburgers, "the men with faces of stone"; Luxemburg intellectuals have accepted this designation and have clandestinely formed the "League of Stone Faces." In Holland, an official order was necessary to forbid the population from leaving public places when a German entered. In Czechoslovakia and Poland illegal journals publish the names of compatriots who carry on social relations with Germans and urge the population to boycott them.

This irreconcilable hostility toward the Germans is applied to their laws. There is a complete revolution going on in the minds of Europeans used to respect authority, law, and the courts. The nazi policy of violating all legal provisions has created a state of lawlessness, because the new German authorities and their procedures are not recognized as legal by the population. The violation of German ordinances is considered a national duty, we read in a report from Poland. The economic policy of the occupying authorities of creating artificial shortages by robbing all the resources of the occupied countries has created in all Europe a vast black market as the only means of avoiding starvation. The traffickers in the black market promote not only the circulation of commodities but also of news and stories throughout the country. Innumerable "smugglers" sabotage the German economic system, contribute to the disorganization of the administrative system by bribing German officials, who are ready to do anything for money, and diffuse the news which the

Germans would like to hide from the population.

Propaganda Against Propaganda

ONE cannot overrate the significance of the illegal information services in Europe today. All the attempts of German propaganda to break the spirit of the oppressed nations and to poison them with nazi ideology, to wake in them the feeling of German invincibility and superiority fail because of the circulation of news from abroad and of genuine information which defies the German lies—and of jokes and stories ridiculing the invader, playing up his weaknesses and failures. These reach the remotest corners of the country with amazing rapidity. Although listening to foreign broadcasts is severely forbidden in all German-occupied Europe, nevertheless, there is not a country where the people do not get news from abroad by radio. The organization and diffusion of news is the first task of the underground movement; a secret radio set and a staff of listeners is the first element of each illegal group.

Another elementary manifestation of collective resistance is the observation of national holidays or other traditional dates. News from all countries shows the same picture. The forms of the commemoration differ, but always it is a day of collective action against Germany. Czech resistance started on October 28, 1939, the twenty-first anniversary of Czechoslovakian independence, when all of Prague's inhabitants remained in their homes. In Holland it began in June, 1940, on the occasion of the birthday of Prince Bernhardt. French resistance started on November 11, 1940, the twenty-second anniversary of the Armistice, when the students demonstrated in the streets of Paris and were shot by the German soldiers.

In Warsaw, on Independence Day, November 11, 1941, walls, fences, and sidewalks bore inscriptions in chalk, paint, and tar: "Poland lives — Poland will win!" The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier was covered with flowers. Candles were lit. Wreaths and flowers were brought to the pedestals of different national monuments. At 6:30 P. M. on May 1, 1942, International Labor Day, French workers and their families, promenaded in front of the statue of the Republic or, where there was no statue in the town, before the City Hall, "symbol of liberties achieved by the French nation." On the occasion of the second anniversary of German invasion of Holland, Dutch flags were raised over many buildings in The Hague, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and other cities during the night of May 9, 1942, while the swastika was torn down from the headquarters of the German military commander in The Hague.

On July 21, 1942, Belgian Independence Day, the nazi commander in Brussels and in other Belgian cities issued an order prohibiting all demonstrations at Allied monuments commemorating the last war. But the Belgian public invented a way to defy the nazi order. They traveled in the streetcars which passed by the Allied monuments and threw wreaths and flowers from the windows. The street-car motormen slowed up at each memorial, and the passengers stood at attention during these unauthorized ceremonies.

Guerrilla Warfare

THE vast areas of Eastern Europe and the Balkans are the theater of the most effective form of organized resistance—guerrilla warfare. The guerrillas started first in Poland, in 1939, immediately after the defeat. German papers acknowledge incessant activity by Polish "bandits" armed with machine guns and automatics. Frequent raids on post offices provide the money for living and for carrying on operations.

The classical land of guerrilla warfare is Yugoslavia. No less than 80,000 Croats and 250,000 Serbs are engaged in the struggle against the Germans and Italians and also against members of their own pro-nazi Ustachi groups. This was graphically described in the article by Major Erwin Lessner in the May issue of FREE WORLD.

In the north near the Italian border in Slovenia between Celio and Triest and in the region around Ljubljana, a million Slovenes are continuing a twenty-five-year fight for freedom. Practically all Slovenian villages are said to be in the hands of Slovenian fighters for freedom although the Italians "control" four big cities and twenty medium-sized cities. The main fighting is now taking place in the Mount Kozora region.

Herzegovina in Montenegro, a mountainous area of 30,000 square kilometers, which is almost as large as Switzerland, is the center of General Mikhailovitch's command. He rules without much trouble from the Axis, issuing his own passports and collecting taxes. On the Serbian-Bulgarian border, constant warfare is being waged under Dragolube Jornaowitch and a number of Bulgarian Peasant party members have joined the Serbs. On the border between southern Hungary and Croatia near Srijem, the fighting flows over into Serbian territory annexed by Hungary. The Yugoslav Government-in-exile declared recently that General Draja Mikhailovitch "has pinned down for more than a year about thirty-six Axis divisions in occupied

Yugoslavia, thereby rendering enormous service to the Russians."

Some 30,000 Greek guerrillas, aided by 3,000 Britons, Australians, and New Zealanders, who remained after the main Allied forces evacuated Greece, are waging constant warfare on Axis troops from mountain hide-outs and inflicting substantial losses. One group of guerrillas operates on the Rhodope range of mountains under Major Douras, who commands 5,000 to 6,000 men.

Under Leonidas Papas, an old, peasant volunteer of the 1912 Balkan war, another band fights on the slopes of Mount Oeta, near the Thermopylae Pass. An even stronger force, estimated at 6,000 men, among whom are many Britons, is in hiding on Mount Parnassus. On Mount Taygetos, near the ruins of Sparta, a force which includes men left from the British Army, attacked the seaport of Calamata some months ago and stormed Italian police headquarters, killing the chief of police.

The strongest guerrilla force, of more than 12,000 men, is harassing the Germans on Crete, where heavy German reinforcements have recently been moved. These guerrillas are led by General George Mandakas, a national hero whose stronghold is in the White Mountains. They have made surprise night attacks on German garrisons at Canea and the Maleme airdrome, the scene of the German parachutists' descent in the spring of 1941. The Greeks gagged and knifed German patrols and crept through the streets to an ammunition dump which they blew up. Here, 1,200 men of the British imperial force are sharing the hardships of the Cretan guerrillas.

In the occupied parts of the Soviet Union, the guerrillas are in general connected with the regular forces of the Red Army. Their activity must be considered as a part of the activity of the Russian Army. Save some regions occupied in the first phase of the Soviet-German war, the guerrillas, with large participation of women, harass the invader throughout the country, attack the airdromes, destroy military trains, exterminate entire military formations. In some places the guerrillas are equipped with artillery and tanks. Here is the report of one guerrilla commander from Belorussia:

> We are camped in a virgin forest. Only people who guard our supplies stay in camp. Our main detachment is constantly on the march. The Nazis worry themselves to death hunting us. The population of the occupied villages love us as a mother loves her children, and keep us informed of the enemy's movements.

The Underground Press

THE first and at all times one of the most important activities of the organized underground groups is the dissemination of news. As soon as a group becomes active, it begins to issue chain letters, leaflets, and newspapers or magazines. If it is at all possible, a secret radio station is established for propaganda purposes. These organs of information give to their people the facts about conditions at home and abroad, unmask and refute German lies, and comment on current events. The underground press is also utilized in the battle against the nazi invaders: the names of traitors and quislings are published; instructions about the various forms of resistance are given; political programs in preparation for the future are discussed and advocated.

Such "illegal" papers are now published all over Europe; their influence is a hundred times greater than that of the publications of the Nazis and quislings. The past year has seen a tremendous growth and development in the underground press. According to the last estimate, there are now at least sixty such publications in France. At the Boulevard Haussmann in Paris, the Germans have set up a special office to deal with them. Large rewards are offered to spies for disclosing the identity of editors and distributors. Hundreds have been arrested; many have been shot. Notwithstanding this repression, new papers appear constantly. Some are mimeographed; others printed, sometimes with reproductions of drawings and even photographs.

A year ago, the French underground papers were mostly one-page affairs. Now, some of them print six or eight pages and in their columns the people often find the secret gov-

ernment communications and documents which the authorities try to hide from the public. By publishing excerpts from letters exchanged by Vichy and Berlin, they not only discredit the collaborationist Administration but they help to demoralize it because the various officials suspect and distrust each other for having disclosed the facts to the patriots. Similarly, information kept out of the legal papers by official censorship appears in these papers. It includes specific facts about the appropriation by the Germans of vast quantities of food in the unoccupied as well as occupied countries; the shooting of the hostages; the activities of the Free French under De Gaulle; the nazi terror in other occupied countries; and the military progress of the war. Recently, the underground press published editorials asking the French people to be patient and to avoid premature activities which would delay the ultimate victory.

To counteract the increasing influence of the publications, the German authorities have been bringing out quasi-illegal papers, like *L'Ouvrier Normand,* in which they attempt to exploit the prestige of the underground press for skillful pro-nazi propaganda.

Underground papers are rarely printed twice in the same place, as the police are constantly on the lookout for the "publishing houses." The need for moving from one hide-out to another forces many "dailies" to appear only once or twice a week; sometimes they are obliged to suspend publication for a couple of weeks while the plant is transferred to safer quarters. The illegal publications are distributed free of charge and the cost is made up by patriotic contributors who are in touch with underground activities. One of the most striking features of the underground press is the fact that the regular news service has now been established through a secret central agency which gets not only the regular information from all over the world but has special correspondence concerning the activities of the Free French forces on all the war fronts.

The Booklets of Poland

SINCE the suppression of the Polish newspapers at the beginning of the German occupation, some 150 secret periodicals of various kinds have made their appearance. Many of them have been in existence for nearly three years. As early as the beginning of October, 1939, copies of small secret newspapers—mimeographed or even written by hand—were being passed from hand to hand. It is indicative of the amazing developments in the underground movement that today the great majority of the secret periodicals are printed.

The format of all these journals is adapted to the dangerous conditions of publication and distribution. Usually they are in the form of a small booklet of not over sixteen pages. Some of them are quite good specimens of the printer's art and contain reproductions. Others are more primitive in style. The public realizes that these are due to the great difficulties with which the Polish journalists and printers have to contend in their highly dangerous activities. Although the majority are weekly newspapers, numerous *Bulletins* which give wireless news take the place of dailies, and some of these have two and even four editions every day.

In view of the danger, an amazingly large number of these papers are distributed. Many of them print over ten thousand copies, and since each copy of an illegal paper is much more widely circulated and read than any ordinary newspaper, it is obvious that their circulation covers the country. To reduce the possibility of discovery by Gestapo agents and their spies, each distributor knows only one or two persons in the general organization and supplies copies to very few readers, but there are thousands of volunteers for this dangerous work.

The underground press in Poland has been so successful that it has actually dared to diversify the various periodicals. There are farm journals, youth publications, and even several humorous papers. There are numerous Hebrew and Yiddish publications and organs of all shades of political opinion of which the liberal and progressive papers are the strongest. Besides the news about Poland and general military information, the secret press reports systematically on the underground struggle throughout Europe, and devotes much space to sabotage and guerrilla activities.

An important document of underground Poland is a "Manifesto to the Peoples of the World," published by the organization called Working Masses of Poland, whose recent secret conference brought together representatives of 2,000 organized groups of workers, peasants, and non-manual workers from all parts of the country. The manifesto formulates a program of the future which is elaborated in a thirty-two-page booklet, The Tribune of Nations. The new spirit of European unity can be judged from the following excerpt:

> There can be no return to the old Europe—neither to pre-1939 Poland nor to pre-1940 France. It is impossible to go back to yesterday, to the Europe of Versailles, torn by economic and social contradictions, corroded by fascism, paralyzed by the constant menace of war.

Other Voices

PATRIOTIC Norwegians realized in the fall of 1940 that steps would have to be taken to counteract nazi propaganda and to provide a news service based on truth. At first, small groups of Norwegians began, here and there, to issue mimeographed leaflets and to send chain letters containing patriotic poems and inspiring messages through the mail. Gradually, however, the underground news service became better organized, until by the summer of last year there were at least a score of different illegal papers appearing at regular intervals and with circulations exceeding the officially tolerated press.



Above we reproduce the heads of three leaflets published in Poland, May 1, 1942. Tradition has established this day as holy to the revolutionary worker. From left to right, the two upper leaflets read as follows: Long life to the federation of all the peoples of the world. Fight every day against the occupying forces for an independent socialist Poland. The lower leaflet states: Workers of Warsaw! The day of Hitler's defeat is near. Be prepared for a revolutionary fight for freedom — independence — socialism.

Among the most popular underground papers are *Tidens Tegn* and *Fri Fagbevegelse*. The first of these is the continuation in mimeographed form of one of the oldest and most respected Oslo newspapers, which closed down early last year because its editors were unwilling to submit to the increasing pressure of the German censorship. *Fri Fagbevegelse* is the organ of the underground Trade Union leaders, who use it as a means of maintaining contact with members. Experiments with printed papers have been made, but it has been found that this makes the possibility of discovery by the Gestapo very much greater. Nearly all the papers contain a request to the readers to make further copies of them and distribute them among friends.

The influence of the nazi-controlled Belgian press is outweighed by the numerous underground papers which are published regularly and distributed widely. The former Belgian Minister, Arthur Wauters, recently estimated the number of these underground publications at fifty, with a circulation of 100,000 copies. The famous underground paper, published bilingually in French and Flemish, as *La Libre Belgique* or *België Vrij*, which was a nuisance to the Imperial German government during the first world war, has been resurrected. A Flemish underground leaflet, FREE FLANDERS, warns the citizens of Aalst against the traitors. Each name is followed by the sums of money paid these traitors by the Gestapo.

The newest underground papers are the four-page Greek *Elpsis* (Hope), written in French, in order, as its editors explain, that it may be read by as many Europeans as possible, and an eight-page, type-written news-letter in Danish, *Free Denmark*.

Prospects

TO understand the importance of the underground movement, it is necessary to realize that the groups which compose it are the remains of powerful organizations active in political and economic life of the countries before the war: trade unions, co-operatives, political parties, and religious societies. But their ideological differences are now postponed for the future; in all countries the only line drawn at present is between the collaborators with Germany and the participants of the movement of resistance. In France, for instance, the representatives of the former syndicalist unions and the Christian unions, who were on bad terms before the war, are now working closely together on the Committee of the French Labor Movement.

In their relations with the outside world, therefore, the underground groups of each country present a united front and arrange among themselves the functions and activities for which they require aid from the outside. The governments-in-exile and other governments of the United Nations give them regular and systematic help ranging from weapons and munitions, especially for the guerrillas, to radio sets and supplies for illegal newspapers.

An interesting form of propaganda is the diffusion by the R.A.F. of miniature newspapers printed in Britain. The midget newspapers carried regularly by the bomber command are well informed, well illustrated, and set in good clear type. These papers print about 10,000 words of news on a tiny sheet which, rolled into a cylinder, would pass as a cigarette. The standard size is four pages, eight by five inches, with three columns to the page. Printed on modern high-speed rotary presses, they are automatically folded and counted and packed into "bricks" of 500. They are taken to the R.A.F. bomber stations throughout Britain, where they are loaded and flown to France, Holland, Belgium, and Germany, and there released through flare-shoots in the bomber floors. Each little paper has its own staff of men and women writers, some of them internationally famous. There is no fixed publishing day. After a lull in bombing operations, several editions may be carried in a single expedition.

When one observes the amazing work of the underground struggle in Europe, the heroism of the population, the unbroken resistance and high spirit, one may get the impression that this state can continue for a long time. This is a dangerous illusion. The force of resistance is not unlimited: terror and repression resulting in conditions of misery, starvation, and extermination of entire cities have their effect.

Outlawed and persecuted like wild beasts, men become tired. It may soon be impossible to increase the resistance, even to carry on, without decisive action from abroad. The life of underground Europe depends upon a short war and defeat of the enemy before the Germans succeed in achieving the physical and moral extermination of all active elements. It is necessary to strike while the guerrillas of Eastern and Southern Europe are maintaining their second fronts, while the workers of Europe are sabotaging the German industrial machine, the railwaymen wrecking the nazi communications, the underground press sustaining the morale of the population. The soldiers of underground Europe, soldiers without uniforms, surrounded from all sides by the foe, are looking for help from their American and English allies, with the hope that this time it will not come too late.

A FREE WORLD CHECK LIST of BOOKS

RUSSIA AND THE BATTLE OF LIBERATION, by Charles S. Seeley. 114 *pages. Dorrance;* $1.00

RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC FRONT FOR WAR AND PEACE, AN APPRAISAL OF THE THREE FIVE-YEAR PLANS, by A. Yugow. LX + 279 pages. Harpers; $3.00

SOVIET ASIA, DEMOCRACY'S FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE, by Raymond Arthur Davies and Andrew J. Steiger. XIII + 384 *pages. Dial Press;* $3.00

Russia's gallant defense against the nazi onslaught and our own national interest in that defense have produced a new wave of popular interest in the nature and workings of the Soviet Union. This interest has produced the inevitable crop of books designed to appeal to a reading public which, until last year, thought of Russia only as the "Red Menace." Three such books, destined, no doubt, to be followed by scores of others, are listed above. In a sense they are as varied in their approach as the many-faceted subject with which they deal.

For those who have no previous knowledge of Russia, and who do not mind a garrulity which destroys all attempts at organization, Commander Seeley (who, incidentally, is a retired U. S. naval officer) has written a painfully elementary little book. It is amusing at times, but its charm consists in the insight which it gives into the character of the author and not into the workings of the Soviet Union. Recommended only for the kindergarten class of Russian students.

Mr. Yugow's book is of a far different sort. Bristling with statistics and with footnotes referring to Russian sources, it contains a first-rate analysis of the character, successes, and shortcomings of Russian economic planning. The author is generally sympathetic to the aims of the Soviet State but he does not believe that a genuine planning stage has yet been reached. Specifically, he regards Soviet economy as "a state-operated economy, but . . . not an economy operated under a planning system, with coordinated constituent parts, with a harmonious development free from crises." With victory over the Axis, bringing about a "radical social and economic transformation of Europe," the dictatorship period of the U. S. S. R. will be outgrown and the socialist elements "existing in its socio-economic framework will develop and grow strong." Recommended reading for serious-minded students of Russian economic organization and operation.

"Soviet Asia" is a good companion-piece to John Scott's "Behind the Urals," which was noted in this column recently. The authors have traveled widely throughout Asiatic Russia and, in addition, they have read exhaustively about its peoples, resources, and history. Their book is a *mélange* of travel experiences, natural history, the Soviet equivalent of the "World Almanac," and a portion of anthropology thrown in for good measure. From first to last it is eminently readable, and the reader soon is led to feel with the authors that this vast, undeveloped, and little-known land represents one of the world's greatest frontiers for the future. Recommended especially for Aunt Isabel who is preparing a paper on *Russia, its Past, Present, and Future* for the fall meeting of her Woman's Study Club.

GRAYSON KIRK

JEWS IN A GENTILE WORLD, by Isacque Graeber and Steuart Henderson Britt, and others. 436 *pages. Macmillan;* $4.00

Perhaps no important subject in the world is more often treated according to the famous method of the literary critic of the *Eatanswill Gazette* than the problem of the Jewish people. It will be recalled that Mr. Pott, the eminent publisher of that vigorous periodical, disclosed to Mr. Pickwick the great simplicity and efficacy of that method as applied by his critic to the subject of Chinese metaphysics.

"An abstruse subject I should conceive," said Mr. Pickwick.

"Very, sir," responded Pott, looking intensely sage. "He *crammed* for it, to use a technical but expressive term; he read up for the subject, at my desire, in the *Encyclopedia Britannica.*"

"Indeed!" said Mr. Pickwick; "I was not aware that that valuable work contained any information respecting Chinese metaphysics."

"He read, sir," rejoined Pott, laying his hand on Mr. Pickwick's knee, and looking round with a smile of intellectual superiority, "he read for metaphysics under the letter M, and for China under the letter C, and combined his information, sir!"

Unfortunately, most of the authors in this ambitious work have also emulated this method which, to quote Mr. Pott again, "excited such general—I may say, such universal—attention and admiration." Unquestionably authorities in their own respective fields, they have looked at the generalized data, whether personal or academic, so readily available, and "combined the information."

With the notable exception of the astute analysis by Professor Carl J. Friedrich and the four chapters which constitute the section, The American Scene, the various essays fall into two categories. There are the statistical studies which are limited in the presentation of their facts by the difficulties of obtaining scientifically reliable material, and there are the far-fetched applications of sociological and psychological theories to an imperfectly known subject. In neither case do the results contribute much to an understanding of the Jew or of his position in Gentile society.

Now the fact is that at no time in modern history was a thorough and thoughtful book about the Jews more necessary. For on general grounds, when the emotional and ideological foundations of our civilization have been shaken by the foul eruption of nazi-fascism, it is essential to apply penetrating analysis to accurate information in the revaluation of all the components which make up our society, and in the reconsideration of all the phenomena which constitute our so-called progress. But more specifically, a real understanding of the Jewish problem and its solution are indispensable to intelligent planning for a better world, because the fascist and reactionary forces have found that the Jew is the most vulnerable point of attack in their political offensive against democratic governments and the institutions of democracy. So long as the Jew remains a problem, so long will democracy—and liberty and justice and decency—be menaced by those who are willing to exploit the hatreds and prejudices of two thousand years, which now form the inner image of the Jew to the masses of men.

Surely a realization of this one fact among all the other important ramifications of the Jewish question would have proved that the subject deserves more time for research and thought than Potts' critic spent on his masterpiece on Chinese metaphysics.

JOHAN J. SMERTENKO

THE NEW FREEDOM OF THE SEAS, by W. Arnold Forster. 134 pages. Methuen & Co., Ltd.; 6 shillings net.

Arnold Forster, who for many years worked untiringly for collective security and international organization, has written an excellent book on the freedom of the seas which we hope will soon be published in the United States. This book, though written before the United States entered the war, foresees the great role which this country may play in a system of permanent security.

Students of international organization will find Mr. Forster's study of great value. The author understands clearly that equal freedom of navigation on the high seas is only the beginning of the policy of freedom because, "unless measures are taken to assure an equitable distribution of the world's shipping resources, such an assurance is no better than the proverbial assurance of freedom to dine at the Ritz."

Mr. Forster's work has the additional advantage of not having limited itself to the technical aspects of one of the great international problems. He has included the freedom of the seas in the system of general security. He well understands that disarmament and security cannot remain unilateral for long, and that "the only lasting argument for security is that based on a real equality of rights." There is one suggestion we should like to submit to Mr. Forster, in case his book is published in this country: that is to include in his treatment a consideration of democracy and freedom, which are indispensable conditions to the creation of such an order as Mr. Forster envisages.

L. D.

AGENDA FOR A POST-WAR WORLD, by J. B. Condliffe. 232 pages. Norton; $2.50

There will never be too many good books on world reconstruction. Mr. Condliffe's book is an excellent addition to the still small library on this vital subject. Proceeding from the premise that "it is indeed unlikely that either the war or the peace will be won unless the foundations of a freer post-war world are laid in the course of the fighting of the war," the author organizes his material well. He examines both the failures of the past and the complexity of the coming tasks, particularly the problem of inflation.

"An *Economic Consequences of the Peace* written in the future tense."
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

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

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An examination of the failures of the past, despite the impatience of some superficial "planners" with everything which is history, is essential for the establishment of the principles and methods of the future international organization.

But Mr. Condliffe's chief contribution to postwar thinking is the remarkable analysis indicating the limits of regionalism and proving that there is no other means of insuring peace in the world than by some effective international force. The chapters on economic co-operation are on an equally high factual and intellectual plane. The author's conclusion regarding the responsibility of the United States in the utilization of the world's resources and in preserving peace is backed by solid arguments.

The definition of the policy which the United States should follow is of an essential importance precisely because of the great influence it now has in world affairs. Mr. Condliffe's book is extremely valuable in analyzing the essential facts which must be taken into account if this influence is to benefit not only this hemisphere but the whole world. Mr. Condliffe's book is particularly commendable because it never attempts to give easy solutions for one of the most complicated but also most important problems of our century.

L. D.

A DOMESTIC MANIFESTO, by Emery Reves. 144 *pages. Random House;* $1.50

Mr. Reves' manifesto to humanity is the expression of a belief that half measures are no longer sufficient to establish a new world order. He insists, rightly, on the necessity of combining international law with international force in order to make aggression impossible. The strongest point in Mr. Reves' book is the necessity of restricting national sovereignty in the interest of world organization. Here lies one of the fundamental problems of our time, since the duration and stability of peace which will come after the defeat of the Axis will depend on the acceptance of limitations in this sphere. Mr. Reves also makes valuable suggestions when he says that enemies of freedom should not be permitted to benefit from its privileges. Had the European countries understood the necessity of outlawing fascism, the international situation might have been quite different at present. Nevertheless, we wish Mr. Reves had examined some important economic and social aspects of international organization. His omission of these aspects was intentional because he considers that the political problem comes first. We disagree with him on this question because we think there is a very definite interdependence among all of them. The problems of the working class and of the farmers and of all the poorer groups are not treated in his book. But the author has had the courage to tackle the fundamental and most debated issues—and has therefore made an excellent contribution to contemporary thinking on world organization.

GREECE FIGHTS, edited by Homer W. Davis. 96 *pages. American Friends of Greece;* $1.00

Americans who saw the Greek soldiers rolling toward the Albanian front in taxis, private cars, buses, trucks, buggies, and carts, who heard them shout the blood-curdling "Aera," tell what they saw for the glory and aid of Greece. They say that Greece will live again because the real triumph belongs to those "for whom freedom is the breath of life itself, and death—just an episode." The writers include Lincoln MacVeigh, American Minister to Greece, Homer Davis, President of Athens College, Leland Stowe, whose newspaper reports of the Greek campaigns stirred this country's admiration in the bitter winter of 1941, and a dozen others—business men, nurses, welfare directors, teachers, librarians—whose vivid testimony will inspire a determination in all who believe in freedom to repay the people of Greece for their miraculous stand against the nazi machine. In these days, when the Nazis are making this valiant people pay for their heroic defense by a policy of starvation, it is well to know how Greece has fought—and that she still fights on. Definitely recommended.

STRATEGIC MATERIALS AND NATIONAL STRENGTH, by Harry N. Holmes. 106 *pages, maps. Macmillan;* $1.75

This little book has been prepared by the president of the American Chemical Society. If it lacks the emotional bias usually injected into discussions of critical materials—synthetic rubber for instance—it is far more scientific and objective. It is perhaps somewhat more kindly towards industrialists and others who promoted shortages than it needs to be. But it offers a very valuable survey of the situation which existed two or three months ago, for events change so rapidly that such books cannot long be accurate. Various chapters give information on such stock piles as we had, name the thirty most vital war raw materials, and then discuss in some detail rubber, metals, explosives, war gases, gasoline and lubricants, foods and fibers; also what is likely to be missing around the house, unexpected problems, material of which we have an abundance, and future prospects.

WHO'S WHO IN THIS ISSUE

SIR NORMAN ANGELL, Nobel Peace Prize winner in 1933, is a frequent contributor to FREE WORLD. He is the author of Hazards? in the February issue and of the Price of National Freedom, in July. He has taken part in several Round Tables and is widely known as a student of international affairs. The most famous of his books on world politics is "The Great Illusion."

GERMAN ARCINIEGAS, Minister of Education of the Republic of Colombia, issued an eloquent appeal in the March number of FREE WORLD to the Latin American nations to join actively in the struggle against the Axis Powers.

WILLIAM ROSE BENÉT, Editor of the *Saturday Review of Literature,* is one of the most noted American poets. His latest books of verse are "With Wings As Eagles" and "The Dust Which Is God."

BALDOMERO SANIN CANO, a distinguished South American scholar, was formerly Colombian Ambassador to to Argentina and a delegate to the Pan-American Conference in Lima in 1938. His work has been published in English, Spanish, and Latin American periodicals.

LORD ROBERT CECIL, Nobel Peace Prize winner for 1937, is co-president of the League of Nations Union and of the International Peace Campaign.

GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S message is in his own handwriting and was sent to us by air mail.

RAYMOND CLAPPER is a nationally known commentator on political events whose column is syndicated by the Scripps-Howard newspapers.

PIERRE MENDÈS FRANCE, Deputy of L'Eure and Undersecretary of State for the Treasury of France, served as Lieutenant in the air force in Syria before the war and in France during the war. He will return to service soon as a Captain in the Fighting French Air Corps. A later issue of FREE WORLD will present his story of the famous trial where he was sentenced to six years' imprisonment by the Vichy judges. This also forms a chapter of his book to be published by Didier this fall.

AMÉRICO GHIOLDI, whose article for this issue came by air mail from Argentina, is leader of the socialist group in the Argentine Parliament, Editor of *Vanguardia,* and Professor at the University of La Plata. To FREE WORLD he contributed in the December issue Winds That Sway the Pampas, and in May, The Drama of Argentine Youth.

GRAYSON KIRK, Professor of Government at Columbia University, is now on leave-of-absence to work for the Department of State. His book reviews appear regularly in FREE WORLD.

THOMAS MANN, winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature, is one of the greatest contemporary authors.

FREDERICK C. McKEE, Vice-President of the West Penn Cement Com-

pany, is Chairman of the Finance Committee of Free World Association and Chairman of Citizens for Victory.

WALTER MILLIS, an editorial writer for the New York *Herald Tribune,* is author of "The Road to War." In our first issue, we published his article, American Foreign Policy: A Symphony Without a Score, and in the February issue, Our Part in a New World.

HUGH MOORE, President of the Dixie Vortex Company, is Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Free World Association.

FERNANDO ORTIZ, Chairman of the Cuban Alliance for a Free World, is Editor of *Ultra* (Havana).

ARTHUR UPHAM POPE, Chairman of the President's Committee on National Morale, was attached to the General Staff of the United States Army during the first World War. As an authority on social psychology, he participated in our March Round Table on American Propaganda.

MANUEL SEAONE, Aprista leader, former Deputy of Lima, Peru, is Editor of *Ercilla* (Santiago de Chile).

WILLIAM L. SHIRER, author of "Berlin Diary," is a noted news commentator for the Columbia Broadcasting System.

JAMES F. SHOTWELL is Director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Chairman of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace.

J. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Spanish Republic, is Executive Director of the Free World Association. He has written many articles for FREE WORLD, among which are The Potential Forces of the Democracies, in the March issue and Free World at Work, in the June issue.

ANTONIO VELAO, parliamentary leader of the Republican Party in Spain, is President of the Spanish Democratic Union and was Minister of Public Works in the Loyalist Government.

TOM WINTRINGHAM, who was commander of the British battalion of the International Brigade in Spain and has served as head of training of the British Home Guard, is an expert in military strategy and a signer of the nine-point declaration supported jointly by the British independent political groups, "Forward March" and "1941 Committee."

In the November issue FREE WORLD will install a special section covering books on international affairs. Each month we shall publish a critical analysis of one outstanding work in this field and with it a check list of forthcoming books with recommendations by the Editors.

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